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Abstract
The Islamic golden age under the Abbasids opened up the opportunity for Christian
thinkers to present several apologies for the doctrine of the Trinity in Islamic context. This study
examines the status of the Arabic church in the eighth to tenth centuries, especially the trinitarian
apologies of John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adi against Islamic
misunderstanding of the Trinity and its probable cause, in order to come up with trinitarian
apologetics that answer Islamic objections and that will be useful for the present day. While both
Christians and Muslims agree that human beings will never be able to fully perceive God in their
own minds, they both agree that God should be the greatest conceived being in order for people
to believe in him. Basing the argument on this common ground, this study shall show that the
greatest conceived being should be relational—intra-relational within himself and inter-relational
with his creation—and the Trinity is the only model that shows the divine being eternally
relational.

iv

General Introduction
From humankind’s earliest history, philosophers and theologians have pondered the
nature of God. Is God a mystery, or can He be known? If He can be known, what are his nature,
attributes, and characteristics? What is His relationship to creation, and how is He supposed to be
worshipped? Several religions came up with different answers to these questions and diverging
understandings of the nature of the deity.
The Christian understanding of the divine nature is trinitarian. 1 God lives forever in intrarelationship never alone because He is one God living in an eternal coinhering community of
equals. Christians settled their debates about the trinitarian nature of God in the Nicene creed in
AD 325 and 381 and the nature of Jesus in the council of Chalcedon in AD 451. However, when
Muslims expanded beyond the Arabic peninsula and invaded the Levant (contemporary Syria,
Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan), Arabophone Christian theologians and philosophers found
themselves obligated to defend the Trinity against tawḥīd (the absolute oneness of Allah)—the
Islamic understanding of the divine. 2 Allah is alone, without a partner, rival, or equal.
Around AD 750, the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyad caliphate and reigned until they
were destroyed by the Mongols in AD 1258. This period is known as the Golden Age of Islamic
scholarship because of the translation movements that took place. This movement began with the
Arabization of the administration of the empire by the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik ibn
Marwan (AD 646-705) in the seventh century. This movement made the Arabic language the
Muslim lingua franca. Up to this point, Christian communities had preserved Greek learning in

1
John 1:1; 17; 20:28; Matthew 28:18-20; Philippians 2:6-9; Hebrews 1:1-3, Revelation 1:5-9; 22:13; Mark
14:62; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Romans 9:5; Titus 2:13.

Muminoon 23: 84-89; Surah az-Zukhruf 43: 9; Surah az-Zukhruf 43: 87; Surah al-Ankaboot 29: 63; Surah
az-Zumar 39: 3; Surah Yunus 10: 18; Surah al-Kafiroon 109: 2-5; Surah Sad 38: 5; Surah al-Mumtahinah 60: 24;
Surah al-Fath 48: 6.
2
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their libraries and monasteries in Alexandria, Antioch, and Edessa. Therefore, they were able to
contribute to this translation movement and to the dialogue between Christians and Muslims.
This era witnessed many conversations and discussions between Muslims and Christians
about the nature of the deity in each religion. This dialogue served as an instrument by which
authors would intellectually verify and defend their positions while critiquing their opponent’s
worldview. During this period, many Christian theologians and philosophers left written
documents explaining the differences of the nature of Allah (both were calling God Allah in
Arabic) and defending the Trinity. This study shall focus primarily on two Christian
theologians—John of Damascus (died in AD 749) and Theodore Abū Qurrah (died in AD 820)
—as well as one philosopher Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī (died AD 974). 3 These three Christian scholars
came from different backgrounds and defended the Trinity in three dissimilar constructions.
The history of Christian-Muslim relations, especially in the Abbasid era, sheds great light on the
inter-religious dialogue between Christians and Muslims. It provides contemporary Christians
with many insights for interacting fruitfully and effectively with Muslims without compromising
the nature of the Christian Gospel. Today’s Christians might not realize that early Arab
Christians faced several objections to the Trinity when Islam expanded to the Levant. This study,
therefore, aims to prevent contemporary Christians from re-inventing the wheel and missing the
positive contributions of early Christian-Muslim history.
Rationale and Need
This dissertation relates to the philosophy of religion, to theology, and to medieval
Christian history. The study will cover the times between the end of the Umayyad and early
Abbasid dynasty. The period between the eighth and the tenth centuries, known as the Golden
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John of Damascus is also known as John Damascene. I will refer to him with John.
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Age of Islam, is considered an illustrious period of Muslim-Christian interaction. As mentioned
above, the early centuries of the Abbasid era were a period when Muslims became increasingly
eager to validate their beliefs in light of the challenges confronting them by more educated
Christians. The doctrine of the Trinity is one of these challenges, and it is inevitably discussed in
terms of the ṣifāt Allāh (the beautiful names of God) found in the Qur’an. During that time, the
Arabic church produced several theologians and philosophers eager to answer the trinitarian
theological objection, and thus their works deserve to be known in the West.
The academy needs Eastern Christian Scholars; their expertise would be especially
beneficial because the research is still in its infancy. Unfortunately, few academics write on John
of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī; the ones who do are mostly Arabs,
and many of their studies are not translated to English. Few Western scholars have attempted to
introduce and translate their works and they are still, in my opinion, underrepresented in Western
scholarship. This study therefore attempts to bridge the gap between the East and the West by
shedding light on the Islamic context of Arab scholars and how they were able to defend their
Christian faith.
Despite the primary and secondary resources that are available on John of Damascus,
Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī, there are not many academic works written on their
arguments for the Trinity, especially when compared to those of early, medieval, and reformed
theologians, such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. A small number of monographs were
written on the life and the work of each of these scholars, but few focused on their methodology
in examining and explaining the Trinity in their Islamic surroundings. To my knowledge, no
scholars have used or developed the arguments of these three Arab scholars to defend the Trinity.

3

In addition to reporting the historical data that is collected from Arabic and non-Arabic
resources of John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī, this study will seek
to trace the sources of the Islamic Trinity in the Qur’an, especially the idea of including Mary in
the Trinity. 4 This investigation is needed because a few studies have stated that Mohammad
derived his information from cultic Christianity that was spreading in the Arabic peninsula at that
time. Although this hypothesis might be true, there might be another influence on Mohammad’s
belief, one related to the veneration of icons in the church. Therefore, this study shall investigate
the possible influence of the Theotokos icons and how their presence in cathedrals came to
influence Muslim understanding of the veneration of Mary and their eventual inclusion of her in
the Trinity. To my knowledge, no other studies have investigated this influence.
The value of this study is to bring Eastern and Western scholarship together by shedding
light on an area of history that is ambiguous and not very well known. I hope that this study
becomes a great aid for scholars of history, theology, and apologetics as they seek to develop
their arguments about the Trinity. Even laymen would benefit greatly from understanding the
history behind the current defense of the Trinity and learn how to defend the Trinity themselves
in Islamic context.
Research Problem, Sub-questions, Limitations, and Terms
The main question this study is asking is this: “Does the Trinity make sense?” Christians
and Muslims agree that human beings will never fully perceive God in their minds. For both,
God is an unlimited infinite divine being, and they are limited finite human beings. However,
while Muslims think that God should make sense in order for human beings to believe in him,
Christians believe that human beings are capable of perceiving limited aspects of God—the ones

4

The Trinity as it is being understood in the Qur’an.
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that He has revealed to them. Founding their belief on the biblical data, the early church
perceived God as a trinitarian in nature. Today, Christians still accept the Nicene and the
Chalcedonian definitions of God as a Trinity and consider them logical. They believe that the
Trinity makes perfect sense based on the relational aspect of God’s nature. In order to address
whether the Trinity makes sense, sub-questions should be asked further: How do Muslims and
Christians perceive the Trinity? How do the Arabic Medieval fathers, such as John of Damascus,
Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī understand and explain the Trinity to Muslims? How
do they differ and agree with the Nicene and the Chalcedonian creeds? Do their perceptions of
the Trinity vary among each other? How can contemporary scholars benefit from their
explanations of the Trinity?
This study does not seek to criticize the Islamic belief in tawḥīd as much as it attempts to
further the dialogue between the two religions. This study does not intend to investigate whether
Christians and Muslims believe in the same God. However, since this topic is related to the
study, it will appear in the conclusion. The principal aim is to inform the readers about the
historical contexts of John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī. The study
will examine how they defended the Trinity in their medieval Islamic surroundings and will
build on their arguments to further the conversation with contemporary Muslims. Furthermore,
this study does not seek to re-define the historical understanding of Trinitarian orthodoxy or
come up with a new perception. The study will adhere to the Nicene and the Chalcedonian
definitions of the apostolic faith, which is based on the Bible.
Since the study does not aim to compare tawḥīd and the Trinity, the use of polemic
language against Islamic theology and their understanding of tawḥīd will be minimized, except
for language used by the three chosen scholars in their arguments. In the final section of the
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study, the relational aspect of the nature of God will be emphasized. This emphasis might be
perceived by some as a criticism of tawḥīd.
In these discussions, the study will use Greek, Arabic , and English terms related to the
topic of the Trinity: Greek terms such as Theotokos, hypostasis, ousia, and perichoresis; and
Arabic terms such as Iqnūm (singular)/Aqanīm (plural) أﻗﺎﻧﯾم/ اﻗﻧومand the beautiful names of Allah
اﺳﻣﺎء ﷲ اﻟﺣﺳﻧﻰ.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Theotokos means “the ‘one
who gave birth to God’ … The word was used of the Virgin by the Greek Fathers (perhaps by
Origen and possibly even by Hippolytus) and increasingly became a popular term of devotion).” 5
This word will appear in the section in which the investigation about the Islamic Trinity is made.
According to Athanasius, Hypostasis “is substance and means nothing else than that
which exists.” 6 For in comparing the person of the Son with the person of the Father, the writer
to the Hebrews calls him “the exact representation of his being” of the subsistence of the Father
(Heb 1:3). 7
Perichōrēsis is the relational aspect of the Trinity. It is the intertwining, inexistence, and
immanence of the divine persons. According to Thomas H. McCall, “The divine hypostases are
genuinely distinct, and they are related to one another in the interpersonal perichōrēsis of holy

F. L. Cross and Elizabeth A. Livingstone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1619.
5

6

NPNF2, 4:490.

7
Unless otherwise noted, all biblical passages referenced are in the New International Version (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008).
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love.” 8 The divine persons/Aqanīm are three fully personal and fully divine entities who know
and love one another.
Ousia or essence denotes the whatness of a thing. It designates the real being of God.
According to Francis Turretin, the essence is “often met with in Scripture, not only in the
concrete when God is cladded on (Ex. 3:14; Rev. 1:4), but also in the abstract when deity
(theotēs, Col. 2:9), nature (physis, Gal. 4:8), divine nature (theia physis, 2 Pet. 1:4) is attributed
to God.” 9
Iqnūm/Aqanīm (singular/plural) is a word early Arab fathers used in the defense of the
Trinity as a result of the usage of their fellow Syriac fathers to express the difference in meaning
between the human person and the divine person. Sweetman mentions that the Syriac word
 ܩܢܘܡܐuqnūm was accepted and widely used without causing any debate or quarrel because of its

use in the Syriac translation of John 5:26. 10 This is important to establish because the word
9F

Iqnūm/Aqanīm will be used repeatedly in this study.
Arab-Syriac apologists believe that it is hard for Muslims to understand the concept of
the Trinity in a metaphysical sense as opposed to a simple numerical one. Therefore, they
decided to create a new word to convey the idea of the divine person and illuminate the
similarities with the concept of a human person as they understood them. According to Imad
Shehadeh, a leading contemporary scholar on the subject of the Trinity in Jordan, “The only
benefit from using this word [uqnūm] in Arabic language is to distance the word ‘person’ from

Thomas H. McCall, “Relational Trinity: Creedal Perspective,” in Two Views on The Doctrine of the
Trinity (MI: Zondervan, 2014), 129.
8

James T. Dennison, Jr. Ed. Francis Turretin Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans., George Musgrave
Giger, Vol. 1, (NJ: P&R, 1992), 253.
9

10
James W. Sweetman, Theology Islam and Christian Theology: A Study of the Interpretation of
Theological ideas in the Two Religions, vol. 2, (London, UK: Lutterworth Press, 1945), 225-226.
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God and substitute it with a foreign and an unknown word that conveys its meaning.” 11 In other
words, dedicating a special terminology to the divine person indicates a special meaning and
illuminates the confusion with Muslims approached the human/physical meaning of the word
person. Furthermore, Awad Sim’an, who is a leading Arab Christian scholar on the subject of the
Trinity in Egypt, defines uqnūm in the following way:
The word Aqanīm differs totally from the word ‘persons,’ the one that is used in Arabic
language and its synonyms in other languages, in two ways: a) ‘persons’ have separate
essences from each other. Whereas, Aqanīm means one essence, which is the essence of
God who does not have associates, or anyone like him. b) Even if persons participate in
one nature, none of them has the same qualities, attributes, or characteristics of the others.
Whereas regarding the Aqanīm, despite the fact that they are distinct from each other
regarding the person, they are one in essence with all its qualities, attributes, and
characteristics of the other because they are the essence of the one God. 12
This definition is needed to avoid the modern concept of a person as merely an individual will
and consciousness, an understanding which would inevitably leads to tritheism. The divine
Aqanīm (persons) are three in a way that does not apply to human persons and cannot be read off
from human experience apart from divine revelation.
Asmā’ Allah al-Husnā means “the beautiful names of Allah” (Surah 7:180; 17:110).
These names are understood to refer to the divine essence and act. Therefore, understanding the
names of Allah is foundational to Islamic theology, especially to an inquiry into the nature and
characteristics of the deity. The attributes that Muslims impute to Allah reflect who he is and

Imad Shehadeh,  ﺿرورة اﻟﺗﻌددﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟوﺣداﻧﯾﺔ اﻻﻟﮭﯾﺔ: آﻣﯾن،[ اﻵب واﻻﺑن واﻟروح اﻟﻘدس اﻟﮫ واﺣدThe father and the Son
and the Holy Spirit On God Amin: the Necessity of the multiplicity in the divine oneness], (al-Matin, Lebanon: Dar
al-Manhal, 2009), 31. The original Arabic renders as: “ اﻟﻔﺎﺋدة اﻟوﺣﯾدة ﻓﻲ اﺳﺗﺧدام ھذه اﻟﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ ھﻲ اﺑﻌﺎد ﻛﻠﻣﺔ
.”’اﻟﺷﺧص’ ﻋن ﷲ واﺳﺗﺑداﻟﮭﺎ ﺑﻛﻠﻣﺔ اﺟﻧﺑﯾﺔ ﻏﯾر ﻣﻌروﻓﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻧﺎھﺎ
11

Awad Sim’an, [ ﷲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺳﯾﺣﯾﺔGod in Christianity] (Cairo, Egypt: Qassir Ad-Dubara Church, 2004), 16.
The original Arabic renders as: “ وﻛﻠﻣﺔ اﻗﺎﻧﯾم ﺗﺧﺗﻠف ﻛل اﻻﺧﺗﻼف ﻋن ﻛﻠﻣﺔ ’أﺷﺧﺎص’ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻌﻣﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ واﻟﻛﻠﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ
 أﻣﺎ اﻟﻣراد ﺑـ’اﻻﻗﺎﻧﯾم’ ﻓذات واﺣد ھﻲ ذات ﷲ. ھم اﻟذوات اﻟﻣﻧﻔﺻل اﺣدھم ﻋن اﻻﺧر، أ( ﻓﺎﻟﻣراد ﺑﺎﻻﺷﺧﺎص. ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺗﯾن رﺋﯾﺳﺗﯾن،اﻟﻠﻐﺎت اﻻﺧرى
 اﻻ اﻧﮫ ﻟﯾس ﻷﺣدھم ذات ﺧﺻﺎﺋص او ﺻﻔﺎت او ﻣﻣﯾزات، ب( إن اﻻﺷﺧﺎص وإن ﻛﺎﻧوا ﯾﺷﺗرﻛون ﻓﻲ اﻟطﺑﯾﻌﺔ اﻟواﺣدة.اﻟذي ﻻ ﺷرﯾك ﻟﮫ وﻻﻧظﯾر
. ﻷﻧﮭم ذات ﷲ اﻟواﺣد، ھم واﺣد ﻓﻲ اﻟﺟوھر ﺑﻛل ﺧﺻﺎﺋﺻﮫ وﺻﻔﺎﺗﮫ وﻣﻣﯾزاﺗﮫ، أﻣﺎ اﻻﻗﺎﻧﯾم ﻓﻣﻊ ﺗﻣﯾز اﺣدھم ﻋن اﻻﺧر ﻓﻲ اﻻﻗﻧوﻣﯾﺔ.”اﻻﺧر
12
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how he acts. 13
Literature Review
In an effort to demonstrate the unique contribution of this present work, I will survey the
relevant literature in order of importance and relevance to the stated thesis. In addition to the
primary resources of the written works of John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥyā
Ibn cAdī, any secondary works on their writings would be beneficial. Despite the fact that there
is not a plethora of secondary resources of these three theologians, there are plenty of studies
available on the history of their contexts which will be included in this study. This is not to say
that other works on the Trinity should be overlooked. On the contrary, contemporary research on
the Trinity will be used as well because they form the foundation for the present inquiry.
As for secondary resources on John, Daniel Janosik has written an excellent monograph
about his life and his Islamic context. 14 He calls John the first apologist to the Muslims and
includes several theological arguments that were circulating among other sects of Muslims, such
as Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites. Moreover, Charles C. Twombly has written a book called,
Perichoresis and Personhood: God, Christ, and Salvation in John of Damascus. This book
focuses on the Perichoretic concept that John explains about the Trinity. Both of these books
offer great insights into John’s trinitarian theology.
Andrew Louth has written extensively on John in his book St John Damascene: Tradition
and Originality in Byzantine Theology. 15 In addition to informing his readers on John’s life and

2016).

13

As for the transliteration from Arabic to English, I am using the SBL Handbook of Style.

14

Daniel J. Janosik, John of Damascus: The First Apologist to the Muslims, (Eugene, OR: Pickwhick,

15
Andrew Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford Printing
Press, 2002).
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context, he offers a chapter on John’s position in defending the veneration of icons against the
iconoclasm initiated by emperor Leo III in AD 726. Furthermore, Peter Schadler has written
John of Damascus and Islam: Christian Heresiology and the Intellectual Background to Earliest
Christian-Muslim Relations. In this book, Schadler focuses on the idea that John considered
Islam not a new religion but a heresy. In his opinion, the main reason for this classification is to
establish a church’s institutional and social power under the Melkites’ foundation. Defining what
is orthodoxy helped the faith community building a refutation of all alternatives, including
Islam. 16
The second theologian that this study is focusing on is Theodore Abū Qurrah, who was a
Melkite. 17 He left several tracts (called Mayāmer), one of which is on the Trinity. Sara Leila
Husseini, who wrote her doctoral work on the same period, included in her sources Abū Qurrah
and two other Arabic Christian theologians from the ninth century: ‘Ammar al-Baṣrī and Abū
Rā’īta Al-Takrītī. These men were Nestorians (the Church of the East) and Jacobite,
respectively. 18 Husseini focuses on their historical, social, linguistic, and religious contexts under
the Islamic rule to determine how their explanation of the Trinity was affected by their Christian
tradition. While she gives great attention to Abū Qurrah, only briefly mentioned John and Yaḥyā
Ibn cAdī.
Wafik Nasry contributed a major work on Abū Qurrah and paid special attention to his

Peter Schadler, John of Damascus and Islam: Christian Heresiology and the Intellectual Background to
Earliest Christian-Muslim Relations (Boston: BRILL, 2017).
16

17

Orthodox Christians who followed the Nicene creed.

This study will call Nestorians “The Church of the East.” This appellation was attributed to the eastern
Syriac-speaking region in the eighth and ninth centuries. For further information see Griffith, The Church in the
Shadow of the Mosque, 110 & Dietmar W. Winkler, “The Age of the Sassanians,” in The Church of the East: A
Concise History, ed., Wilhelm Baum , and Dietmar W. Winkler, (Taylor and Francis, 2003), 7.
18
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book Al-Mujādalah. In his book, Nasry provides arguments both for and against the authenticity
of Al-Mujādalah book as well as discussing whether Abū Qurrah actually wrote it or not. Since
this study is not focusing on Abū Qurrah’s writings in general, our concentration will be given to
his argument for the Trinity, which Nasry discussed thoroughly. 19 Recently, Najib Awad
published a large monograph on Abū Qurrah’s life and writings. In it, dedicates a whole chapter
to Abū Qurrah’s trinitarian theology. He even makes a comparison of Qurrah’s trinitarian
argument and other theologians contemporary with him, such as John and Maximus the
Confessor. 20 Awad describes Abū Qurrah as not just a mere witness or testifer to patrisic
orthodoxy but also a protector and defender of it. In Awad’s opinion, Abū Qurrah does more
than simply preserve and protect Christian orthodoxy against the heresies: he also defendes it
against Islamic monotheism.
In addition to these works, Abū Qurrah has also been the subject of several scholarly
papers. In one, John Lamoreaux revises Abū Qurrah’s earlier biography. In a paper titled, “The
Biography of Theodore Abi Qurrah Revisited,” Lamoreaux defends the idea that Abū Qurrah
was a member of Mar Saba’s monastery in Palestine. He also mentions that Abū Qurrah is the
first Syriac scholar to write in the Arabic language, acknowledging him as a significant defender
in the history of the iconoclast controversy, especially in its non-Byzantine form. 21 Moreover,
Nestor Kavvadas contributed a paper called “Theodore Abu Qurrah and Byzantine Orthodox
Iconoclasts in the Early Abbasid Society” in which he examines the reason why Abū Qurrah

Wafik Nasry, The Caliph and the Bishop: A 9th Century Muslim-Chrtian Debate: Al-Ma’mūn and Abū
Qurrah (Beirut, Lebanon: CEDRAC Université Saint Joseph, 2008).
19

Najib George Awad, Orthodoxy in Arabic Terms: A Study of Theodore Abu Qurrah’s Theology in Its
Islamic Context (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2015).
20

21
John C. Lamoreaux, “The Biography of Theodore Abi Qurrah Revisited,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers,
2002, Vol. 56 (2002): 25-40.
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defend the veneration of the icons. 22 This paper relates both to our investigation of Mary and the
Trinity and to whether the veneration of the icons has anything to do with the Muslim
understanding of her inclusion in it.
The third thinker that this study seeks to examine is Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī. His original writings
were lost for some time but were found in Tehran Codex. This study will examine the article
“The Life of Yahya Ibn ‘Adi: A Famous Christian Philosopher of Baghdad” by Mohd. Nasir
Omar. 23 This article is important because it not only sheds light on Ibn cAdī’s life, education, and
career as a philosopher, but it also takes records of the Islamic scholars and resources that
mention him, for Ibn cAdī was a famous philosopher who had Christian and Muslim pupils.
Moreover, Father Samir Khalil al-Yasu’i analyzes, commentates, and interacts thoroughly with
Ibn cAdī’s Essay in Monotheism in his book Al-Turāth al-‘Arabī al-Masiḥī (the Arabic Christian
Heritage). 24 Al-Yasu’i contrasts and compares Ibn cAdī’s answers to the Trinity and the nature of
God with ‘Abd al-Masīḥ al-Kindī’s apologetics against Islam. This work is written in Arabic,
and it will expand the horizon of this research by shedding great light on Ibn cAdī’s sources.
Finally, Nadine Abbas has written several articles as well as her doctoral dissertation on Ibn cAdī
in Lebanon. Her book is published in Arabic, but it is not available in the United States. Her
articles in Arabic summarize her thoughts on Ibn cAdī. The first article is called “Al-Falsafa wa
al-Lāhūt ‘nd Yaḥyā” (The Philosophy and the Theology of Yaḥyā), in which she lists his essays
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and traces the weight of logic in defining and explaining his theology. 25 The second article is
called “Mafhūm al-‘lūhiya ‘ind Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī fi Kītāb ‘al-Rad ‘ala al-Warrāq’ wa Maqālah fi
al-Mawjūdāt” (The Concept of Divinity for Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī in the Book ‘The Reply to alWarrāq’ and ‘A Tract in Things that are Existing’), in which she reviews the terminologies that
‘Adi used in his explanation of the meaning of the divine. 26
As for Muslim-Christian relations in the eighth, the nineth, and the thenth centuries,
David Thomas has written and edited several books on this topic. In Routledge Handbook on
Christian-Muslim Relations, the writers walk the readers through the history of Christian-Muslim
relations from the beginning, through the middle ages, and to early modern and modern
periods. 27 Thomas reports the situation of Christians in the Middle Ages under Islamic rule. He
starts by explaining the Pact of ‘Umar and how it affected the liberties of Christians by opening
the doors for mistreatment. During that time, many Islamic officials treated Christians as lesser
citizens by asking them to dress in a certain way, to show respect to Muslims and give up their
seats for them, and possibly not to teach the Qur’an to their children. Additionally, in the same
volume, Sandra Toenies Keating discusses in her article “The First Arabic-Speaking Christian
Theologians” the situation that forced the Christians who knew Greek and spoke Aramaic and
Syriac to see a great need to shift to the Arabic language. By the late eighth century, deeper
differences were introduced that necessitated creative responses to the emerging religion of
Islam. The situation further escalated with the accession of the Abbasids dynasty and their
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intentional program of Arabization and Islamization. Consequently, the early ninth century saw
an intensified effort on the part of all Christians to provide theological responses to the questions
of both common people and elite Muslims. Moreover, I. Mark Beaumont briefly surveys the
earliest written Christian references to Islam in his article “Early Muslim Attitudes Towards the
Bible.” None of the articles included in this book, however, carefully examine the early
argument for the Trinity.
Daniel King provides another edited work titled The Syriac World of the East, which
includes great information about the status of the church during the early invasion of Islam and
the Abbasid period. 28 In this source, David Wilmshurst includes a chapter about “The Church of
the East in the ʿAbbasid Era.” By this time, the church’s losses were too many. After the loss of
the patriarchates of Rome and Constantinople, nine metropolitan provinces of the patriarchate of
Alexandria were placed under the Arab Islamic conquest of Egypt, three metropolitan provinces
in the patriarchate of Jerusalem, and twelve metropolitan provinces in the patriarchate of Antioch
were placed under Islamic rulers. The time between the reigns of the Caliphs al-Mahdī AD 775–
785 and al-Mutawakkil AD 847–861 was marked by a religious debate, enabling few scholars
(such the ones that this study is focusing on) to introduce their defense for the Trinity and other
topics.
Regarding the Divine images and Icons in the church, this study shall investigate
several resources. As mentioned earlier, the three above scholars had their own teachings on the
icons of the church. John and Abū Qurrah argued for the veneration of the icons, and Ibn cAdī
was against it.
In a book published for the J. Paul Getty Museum, Alfredo Tradigo explains the different
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types of icons that churches used throughout history. 29 Many of them were used in the Byzantine
era, especially in the cathedrals of Constantinople. During the struggle of the iconoclasts in the
seventh century, the use of The Virgin Nursing icon spread widely in Egypt, Constantinople, and
Jerusalem. Pope Gregory, while writing to his adversary Emperor Leo III, mentioned that The
Virgin Nursing icon should be worshiped. He also references the Three-Handed Virgin Icon that
healed John’s hand when the Islamic emperor amputated it. This source is necessary to learn
what type of icons were circulating among cathedrals during that period.
In the book The Virgin Goddess: Studies in the Pagan and Christian Roots of Mariology,
Stephen Benko proposes that there is a direct line between the goddess-cults of the ancients to
the reverence paid to the Virgin Mary. 30 One cult he mentions is the Collyridians (Kollyridians),
who worshiped Mary in Arabia. Many scholars related this cult to the misunderstanding of the
Islamic Trinity. While this idea is not impossible, it is not known how or when this cult
developed in Arabia. There is also no record in Islamic literature that Mohammad was in contact
with such a cult. While Benko’s book does not give a definite answer to our question about the
Islamic Trinity, it sheds light on several Marian cults and how they affected the development of
Mariology within the church.
Imad Shehadeh wrote a two-volume work titled God with Us and Without Us: Oneness in
Trinity versus Absolute Oneness in which he makes a comparison between Trinity and Tawḥīd . 31
In the first volume, he examines the historical struggle over absolute oneness between two
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Islamic schools in the eighth century. At the end of this volume, he attempts to harmonize the
nature of the doctrine of the Trinity with logic by explaining that the eternal existence of God is
in harmony with the eternal activity of his attributes. In order for God’s attributes to be part of
him, they must exist eternally with him. In other words, they need to be eternally functional and
active with him in order for him to be the highest conceived divine being. In volume two,
Shehadeh deals with several topics related to the Trinity, such as the difference between OT
oneness and absolute oneness. One such difference is that the oneness of the OT shows God’s
desire to be known. This idea is clear “in God’s revelation of his attributes, in his promise of
knowing him, and in the use of anthropomorphism to describe him,” 32 whereas within absolute
oneness, the idea that God desires to be known is completely rejected. There are several
covenants in the OT in which God expresses his desire to have a relationship with his people.
Moreover, Christ’s revelation of the special relationship between the father and Jesus revealed
God’s desire to be the father of all believers by extending the sonship to them. The fatherhood
and sonship concepts are absent from the absolute oneness.
Another important work on the subject of the Trinity is written by Miroslav Volf and
titled Allah: a Christian Response. 33 In it, he develops part of his argument in a dialogical
manner with Sheikh al-Jifri. Volf, a prominent Trinitarian theologian, explains some of the
difficulties of explicating the Trinity. For instance, he mentions the tension that the term begets
sparks in the Muslim’s minds and explains that this word does not mean a male and female
relationship. Furthermore, Christians are not trying to soothe the troubled conscience of their
supposed tritheism by means of a belief in Trinitarian monotheism. Volf clarifys that the acts of
Imad N. Shehadeh, God with Us and Without Us: Oneness in Trinity versus Absolute Oneness, vol. 2,
(Carlisle, UK: Langham, 2019), 7.
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the Christian God are divided because they belong to three different persons. Volf explains that
regarding creation, God is acting “toward the outside”; his acts are undivided and inseparable.
Every act of one Person of the Trinity is always caused by all three.
William Montgomery Watt’s work Islam and Christianity today: a Contribution to
Dialogue 34 makes a comparison study on several topics between Islam and Christianity. On the
transcendence and the immanence of God, Watt states that the Qur’an shows Allah’s
immanence; he concedes that immanence is more obvious in the Christian faith than it is in
Islam. On the topic of oneness and unicity, he is probably the first scholar to use the word unicity
to explain the nature of Allah and God. He demonstrates that the problem of the attributes of
Allah arises from the fact that in mainstream Islamic thought the Qur’an is not created but it is
accepted as the speech of God, which makes it eternal with the eternality of God. The opponents
of this view do not accept the idea of the eternality of the Qur’an because they could not admit to
two Eternals. Although Watt’s book does not include a thorough discussion of the Trinity, it
offers good analysis and comparisons over several topics, which in turn are helpful for this study.
Additionally, Gregory A. Boyd has written an article titled “The Self-Sufficient Sociality
of God: A Trinitarian Revision of Hartshorne’s Metaphysics.” 35 In it, he compares classical
trinitarianism on one hand, and process trinitarianism and the sociality of God on the other. The
former believes that God’s essential sociality is defined within Godself. The only important
metaphysical relationship that God has is within the Trinity of the divine persons. Any
relationship with creation is highly contingent on God’s will or choice. The process of trinitarian
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thought, in contrast, believes that God is essentially social but that his sociality is defined by his
relationship with the world—a relationship that lies “beyond the accident of God’s Will.” 36 The
notion that God could exist apart from the world is, within process thought, an unintelligible
notion. Boyd’s article is important because the thought process seems similar to Islamic belief
about the tawḥīdic nature of Allah. The supposition of a self-sufficient social God who satisfies
the a priori requirements of relationality (God-God) when he is alone before the creation is a
necessary idea to provide the metaphysical foundation for a coherent understanding of the
contingent relationality (God-creation).
Michael J. Chan and Brent A. Strawn have collected several essays by Old Testament
theologian Terence E. Fretheim and published them in a book called What Kind of God?
Collected Essays of Terence E. Fretheim. Fretheim’s central theology rests on a God-world
relationship. 37 God is and remains transcendent while simultaneously immanent. God has taken
initiative and freely entered both into a relationship with his creation and into a covenant with
Israel. Having done so, He “has decisively and irrevocably committed himself to be in
relationship with the world.” 38
Survey Conclusion
From the content of our literature survey, it is clear that of the several resources
written on Christianity under the Abbasid dynasty, few dealt with the Arabic trinitarian
apologetics under the Islamic context. However, none whatsoever reflected on John of
Damascus’s, Theodore Abū Qurrah’s, and Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī’s arguments of the
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Trinity/iconoclasm particularly for the purpose of creating contemporary trinitarian apologetics.
Many separate studies reported these three thinkers’ trinitarian arguments without reflecting on
how contemporary readers can benefit from their contributions. Moreover, no literature on record
has attempted an abductive/analytical method to show the trinitarian God as the greatest
conceived divine being. Once this analysis is properly integrated, the path will be open for
adding new insights to the apologetical argument against Islamic objections in our contemporary
days.
Statement of Methodology
Because this dissertation relates to history, theology, and apologetics, it will employ a
combination of methodologies. Due to its historical nature, a textual analysis will be done to
establish the context in which the Arabic church in general and the three thinkers, in particular,
were facing. Then, an abductive historical investigation will follow, exploring the probable cause
behind the Muslim misunderstanding of the orthodox Christian Trinity. The Trinitarian
arguments of the three thinkers will be textually analyzed and closely defined and compared.
Lastly, a deductive analysis shall be applied to reach into an apologetical answer to Islamic
objections against the Trinity.
The historical investigation will adopt abductive reasoning, which typically begins with
an incomplete set of observations and proceeds to the best explanation for the set. Abductive
reasoning does its best with the available information, often incomplete. It relaxes the standard
and gives up the search for absolute certainty. While I cannot prove that the Theotokos icons are
the main reason for Mohammad’s misunderstanding of the Trinity, I can at least show that it is
probable. My goal in using this method is to provide the best explanation for the Islamic
perception of the Trinity.
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The process of inquiry is one of the most widely used ways to examine a perceptual
problem that cannot be addressed through immediate observation and background knowledge.. 39
Mark Tschaepe calls this step “a guessing procedure,” in which the inquirer’s starting point is an
attempt to resolve a genuine doubt about a certain issue and arrive at a stable belief. Tschaepe
explains that
The more the problem is examined, the further we move from the perceptual judgment
and into the procedure of guessing. Perceptual judgment simply declares the problem or
question at hand. Guessing is the process that creates a Third by which to understand the
problem that was determined by perceptual judgment but for which perceptual judgment
could not supply an answer. 40
At the beginning of the process, the inquirer guesses by defining a new starting point in his or
her examination. This new point serves as an attempt to address the surprising phenomenon that
has led to doubt. Next, the inquirer draws a number of elements without ranking them or giving
them any priority over each other for the purpose of reaching into the best explanation of the
inquiry.
In identifying the starting point, I will review the answers that were provided for the
Islamic conception of the Trinity, arguing against their adequacy. Next, I will examine Islamic
historical resources that mention the relationship between Mohammad and Christians in the areas
where he visited or lived. I will also evaluate the conversations that were widely spread among
Christians and Muslims from the seventh century to the tenth century to verify whether they are
consistent with the Islamic understanding of the Trinity.
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Some previous attempts of the concept of “guessing,” which is the starting point of the
inquiry, have led to the post hoc propter hoc fallacy: the belief that “because event B happened
after event A, therefore there must be some causal connection between the two events.” 41
Sometimes there is no connection, and in other cases, there might be more complicated reasons
and connections than the historians have proposed. In order to avoid such fallacies, this study
shall follow the criterion of “the sufficient cause” rather than “the necessary cause.” According
to Carl Trueman, the necessary cause means, “if phenomenon B is present, then A must be
present too; though the presence of A does not necessarily imply that B will occur”; 42 whereas,
the sufficient cause means, “A necessarily implies the presence of B, but B could be caused by
C; thus the presence of B does not mean that A is necessarily present.” 43 The misunderstanding
necessarily implies a false narration, teachings, or implications of some other beliefs, which is
caused by the spread of cults, other religions, or misrepresentation of orthodox Christianity.
Thus, the false narration, teachings, or implication of some other beliefs does not mean that the
misunderstanding is necessarily present. The presence of the misunderstanding does not mean
that the extensive reach of icons is necessarily the cause of this misunderstanding, but it is a
sufficient cause, given other circumstances.
While the historical application of this study will adopt abductive reasoning, the
philosophical application will require deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning starts with true
premises and ends with a strongly supported conclusion. If the premises are true, then it would
be impossible for the conclusion to be false. By employing the deductive method, the study shall
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defend the relational character of God to refute the Islamic objection: The Trinity is a
theologically contradictory concept which minimizes the perfection of the divine nature.
The argument goes this way:
P1: One aspect of divine perfection is relationality—the greatest conceived being should
be a relational being in order to be perfect (the greatest).
P2: The Trinity shows God as a relational divine being (intra-relational and interrelational)
C: The Trinity is non-contradictory.
If I am successful in defending the first and the second premises, then the conclusion should
necessarily be true, and, therefore demonstrate that the Trinity is not a contradiction but instead a
necessary attribute of the greatest conceived divine being.
The main question of this study is related to the Divine nature, a topic which falls under
theology proper. Therefore, the idea of the Anselmian God (as presented by David Baggett and
Jerry Walls) shall be both presented and assumed in this study. In their book Good God: The
Theistic Foundations of Morality, Baggett and Walls identify the Anselmian God “as a being
who has no ontological deficiencies, and who is also the proper desire for human beings.” 44 I will
use the notion of the Anselmian God throughout the study to refer to the highest perceived divine
being, and not necessarily the Christian God. On one hand, both Islam and Christianity affirm
their belief in the “greatest conceived being,” that is monotheistic in nature. They both also deny
any type of atheism, agnosticism, or skepticism. Likewise, both believe that God is monotheistic,
omnipotent, omniscient, glorious, and worthy; and both deny that the “greatest conceived being”
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is an impersonal force, chi, or an amorphous cosmic power. On the other hand, Christians and
Muslims disagree about the nature of the divine. Muslims believe in tawḥīd and Christians
believe in the Trinity. The differences between the two doctrines will be briefly explained to
show the general direction. The bulk of attention, however, will be given to trinitarian
apologetics.
While recognizing that the interaction between theology and philosophy has been an
apologetic necessity in the history of Christian thought, several distinctions should be made at
this point to offer more clarity to this argument.
Throughout this dissertation, I will be using the term apologetics. Some people think that
all apologetical methods are polemic. I admit that the latter term is related to the former, but it
has a different meaning. Apologetics is a subset of theology involving the art of providing a
defense for one’s faith. A person can develop an apologetic that defines his or her belief in
opposition to other people’s beliefs and religions. Defined in this way, apologetics is related to
polemics. The differences, however, have to deal with the tone, intent, and content. Polemics is a
critique of other ideologies and sets of belief. Polemic is less interested in defining one’s religion
than it is defining and criticizing other’s doctrines and beliefs. The three thinkers examined in
this study used a combination of apologetics and polemic. On some occasions, they defined the
orthodox Christian faith; and at other times, they explained the weaknesses of certain Islamic
beliefs and pointed out its illogical and philosophical flaws.
Most Encyclopedias of Islam present a classification according to the attributes of
essence, such as existence, divine eternity, and divine permanence …etc., and the attributes of
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action, such as divine power, will, and knowledge ..etc. 45 Other scholars have categorized the
attributes of Allah in relationship to God’s essence, to the universe, to the natural world, and to
human beings. This study, however, shall follow two categorizations of essence and action.
This analysis focuses on the nature of the divine and its moral perfection, not moral
goodness and rightness. The study is not related to God’s commands or actions, but his divine
nature and whether it is lacking any attributes that prevent him from being perfect. The study
presupposes that being relational is one of the attributes that contribute to God’s goodness and
perfection. If God is non-relational, then his nature is missing a major attribute, and therefore is
imperfect. Christians believe that God’s inherent Trinitarian nature and desire for harmonious
relationships with his creation demonstrate a profoundly social and relational divine nature. His
trinitarian nature shows that He is eternally relational, from eternity to eternity. He is intrarelational before the foundation of the earth through the persons (aqānīm) of the Trinity, and He
is inter-relational with his creation in the Old Testament, New Testament, and through the Holy
Spirit in today’s church’s age.
Chapter Breakdown
Following this introductory chapter, chapter one examines the historical, linguistic, and
intellectual environment of the Arabic church in the eighth to the tenth centuries. The church
lived under the Abbasid dynasty in a period known as the golden age of Islam. Special attention
was given to science, philosophy, and language during this brief period, and Arabic became the
official language of the government after replacing Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic. Many
Christians converted to Islam to avoid heavy taxation and to facilitate entry to government
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services. This massive conversion prompted Christian authors of this period to compose
apologetic treatises that reflect Islamic concerns and explain Christian doctrines by using the
Arabic language and Islamic concepts. This shift explains the widely recorded Islamic contextual
perception of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Chapter two presents the answer to the Qur’anic objections against the Trinity. The writer
of the Qur’an think that Christians believe in the divinity of Mary and they include her within the
Trinity as being God’s wife and the mother of Jesus. This chapter summarizes the efforts that has
being done to explain the Qur’anic reference of Mary and examines the historical prevalence and
the theological beliefs about the Theotokos icons in the history of Christianity, seeking to
discover a link between these icons and the impression that they might have left on
Mohammad’s understanding of the Trinity.
Chapter three investigates the trinitarian apologetics of John, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and
Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī by comparing, contrasting, and defining the essential and the fundamental
components and layouts of their apologetics, noting how they used Islamic and Qur’anic
concepts in their defense. It is important to discuss their arguments and understand how the
Arabic church defended the Trinity against Islamic objections to learn from their apologetical
style and to form a modern defense that suits the current Islamic objections in the twenty-first
century.
Chapter four provides trinitarian apologetics against the claim that its doctrine is illogical
(tawḥīd is unsurpassable) and therefore does not present God as the greatest conceived being.
Since the idea of the Anselmian God is a common ground between Christians and Muslims, this
chapter argues that the greatest conceived being should be relational. Otherwise, He is not the
greatest being because he lacks an essential attribute—the one that makes him merciful and
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compassionate. In order for God to be relational, He has to be trinitarian in nature because the
Trinity is the only way that shows him as a relational divine being—he is intra-relational within
himself as a Trinity and inter-relational with his creation. In this way, God is not dependent on
his creation because there is no time in history when He was alone without a relationship before
the creation, and there is no time when he needed the creation in order for his attributes to be
functional (such as being a seer, a hearer, or loving).
Chapter five, which is the last chapter, will summarize my argument, finalize my
analysis, and discusses further areas of research.
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Chapter One: The Rise of the Abbasids and the Golden Age of Islam
After the death of the prophet Mohammad, Muslims expanded beyond the Arabic
peninsula to the Levant and Mesopotamia. The Umayyad dynasty (AD 661-750) followed the
period of the Rashidun caliphs (the rightly guided caliphs) and moved their capital to Damascus.
After the fall of the Umayyads, the Abbasids ruled (AD 750-1258) in Bagdad through a military
revolution. “It was the armies of the Muslims of Khurasan,” says Hugh Kennedy, “which
defeated the forces of the Umayyads and swept the new dynasty to power in 750.” 46 The number
of the Abbasids’ troops in the late eighth century was around 100,000. 47 This military power led
to many uprisings within the ruling parties. Most of the Abbasid caliphs died through military
coups, treason, and treachery.
Like the Umayyad, the Abbasids practiced hereditary rule to keep the caliphate within the
family. They even appointed several sons as crown princes, which in many cases led the elder
crown prince to isolate his younger brothers in order to deliver the regime to his own son instead
of his brothers. This situation resulted in many military coups within the same family. 48
Moreover, the Abbasid dynasty included religiously mixed caliphs. Many of them were
religious, prayed regularly, censured or curtailed musical practice, and did not serve wine at their
tables. 49 Others were less religious; they kept concubines and paid more attention to knowledge,
music, and translation than caliphs of other periods. This shift in focus led to several
improvements in science, language, and art.
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The translation movement from Greek to Arabic started under the Umayyad period. The
initial Arab conquests in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and the move of Arab rulers and tribesmen
into Greek-speaking areas made transition from Greek to Arabic inevitable, both in government
circles and in everyday life. Greek was widely used in Syria and Palestine as the official
language of commerce and business and as the language of learning of Christian clerics. 50
However, most—if not all—of the translation activities during the Umayyad period are “instances
of random and ad hoc accommodation to the needs of the times, generated by Arab rule over
non-Arab peoples.” 51 Most of the materials were administrative, political, and commercial
documents. They were translated for the purpose of expanding the communication between the
new rulers and the allophones. 52
After the Abbasid revolution and the transfer of the seat of the caliphate to Iraq, the
cultural orientation of Islam changed drastically. Harūn al-Rashīd (AD 766-809) established Bayt
al-Ḥikma (the House of Wisdom), which reached its pinnacle under the reign of his son alMam’ūn (AD 813-833) with the involvement of Aramaic speakers, Christians, Jews, and Persian
scholars. 53 Several resources mention that Bayt al-Ḥikma started as a royal library. As an
institution, it was adopted as part of the Sasanian administrative and bureaucratic state system. 54
“With the books brought from both the church schools within the state’s borders and neighboring
geographies,” says Mustafa Barış, “Bayt al-Hikma grew to be the richest library of medieval
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period and a science center encompassing intense scientific studies. In the foregoing science
center were a director, authors and interpreters with clerks working under them, scribes copying
the books and bookbinders responsible of binding.” 55 According to Ibn Al-Nadīm, who closely
examined Bayt al-Ḥikma and utilized its library, forty-six scholars translated from Syriac to
Arabic, fourteen from Persian, and three from Sanskrit. 56
The translation movement would have not flourished without the support of the caliphs,
such as Harūn al-Rashīd and al-Ma’mūn, and the scholarly zeal of Syriac-speaking Christians,
who were fluent in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic. Christian theologians who wrote in Arabic in the
early Islamic period were associated with monasteries and ecclesiastical institutions. Under the
influence of the caliphs and Christian thinkers, intellectual life flourished in Baghdad and
beyond. As Griffith mentions, “Some were physicians, some were philosophers, and some were
logicians, mathematicians, copyists, or translators. Some were also Christian apologists and
theologians ... All of them contributed something to the newly flowering culture of the classical
period of Islamic civilization.” 57
The Status of the Christian Scholarship During the Early Abbasid Period
Under the Byzantine rule and the invasion of Islam into the Levant, Christians were
divided into three major groups. The monasteries of Jerusalem, the Judean desert, and (to a
certain extent) the ecclesiastical establishment in Edessa in Syria were filled with Greek and
Syriac-speaking confessors of the Chalcedonian faith. They were known later in the ninth
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century by the name Melkites “because of their acceptance of the doctrinal decisions of the
imperially sponsored, sixth ecumenical council in Byzantium, Constantinople III (681 CE), along
with its five equally imperially sponsored predecessors.” 58 After the invasion of the Muslims to
the Levant, the Melkites adopted the Arabic language in the ninth century. John of Damascus
(AD 655-749) is the first theologian/apologist who wrote against Islam in Greek, and Theodore
Abū Qurrah (AD 750-820) is the first theologian to write in Arabic. He even translated the Greek
secular work of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De virtutibus animae into Arabic and submitted
it to Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn, the caliph al-Ma’mūn’s famous general. 59
The second Christian group who had knowledge of Greek is called Jacobites. They took
their name and existence after Jacob Baradeus (AD 500-578), who was credited with organizing
the Syrian Orthodox “Jacobite” Church. 60 This group is also called Monophysites because they
believe in the single nature of Christ, particularly Jesus’ divinity being the principle of union of
his two natures, in which his humanity is absorbed. 61 They were condemned as heretics by the
church in the middle of the fifth century at the council of Chalcedon. 62 However, Baradeus
continued to travel throughout Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Arabia, and many other
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countries, ordaining numerous bishops and priests. 63 As he traveled, his preaching was all the
more effective because of his fluency in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic.
It is worth noting that in the age before the printing press, copyists and booksellers were
closely related professions. Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī, for instance, who received most of his education in
Bagdad, was a member of the Jacobite church and quite knowledgeable in Syriac and Arabic. He
devoted considerable time to copying manuscripts. Despite the fact that he was Christian, he did
not restrict himself to writing only about Christianity or Christian theology. On the contrary, he
boasted of being a scribe, copying Islamic manuscripts. He states, “I have transcribed with my
hand two copies of the Tafsīr [Quranic Commentary] of al-Tabarī [d. 923], which I have taken to
the kings of the frontiers, and I have copied innumerable works of the Muslim theologians. In
fact, I have forced myself to write a hundred pages each day and night, though I felt this to be
little.” 64 Ibn cAdī did not speak or read Greek; instead, he worked from existing translations into
his native Syriac and was a major ambassador for Greek ideas into the Christian and Islamic
worlds. 65
In addition to the Melkites and the Jacobites, Church of the East, made up the community
of scholars inspiring the next generation of thinkers to follow their footsteps in learning, writing,
and translating philosophy. The Church of the East lived in Iraq, yet they had their own Greek
and Syriac learning tradition. Gutas states that the same Greek-Syriac learning atmosphere
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existed in Monophysite and Church of the East congregations throughout the area,
if we are to judge by scholars who appeared during the early ‘Abbasid period with a solid
background in Greek learning; witness Dayr Qunnā south of Baghdad on the Tigris [EI
II, 197] the site of a large and flourishing Nestorian monastery, where Abū-Biŝr Matta
ibn-Yunus (EI VI, 844-51), the founder of the Aristotelian school in Baghdad early in the
tenth century, studied and taught.” 66
Many cities in the Levant and Mesopotamia maintained a Greek-Syriac learning tradition, which
Church of the East contributed effectively to in the pre-Islamic era.
The previous analysis shows the important role that the Christians played in launching
Arabic language, philosophy, and science. These scholars participated in the translation
movement out of altruistic motives for the improvement of society and the promotion of their
own religion. The translation movement created new developments in studying philosophy in the
Arabic world, which in turn allowed some Christian and Muslim scholars to dialogue and debate.
Both Christian and Muslim scholars leveraged their skills to employ philosophical, theological,
and logical ideas to support the faith of their communities.
The Status of Christian Societies Under the Abbasids
Some Christians held notable positions in the government under the Umayyads, valuable
in service because of their knowledge of Greek and the previous positions that they held during
the Byzantine’s power. When the Arabs came to the Levant and Mesopotamia, they ruled as a
minority community over established societies. Their expertise in the existing administrative
systems helped them to establish their own methods and maintain order over the newly
conquered lands. 67 Thus, non-Muslims were in demand as professional state administrators, and
they often rose to influential and important positions, especially at the beginning of the Islamic
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conquest. However, several conditions changed when the Abbasids took over after the
Umayyads. While many of the Christians did work for the Abbasid caliphs in translation, this
does not mean that they had total freedom or that all Christian communities were treated
respectfully during the extended period of the Abbasid reign. On the contrary, even with
Christians in key positions of influence, they were unable to prevent Abbasid rulers from
imposing new restrictions on Christians and non-Muslim communities.
One of the restrictions that Abbasids applied on local non-Muslims in the Levant and
Mesopotamia is called the dhimma—a covenant of protection between Muslims and certain
tolerated non-Muslim religious communities (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabaeans)
living permanently within its boundaries. 68 Muslims were a minority at the beginning of the
conquest; however, their number increased rapidly as many locals converted to Islam after being
given the choice of conversion, paying taxes, or being killed. The people who refused to convert
and opted for paying taxes are called ahl al-dhimma, or dhimmis. They did not have to pay any
zakat (alms) on their properties, vines, crops, or livestock like Muslims did, but they had to pay
jizya—a poll tax imposed on non-Muslims in lieu of military service. Women and senior citizens
did not pay jizya, only men who are able to hold the sword and fight. 69
Jizya is a Qur’anic command that Mohammad himself imposed on non-Muslims during
his ghazawat (raids). In Surah 9:29, Mohammad commands the Muslims to “fight those who do
not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they prohibit what Allah and His Messenger
have prohibited, nor follow the religion of truth, out of those who have been given the Book,
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until they pay the tax in acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection.” 70
The amount of jizya, however, is not defined in the Qur’an. The Ḥadīths mention briefly that
Jews and Christians should pay a tenth of their profits if they are making trade outside their area
of residence. 71 Muwatta Malik includes a Ḥadīth stating that jizya is imposed on
The people of the Book to humble them. As long as they are in the country they have
agreed to live in, they do not have to pay anything on their property except the jizya…
This is because jizya is only imposed on them on conditions, which they have agreed on,
namely that they will remain in their own countries, and that war will be waged for them
on any enemy of theirs, and that if they then leave that land to go anywhere else to do
business they will have to pay a tenth. 72
Non-Muslims (mostly Christians and Jews) who lived under Islamic ruling paid a certain amount
of money on their properties in exchange for protection, but if they traveled from their area of
residence to do business in other Islamic regions, they had to pay one-tenth of their trade,
whereas Muslims did not. In another Ḥadīth , Mohammad explains that tithing is not imposed on
Muslims: it is only for the Jews and the Christians. 73
As for the people of the Book who do not travel and remain in their area of residence in
the Islamic regions, their jizya was not standardized, and its conditions fluctuated. The amount
was left to be negotiated with individual Muslim monarchs. Al-Qurṭubi records several cases
which he heard from different resources about jizya, detailing how Mohammad and the caliphs
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after him treated the non-Muslims among them. 74 He recalls al-Ṭabari saying that jizya should be
at least one dinar with no maximum amount, while others say it should be more than one dinar or
be based on whatatever the Muslim potentate defines. 75
As Islamic dominance in the region increased with time, Islamic law and administrative
practice evolved, and the rule of dhimma became more closely defined. At the beginning of the
Abbasid’s reign, the tribute paid by the non-Muslims varied from one province to another,
depending on the conditions of the Arab commanders. Eventually, Islamic law required all adult
dhimmi males to pay jizya “of five dinars for the wealthy, three for the middle class, and one for
the working poor (although not for the total [sic] indigent), as well as a land tax (kharaj) for
those who owned real estate.” 76 Harun al-Rashid was the first Abbasid caliph to discuss the
proper administration of the jizya and kharja. During his time, dhimmis were required “to pay a
five percent tariff on their merchandise, as opposed to the Muslims, 2.5 percent.” 77 Some
historians like to argue that dhimmis were not oppressed, mistreated, or taxed beyond their means
and that jizya was not as restrictive rule as we might think today, especially since Muslims
themselves are required to pay zakat (alms). Amira Bennison, in her comment on Muwatta’
Malik’s Ḥadīth , states that “the distinction between the two was therefore not so much a matter
of quantity but quality: Muslims paid taxes for the benefit of their own souls and the needy
amongst them, while non-Muslims were obliged to pay their masters taxes of no particular
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benefit to themselves, except to guarantee their protected status.” 78 While these are helpful
observations, Bennison completely overlooks the fact that jizya was mandated as a way out of
conversion or death. It is true that dhimmis were not obligated to go to war, but they also missed
the booties of the war that their Muslim neighbors gained. Bennison also does not discuss the
percentage that the dhimmis were asked to pay, which is double the amount that the Muslims
paid in regular circumstances—and four times the amount paid if they were traveler merchants.
If there is any doubt left about the intention of jizya, note that dhimmis were required to
pay their jizya publicly “in broad daylight, with hands turned palm upward, and to receive a
smart smack on the forehead or the nape of the neck from the collection officer.” 79 As these
actions clearly demonstrate, jizya was not only served as a means of protection, but it was also
intended to humiliate the dhimmis.
In addition to their obligation to pay the jizya, Christians were subject to persecution and
subordination. Ira M. Lapidus explains that in the eighth century, “Muslims increasingly treated
Jews and Christians as subordinate minorities, forbidding non-Muslims to ride horses, bear
weapons, ring church bells, stage processions, or display religious symbols in public.” 80
Bennison admits that ahl al-dhimma were sometimes required to wear “distinctive garments or
markers of their various faiths—coloured shoulder strips, shawls and belts were all stipulated at
different times—and forbidden to build ostentatious places of worship, ring bells or sound
clappers, sell wine and pork in Muslim areas, carry weapons or hold positions of power over
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Muslims.” 81 During al-Mutawwakil reign, dhimmis were not persecuted or forced to convert to
Islam but rather were subject to public shaming. Kennedy mentions that in AD 850, alMutawwakil issued a decree which forced all dhimmis “to wear yellow on their clothes. Upperclass dhimmis had to wear yellow hoods and simple belts. They also were required to ride with
wooden stirrups and sport two pommels on the backs of their saddles. Their slaves were to wear
yellow patches on their fronts and backs, not less than four finger spans (8 centimeters) across.” 82
These markers represent another way Muslims discriminated against the non-Muslim
communities, creating a system by which they could restrict freedom of movement.
After the establishment of the Islamic government, the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakil (AD
847-862) “banned non-Muslims from holding state office. Not only did he forbid the
employment of non-Muslims in government offices, he also ordered that all churches built since
the commencement of Islam should be demolished and imposed several other discriminatory
regulations on them.” 83 The hagiographical literature of Christian communities from this time
period is rife with stories of Christians martyrs executed by Muslim authorities while confessing
their Christian faith, opposing Islam, converting Muslims from Islam, or preaching against
Islam. 84 The church hagiography tells several stories about people who lost their lives during the
Abbasid dynasty. Christian C. Sahner records that “these martyrs were a varied group, including
monks, soldiers, shopkeepers, village priests, craftsmen, princes, and bishops. They were women and
men, young and old, peasants and nobles Although capital punishment disproportionately affected
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certain groups, especially the clergy, martyrs hailed from across the social spectrum of the early
medieval Middle East.” 85 This is not to say that Muslims were killing people by the sword in a
massive way; rather, it is to show that the historical picture is more complicated than one might
assume at first glance. Capital punishment, while real and furious, was also largely bureaucratic in
nature and relied on state institution. Sahner states that “the Umayyads and Abbasids were not much
interested in persecuting Christians, at least systematically. In fact, the state took a rather laissez-faire
attitude toward the governance of dhimmis… It allowed them to live as they wished provided they
paid the jizya … and accepted their subordination as laid down by the law.” 86 The newly established
religion and law led to massive conversion to Islam, especially for people who were not firmed in
their faith or did not have the means to pay jizya.

The Christians Thinkers in The Council of the Caliphs
The Abbasid regime founded its influence on the idea of proselytism. By definition,
proselytism is “One religion, and within that religion, one version of it, is true.” 87 This idea,
when it is imposed on a local community from a foreign ruler, generates opposition—both
inward-facing within the religion itself and outward-facing toward the adherents of other
religions who resist. The leaders of the subjugated religion do not only resist because they
believe that their own religion is true but also because they are losing power and followers. Right
after the Abbasid’s control was consolidated and its firm political power established, the stage
was set for confrontations between the Abbasid religion—defined as Islam—and the other
religions in the area. Most of the debates that transpired in the History of Islam took place

Christian C. Sahner, Christian Martyrs under Islam: Religious Violence and the Making of the Muslim
World (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), 2.
85

86

Ibid., 6.

87

Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, 64.

38

between the traditionalists and many other parties. Caesar Farah illustrates how the different
views in early Islamic theology were formed into a standard belief system:
Qadarite, for instance, stressed the doctrine of free will, while the Jabrites denied it; the
Sifatites argued for the eternal nature of the attributes of God, while the Mu’tazilites
denied they were eternal; the Murji’ites stressed that human actions must not be subject
to human judgment, while their opponents, the Wa’dites, insisted on the condemnation of
man in this life, before the Day of Judgment; the Kharijites played down the importance
of the role of secular leadership, i.e., the caliphate which they considered merely a human
institution, while the Shi’ites went so far as to consider their imam as divine. 88
At the time, the three major debates among Muslims were as follows: 1) faith versus works. The
Kharijites equated faith and works, insisting that “there could be no compromise, no middle
ground. A Muslim was either rigorously observant, a true believer, or not a Muslim at all.” 89 2)
predestination versus free will. The Qadarites argued for khalq alafcal (that man determines his
own fate) against Jabrya, who followed the majority of the Kharijites and believed in jabr
(predestination). 3) Qur’an—the created Word, versus Qur’an—the uncreated word of God.
Mu’tazilites and Jahmites argued against traditionalists that God’s speech is as eternal as any of
his attributes, and they are inseparable from his essence. Mu’tazilites viewed God speaking or
revealing as an anthropomorphic act, which ultimately would destroy the unity of God because
there would be two eternal entities (God and his word) rather than one that existed eternally. 90
On the Christian side, there arose a need to defend the Christian belief against Islamic
objections. At the center of the debate was the Trinity: both communities believed that they do
not worship the same God, although they both call him Allah in Arabic language. Due to the
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widespread of heresies in the early church period, defending ecclesiastical doctrine was not a
foreign practice among Christians. However, Sara Leila Hussaini suggests that the Trinity itself
was not a topic of discussion among Christians before the rise of Islam because “the doctrine had
been largely settled within the tradition by the end of the fourth century, and the expression of
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit as ‘one ousia and three hypostases’ would have been
accepted in most Christian communities.” 91 However, it is important to mention that the doctrine
of the Trinity cannot be separated from the doctrine of Christology (the two natures of Jesus
Christ as the son of God and son of man). The Melkites, Jacobites, and Church of the East were
in constant contact with each other to defend their conflicting Christology, both amongst
themselves and with many Muslim scholars who debated them.
During the Abbasid dynasty, the new challenge that faced Christians was the need to
communicate their beliefs in Arabic. Muslims were not willing to learn the local language of the
land, but they were spreading Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, in schools and public systems.
Christian scholars needed to write their apologies in Arabic because Muslims do not speak, read,
or write Greek or Syriac. The church faced palpable needs to move to the Arabic language in
their ecclesiastical worship. It needed to reach out to Arabic-speaking/reading Christians and
defend the tenets of orthodoxy from the new Islamic religion. Switching to Arabic would also be
necessary in order to maintain the church’s existence and enlarge as a community. 92 As a result,
the first Abbasid century saw an unprecedented rise in Arabic Christian apologetic writings
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directed against Islam. 93 The Melkites were at the forefront of the shift from Greek into Arabic,
and their monasteries in the Judean desert produced the first translations of the Gospels and
patristic literature. 94 John of Damascus’ writings were the first books to be translated into Arabic,
and Theodor Abū Qurrah was the first Christian theologian to write in Arabic.
Al-Ma’mūn received a thorough education in the most important fields of learning of
his day. His father, caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, used the best teachers in the country to teach his sons
the Arabic language, literature, music, and poetry. 95 Concerning the religious sciences, alMa’mūn was trained in Ḥadīth and studied fiqh (Islamic law) under the experts of the field.
Among other things, he was known for hosting debates between Muslims and representatives of
other faiths at his court. 96 Under his supervision, many debates took place between Christian and
Muslim scholars. But, before we examine the debates that took place under the council of alMa’mūn, we need to understand the Qur’anic conception of the Trinity.
It is important to mention that in AD 833, al-Ma’mūn initiated what is called miḥna
(inquisition) between Sunnis and Muctazilites. During this time, the miḥna was carried out to
ensure that all Muslim scholars professed the doctrine of the created (as opposed to uncreated
and eternal) nature of the Qur’an. The Muctazilites believed that the Qur’an had been created at a
certain point in time by God to confess that God is the only divine and eternal being. 97 AlMa’mūn imprisoned or exiled those who did not comply, most famously Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (AD
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780–855), a respected Ḥadīth scholar and founder of the Ḥanbalī legal school, who actively
opposed the Muctazilite’s doctrine. 98 Though his definitive motive is unclear, it is likely that alMa’mūn wanted to restrict the religious and the secular affairs and keep them under his direct
control. Hussaini believes that even for a short time “the Muctazila enjoyed a ‘golden period’ of
theological and political dominance, which had implications for the nature of Christian-Muslim
debate during this period.” 99 The miḥna period and the ideology of the Muctazilites allowed the
use of human reason to investigate the divine mysteries. This period in the Abbasid dynasty
produced several theological writings on both the Islamic and the Christian sides.
The Widely Recorded Islamic Perception of the Trinity
Against the backdrop of Arabic-Islamic rule, it is no surprise that the doctrine of the
Trinity would become the center of the debate between Muslims and Christians. Muslims believe
in a strict form of monotheism called tawḥīd (divine unity), which is one of the cornerstones of
the Islamic faith. The first pillar of Islam, the shahada, witnesses that “there is no God but
Allah,” implying that the existence of one God. Muslims believe that God is one, without
associates, separation, and division of parts. Allah is also indivisible, eternal, merciful,
transcendent, and possesses ninety-nine beautiful names (Asmā’ Allah al-Husnā), which reflect
his essence, nature, and acts. This belief is supported in the Qur’an. Allah says, “Take not two
gods, He is only one Allah; so of Me alone should you be afraid” (Surah 16:51). Any belief that
is contrary to what Allah requires is considered blasphemy and shirk (associating someone with
Allah in worship), which is the unforgettable sin. The next sections shall examine the Quranic
and the Islamic medieval understanding of the Trinity and objections thereof.
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The Qur’anic Understanding of the Trinity
Mohammad was in direct contact with Christians, and they probably shared some of their
beliefs with him. However, the Qur’an includes several verses that do not reflect orthodox
Christian belief about the doctrine of the Trinity (the Nicene belief) but rather directly criticize it.
The locus classicus of denying the Trinity in the Qur’an is found in Surah 4:171, where
Mohammad exhorts the Christians to stop being dishonest and declare the truth that “the
Messiah, Isa son of Marium is only a messenger of Allah and His Word which He communicated
to Marium and a spirit from Him; believe therefore in Allah and His messengers, and say not,
Three.” Here Mohammad speaks directly to the people of the Book (Christians) and calls Isa
(Jesus) the Messiah, but he orders them not to say “three.” Some new translations render three as
the Trinity. 100 The word thalātha (three) in Arabic shares the same root of the word Trinity, but
the specific Christian phrase for the Trinity—Uqnūm (singular), Aqanīm (plural)—does not
appear in the Qur’an. It seems obvious that the meaning of the phrase “say not, Three” implies
the belief that Christians are not monotheists because “three” indicates the understanding of
polytheism.
Mohammad also thinks that the Trinity includes three gods: Allah, Jesus, and Mary. In
Surah 5:116, he recounts a conversation in which Allah asks Jesus, “did you say to men, take me
and my mother for two gods besides? Allah he will say: Glory be to Thee, it did not befit me that
I should say what I had no right to (say); if I had said it, Thou wouldst indeed have known it;
Thou knowest what is in my mind, and I do not know what is in Thy mind, surely Thou art the
great Knower of the unseen things.” Most commentators project this text to the Day of Judgment.
Jesus denies that he taught the crowd about his and his mother’s divinity. The followers of Jesus
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are accused of taking Jesus and Mary as gods in derogation of Allah. The implied relationship—
father, mother, child—is very foreign to the Christian identity. This verse contradicts the Nicene
understanding of the Trinity that all Christians agree upon.
The inclusion of Mary in the Trinity occurs at different occasions in the Qur’an.
Mohammad teaches the Muslims that “Certainly they disbelieve who say: Surely, Allah—He is
the Messiah, son of Marium,” and he teaches them to reply: “Who then could control anything as
against Allah when He wished to destroy the Messiah son of Marium and his mother and all
those on the earth? And Allah’s is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what is between
them; He creates what He pleases; and Allah has power over all things” (Surah 5:17). It is highly
unusual for Christians to express their faith by saying “Allah—He is the Messiah.” Proclaiming
Christ’s deity is not the same as saying “God is Christ.” It is not that simple. James White
explains that “we do not believe the Son exhausts all that can be said about God. The proper and
balanced assertion is ‘The Messiah is divine and human,’ and, even more to the point, ‘The Son
of God is eternally divine and became man in the person of Jesus the Messiah.’” 101 The
contention of Surah 5:17 denies Mary and Jesus’s divinity and attributes the power of creation
and destruction to Allah only.
The writer of the Qur’an provides several other reasons not to believe that Jesus is God.
First, Jesus himself states that he is not God. Mohammad quotes Jesus directly as stating, “O
Children of Israel! serve Allah, my Lord and your Lord. Surely whoever associates (others) with
Allah, then Allah has forbidden to him the garden, and his abode is the fire; and there shall be no
helpers for the unjust” (Surah 5:72). Al-Ṭabarī explains that Jesus asked people not to worship
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him but to direct their worship to Allah because he is his God, his king, his master, his creator,
and theirs as well. 102 Al-Qurtubī echoes al-Ṭabarī in his explanation and adds that the Jacobites
are the ones who told Mohammad that God is Jesus, son of Mary. Al-Qurtubī repudiates the
divinity of Jesus by asking a question: “if Jesus says O Lord! And O God! then how can he call
himself God? and how can he ask himself? This is impossible.” 103 Ibn Kathīr agrees with alṬabarī and al-Qurtubī, adding the other two sects of Christianity to the conversation (the
Melkites and the Church of the East) and calling their belief shirk (polytheism) to emphasize that
the Christian belief is considered an unforgivable sin—people will lose their eternal life in
heaven if they persevere in this belief. 104
The second reason that the writer of the Qur’an gives against the divinity of Jesus is that
Isa is a mere messenger, a normal man who eats, drinks, and sleeps. “The Messiah, son of
Marium is but a messenger,” says Mohammad, “messengers before him have indeed passed
away; and his mother was a truthful woman; they both used to eat food. See how We make the
communications clear to them, then behold, how they are turned away” (Surah 5:75). Al-Qurṭubī
explains that God shows them shreds of evidence against their beliefs. He tells the Christians,
“You admit that Jesus was a fetus in his mother’s womb, cannot cause harm or benefit, and if
you decided that Jesus does not hear, or see, and does not know, harm, or benefit, then how did
you take that to mean he is God? Allah is the one who hears, which means he is still hearing,
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knowing, causing harm and benefit, and who has these attributes is the real God.” 105 Al-Qurṭubī
believes that the evidence is clear: Jesus was born, acted, and lived his life like a normal man. He
had human desires and needed what human’s need requires; therefore, he cannot be God. All
above-mentioned Islamic scholars—al-Ṭabarī, al-Qurtubī, and Ibn Kathīr—display great
ignorance of, or at the very least completely overlook, the classical Christian orthodox
understanding of the Trinity—one ousia, three hypostases. Instead, they just reflect and expand
on their own interpretations of the Trinity.
Finally, the Qur’an conveys a literal, materialistic, and anthropomorphic understanding of
the title “Son of God.” The writer of the Qur’an states that “the Originator of the heavens and the
earth! How can He have a child, when there is for Him no consort, when He created all things
and is Aware of all things?” (Surah 6:101). Although Mary’s name is not mentioned directly in
this passage, the verse’s allusion is clear: Allah married Mary and had a child called Isa. Ibn
Kathīr, al-Qurtubī, and al-Ṭabarī agree that the meaning of wife is meant to be understood
literally. Since Allah created the heavens and the earth, he does not need a wife and does not
need to have a son who looks like him. 106 He can create whatever he wants and nothing in
creation is like him. The writer of the Qur’an thinks of a physical relationship between God and
his wife (Mary) and a literal pregnancy and birth. The same idea is repeated in Surah 112:1-4.
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Mohammad teaches his followers to say that “Allah, is One. Allah is He on Whom all depend.
He begets not, nor is He begotten. And none is like Him.” The literal understanding of the
Qur’an conveys a distorted picture of the orthodox Trinity that most Christians agree upon.
To conclude, the Quran neither mentions the Trinity nor comes close to accurately
defining what Christians meant by it. The writer of the Qur’an considers Christians to be
polytheists, understands the Trinity in a physical sense and mathematical terms (i.e., 1+1+1=3)—
three beings are divine, namely Father, Mary, and Jesus. God the Father married Mary and had a
baby, named Isa (Jesus). The title Father is not mentioned in the Qur’an, but it is implied in the
physical relationship—Father (Allah), Mother (Mary), and Child (Jesus). The Nicene profession
of the Trinity is not mentioned anywhere in the Qur’an even though it was conducted and widely
agreed upon among Christians about 300 years before the Qur’an is written.
Omitting the correct theological concept of the Trinity from the Qur’an employs a
historical weakness because the Qur’an was written approximately 300 years after the Nicene
Creed. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Qur’anic way of understanding the Trinity is
non-historical. No early church father used the concept of the Trinity in the way that Mohammad
understood it. Tertullian (AD 155-220), for example, was the first church theologian who
introduced the word Trinity while explaining the unity of God in the third century. 107 He did not
believe that God is three separate persons and Mary is one of the divine persons. Augustine (AD
354-430) also believed that “the Trinity is the one and only and true God…” 108 contradicting the
Qur’an and its belief.
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Other Islamic resources, such as Ḥadīths, Islamic commentators, and Islamic
theologians (Mutaklimīn) express the same understanding of the writer of the Qur’an about the
doctrine of the Trinity. In Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī, Mohammad tells his people about the end of times and
how Allah shall conduct his judgment. He states, “Then it will be said to the Christians, ‘What
did you use to worship?’ They will reply, ‘We used to worship Messiah, the son of Allah.’ It will
be said, ‘You are liars, for Allah has neither a wife nor a son.’” 109 This Ḥadīth duplicates the
Qur’anic understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, venerating Mary by making her part of the
Trinity and God’s wife.
The Medieval Islamic Understanding of the Trinity
Under the Abbasid dynasty in the ninth century, several scholars left written apologies
against the Trinity. This section shall examine three of them. The intended purpose of this
section is to inform the reader of the varieties of Islamic objections to the Trinity.
Alī Ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī (783-858)
The first apology was written by Alī Ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī, the son of a Jewish scholar, a
Christian, and a Muslim later on in his life—he converted to Islam at the age of seventy. 110 His
father was a religious leader in a Syriac-speaking community. 111 He was a senior member of the
Muslim governor’s administration and a trusted supporter. According to Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Ṭabarī
converted to Islam at the prompting of the caliph al-Muctaṣim (AD 833–842) and came to court
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during caliph al-Mutawakkil (AD 847–861), who later on made him a table companion. 112 AlṬabarī’s polemic objections to the Trinity are very unique because they are written from the
perspective of a former Christian. It is hard to know why he converted to Islam, but he states that
“the eternal One has called me to write this book of mine as a renunciation of the religion of
Christianity (li-l-tanaṣṣul min dīn al-Naṣrāniyya).” 113 He also thanks al-Mutawakkil, for his help
in writing the book. It seems that he probably felt the need to prove his belief to the caliph. Thus,
he wrote his polemic against the Trinity in order to return a favor or gain his trust. 114
Al-Ṭabarī’s methodology seems to authenticate many sayings of Jesus, especially the
ones that indicate his humanity. He starts his polemics against the Trinity by dissecting the
nature of Jesus Christ and who He is. He lays out twelve points to refute the divinity of Jesus.
For the purpose of this study, only the major objections in relation to the Trinity will be listed.
For instance, al-Ṭabarī accuses the Christians of being polytheists, believing “in three or even
four gods, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and an eternal human who is Jesus Christ.” 115 Al-Ṭabarī
separates between the title “Son” and the person “Jesus Christ,” making them two different
beings. While he does not elaborate on this point, he accuses Christians of believing in four
divine beings. This section could be understood as his personal understanding or addition to the
Christian belief.
Unlike the Qur’an and many other Islamic scholars, al-Ṭabarī cites several Christian
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sources. 116 He focuses in his Christology on what Jesus says according to his humanity to prove
that he cannot be God. For instance, al-Ṭabarī quotes John 20:17, in which Jesus says, “I am
ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God,” and concludes that Jesus is a
mere human, for he is calling God his God. 117 He also quotes Jesus declaring that his mission on
earth is to do the will of God, not his own (John 6:38). Al-Ṭabarī deduces that since Jesus is
fulfilling not his will but God’s will, then he is a different person from God and cannot be
God. 118
Al-Ṭabarī mentions the three major branches of Christianity that existed during the
Abbasid dynasty. Because of his Christian background, it seems that he was aware of the
Christological differences among these branches. To know whether Jesus is divine or not, alṬabarī teaches his followers to ask all types of Christians about the eternality of the creator:
Can he [God] be changed from the condition of his eternity and substantiality, and can
illnesses and death affect him or not? If they say that he is changed and dies, their belief
has died, and the person who says this is like the person whom God almighty in his Book
likens to animals … The eternal Creator cannot be changed and does not die’, they are at
variance with their Creed, and in their eyes the one who is at variance with it does not
believe in it, for it says that Jesus Christ is Creator not created, and is true God from true
God, of the substance of his Father, and that he was killed and crucified and made to
suffer. Thus, their God was changed and died. 119
Al-Ṭabarī believes that God cannot be likened to creation (human or animals) and his nature
cannot be changed. When he looks at Jesus, he sees a person who gets hungry and thirsty,
suffers, and is crucified. For these reasons, Jesus cannot be God.
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Most Islamic scholars either ignore the Nicene Creed in their polemics or deem it as a
hoax, so they do not quote it to explain the Christian belief. Al-Ṭabarī, on the other hand, is one
of few Islamic scholars who use the Nicene Creed in his polemics against the Trinity. 120 While he
acknowledges that all Christian denominations agree on the Nicene Creed, he attributes
contradictions to the first part of the creed:
The beginning of the Creed is, ‘We believe in one God, the Father, Possessor of all
things, Maker of what is seen and unseen.’ And then, with this they stop referring to God
and begin with a new reference, saying, ‘We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, true God
from true God, of the substance of his Father.’ But this is a contradiction of the first part
of what they say, and no one with any justness or understanding will think this fanciful.
For they say, ‘We believe in one God’, and then immediately after this and in the same
way they say, ‘We believe that Jesus Christ is the Creator of all things by his hand’. In
this they affirm another Creator different from the first Creator.
This is another attempt to prove that Christians believe in two different beings, God the Father
and God the Son. Al-Ṭabarī’s understanding of the creed implies literal polytheism. Since the
Father is a creator and the Son is a creator, then there is no one God, but two.
Lastly, al-Ṭabarī contests the meaning of the words Father and Son. He argues that the
meanings of father and progenitor can be understood both literally as referring to procreation
and metaphorically “as when a child uses ‘father’ for his uncle or the person who brings him up
or teaches him or educates him or does him good, and he will also call the elders of his family
and his grandparents ‘fathers’: thus, Adam is called ‘the father of humanity.’ And I have heard
Christian scholars say that God is really called ‘father’ because he is the Initiator and Progenitor
of things.” 121 Al-Ṭabarī does not cite the person who stated this information; instead, he
generalizes the meaning and assumes that it is accepted by all Christians. He continues with the
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same reasoning, explaining that the metaphorical meaning of Son is “someone adopts someone,
that is, he brings him up, teaches him, educates him and does him good. And people of culture
are called ‘sons of culture’ and its ‘brothers.’” 122 Al-Ṭabarī believes that the metaphorical
meanings of the title Son contradicts the Nicene Creed and the Christian faith “because the
followers of Christianity unanimously agree that there are realities to these names, and the
realities are not concealed or derived but are obvious and distinct.” 123 In Al-Ṭabarī’s opinion, if
the Son is eternal, then he is not generated, and if he was generated, then he is not eternal. He
understands the meaning of the word generated in a temporal sense—with a beginning and an
end.
Abū cīsā Muḥammad al-Warrāq (AD 864)
Abū cīsā Muḥammad al-Warrāq was an independent scholar who lived in the ninth
century. Little is known about his life and background, but it seems that he was active in AD
864. 124 It is hard to know his religious background. While the Muctazilites scholars (e.g., cAbd alJabbār and al-Mascudī) accused him of being a Shicite, a zindiq (irreligious), and mulḥid
(atheist), the Ashcarī said that he was a Manichee; and Ibn al-Nadīm portrays him as an
unconventional Muctazilite with such a deep interest in dualist beliefs. 125 David Thomas believes
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Al-Warrāq left a written work against Christianity called Radd calā al-Thalāth Firaq min
al-Naṣārā. The book itself is not available, but Yaḥyā Ibn cAdī included it in his reply by making
a detailed refutation of its arguments. 127 David Thomas managed to edit and translate two
volumes of al-Warrāq’s works, one about the Trinity and the other one about the incarnation.
Although al-Warrāq was labeled a heretic by many Muslims, he was recognized by others as a
reliable authority on non-Muslim religions. Many scholars in the tenth century, such as alMāturīdī, al-Bāqillānī, and cAbdh al-Jabbār, used his works to defeat other religions; but they
attacked him because of his criticism of the Qur’an and the prophet. 128
Al-Warrāq stands out because he is one of a few scholars who studied the Trinity as
Christians explain it. He does not quote the Bible in his book, but he mentions that the referenced
explanation about the Trinity comes from a Christian source. His intention in the Radd is to
expose the downfalls of the Christian belief by presenting several dilemmas against the concept
of God among the three types of Christian sects (Melkites, Jacobites, and Church of the East). He
forms his argument in a series of questions and presents them with several dilemmas to force his
audience to review their beliefs (i.e., ask this … if they answer no, then … and if they answer
yes, then …).
The first dilemma that al-Warrāq presents is related to the nature of substance. While the
Church of the East and the Jacobites apply differentiation and number to the hypostases, they
equate the substance with the hypostases. In al-Warrāq’s opinion, this belief is contradictory
because they are “claiming that what is differentiated is what is not.” 129 The Melkites, on the
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other hand, do not believe that the substance is the hypothesis, but if they do in some respects
“other than the respect in which it is different from them, then if the respect in which it is
identical with them is itself, the respect in which it is different from them must be other than
itself, requiring an eternal other than the substance.” 130 In other words, if the substance is
different from the hypostases in a respect that is different from them and itself, then there is
another eternal being other than the substance; and if another eternal is admitted, then
Christianity becomes a polytheistic belief.
The second dilemma is presented when the Christians say that the substance is different
from the hypostases in every respect. Al-Warrāq believes, “then it necessarily follows, since the
substance is divine, that neither the father nor the Son nor the Spirit is divine; and if each of the
hypostases is divine, that the substance is not divine.” 131 In other words, whether the Melkites say
it is the same or it is different, their belief is wrong.
The third dilemma arises when the Christians say that the substance is neither different
from the hypostases nor identical to them. Al-Warrāq asks these questions: “why characterize the
substance differently from the hypostases and the hypostases differently from the substance? …
will people be able to tell at all between the statement: ‘two things, one separate from the other,
whose names and descriptions are distinct but they themselves are not,’?” 132 Al-Warrāq’s
understanding requires the term other, but “the term ‘other’ cannot be applied to it neither can
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the terms ‘identical and different,’ or ‘identity’ and ‘difference.’” 133 Therefore, their claim that
the substance is neither identical nor different from the hypostases does not stands.
Al-Warrāq raises a different objection to the divinity of the three hypostases. He is one of
a few scholars who acknowledge that Christians believe that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit
are divine; however, they do not believe in three divinities but one. They all believe that each of
the hypostases is Lord and creator, not three Lords and three creators. 134 However, al-Warrāq still
thinks of this belief as a contradiction. He explains:
If the substance is other than the hypostases then its action must be other than theirs and its
creation other than theirs… if action must be affirmed of the substance and not of the
hypostases, then consequently it must be denied of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, which
must all be debarred from it… if action and creation belong to the hypostases and not the
substance which is other than them, then you have claimed that the eternal divinity, which
is the general substance and its hypostases, has no action or work or control. 135
Al-Warrāq seems to consider the substance as a separate being, which is comparable to the three
hypostases.
Al-Warrāq presents an objection to the nature of fatherhood and sonship of the Trinity.
He asks, “Is it [substance] of the Father’s substance or not? If it is not of his substance then it
must be of a substance other than his ... If it is eternal then they affirm two eternal substances ...
If it is contingent, then before the appearance of this substance the Father was not Father and was
not entitled to fatherhood.” 136 His confusion between the substance and the hypostases continues
with his understanding of the fatherhood of the Father and the sonship of Jesus. “If fatherhood is
of the substance of the father,” says al-Warrāq, “and the substance of the Son is according to
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you, the substance of the Father then it follows that the Son must be Father and that you must
affirm fatherhood of him as you do of the Father, since their substance is one.” 137 It seems that
although al-Warrāq worked to understand the Trinity according to Christian belief, his grasp of
the one divine being and three hypostases remained oblique.
Al-Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Husnī, al-Rassī (AD 785-860)
Al-Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Husnī, known as al-Rassī, was born in AD 785, grew up in alMedina, and spent eleven years in Egypt. 138 He was contemporary to Hārūn al-Rashīd, alMa’mūn, and al-Mūtawakkil caliphs during the Abbasid reign. He was persecuted by the
Abbasids for practicing secret dacwa (call) to the Shicites.139 He gained several supporters,
however, and was called the star of Mohammad. 140 While he was in Egypt, he learned about
Christianity and debated Christians and Jews. In AD 826, he left Egypt and settled in al-Rass
near al-Medina, where he died in AD 860. While he was influenced to a large extent by the
Muctazilites, he was one of the founders of the theological traditions of the Zaydi branch
of Shicite. 141
Al-Rassī’s intent in writing Ar-Radd calā al-Naṣarā (a reply to the Christians) is to refute
the Christian revelation and their doctrine of God. He objects to the names of the hypostases—
Father, Son, and Spirit—categorizing them into three different groups: natural names, which are

137

Ibid., 129.

W. Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrdhim und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin, Germany:
De Gruyter, 1966), 86-96. Binyamin Abrahamov, “Al-Ḳāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm’s Theory of the Imamate,” Arabica, T. 34,
(1987): 80.
138

Al-Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Husnī al-Rassī, اﻟرد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻧﺻﺎرى, ed. Hanafi Abduallah (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al=Afaq al-Arabia, 2000), 15.
139

140

Ibid.

141

Abrahamov, “Al-Ḳāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm’s Theory of the Imamate,” 80.

56

related to the substance; hypostatical names, which are proper names; and incidental names,
which are related to the situation/verb. To him, Father and Son are incidental names. “If you
name the Father as father,” says al-Rassī, “because he gave birth, as you stated, he had a son and
a child, so these names are not natural nor hypostatical personal names, but they are incidental,
when children are born, between the parents and their children, and not natural, or proper names
nor in Roma or other than Roma.” 142 Al-Rassī categorizes Father and Son as incidental names
and not natural or proper. These names, in his opinion, are used to describe a verb or an action.
He compares them to earth, heaven, or fire, which denote something that is its substance. 143
Something that can be explained by its name and not by anything else.
In the second part of the book, al-Rassī calls the Christian to al-Inṣāf (fairness). He bases
his invitation on five common points on which all Christians and Muslims agree: 1) the
testimony of Allah, 2) the testimony of the angels, 3) the sayings of Jesus and his testimony, 4)
the testimony of Mary the mother of Jesus, and 5) the testimony of Jesus’s disciples and their
message. 144 He starts by quoting Matthew 1:1: “This is the genealogy of Jesus the Messiah the
son of David, the son of Abraham.” Al-Rassī uses this verse to prove to the Christians that Jesus
is the son of David, not God. He explains that the meaning of fatherhood and sonship in the
Gospel is not consistent in the Gospels because Jesus says to his disciples that God is their father
(Matt 5:48). Al-Rassī also adds the testimony of Mary, Jesus’s mother, to that of Apostle Philip,
stating that both give testimony that Jesus is the son of Joseph. However, he never cites any
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reference from the Gospel. 145 Finally, al-Rassī includes the testimony of the angels to Mary, 146
telling her that she will bear a child, not that she would bear the son of God. 147 Moreover, while
al-Rassī affirms the authenticity of a few verses, he declines the authenticity of others. For
example, he declines that Simon Peter may have said that Jesus is the son of God. 148 It is
important to note that Al-Rassī claims to quote the Bible; however, he does not quote from a
known Arabic translation. He either cites the Bible from memory without paying attention to the
accuracy of the verses or paraphrases the verses according to his own understanding.
Conclusion
During the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, Christian-Muslim relations were
complicated. Some of the Christians were professional state administrators under the Umayyads.
They were in high demand, both because they knew how to run the government and because they
knew Greek, Syriac, and Arabic. Under the early reign of the Abbasids, circumstances changed
for the Christians. Some caliphs, like Harūn al-Rashīd and his son al-Ma’mūn, were not
religiously strict. The former started the translation project of Bayt al-Ḥikma, which contributed
to the development of several sciences, and the latter encouraged debates between Muslim and
non-Muslim scholars under his council, which resulted in several religious writings. The
translation movement would have not flourished without the support of the caliphs and the
contributions of Syriac-speaking Christians.
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Although many Christians worked for the Abbasid caliphs in translation, several also
lived under restrictions, and various were persecuted. Various social, religious, and financial
restrictions were implemented on Christians and dhimmis under caliph al-Mutawakil, resulting in
persecution to the extent of martyrdom. However, Christian scholars were able to defend and
debate Muslim scholars for a short period, especially during al-Ma’mūn’s reign. A need to
defend the Christian belief against Islamic objections arose, and the Trinity was at the center of
the debate as Christian and Muslim scholars worked to demonstrate that they did not worship the
same God.
During this time and under these circumstances, many disputations were written between
Muslims and Christians. From the Muslim side, the majority of them are directed against the
Trinity and the Christian understanding of the nature of God. Some objections are based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of what the Christians actually teach because they are based on
non-historical arguments, others are rooted in semantic confusion, and others are based on
personal observation, accusing Christians of being non-rational.
The non-historical objections ignore the Gospels and the Nicene Creed’s explanation of
the Trinity. They ridicule the Christian belief, label it as contradictory, and add what does not
belong to it. In the Qur’an, Mohammad clearly confuses the doctrine of the Trinity with the
notion of divine cohabitation, deifying Mary from whom Christ was born, and making her
member of the holy Trinity. He also describes the Christian faith in a polytheistic way, including
God, Mary, and Jesus to the Godhead.
The semantic objections are more Christological in nature because they are related to the
literal and metaphorical meanings of the titles “Father” and “Son.” These objections convey a
literal, materialistic, and anthropomorphic perception of the title “Son of God.” Muslims argue
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that the Christian belief includes God having a wife or a son in a literal sense. When the title
“Father” is used literally, it must mean progenitor, which indicates procreation. When it is used
metaphorically, it conveys the idea of God being the Creator of all things. “Son,” on the other
hand, may be understood in an adoptionist sense if it is used metaphorically. According to the
Muslims, this thinking contradicts the Nicene Creed because while Christians claim to believe in
one God, they announce two creators. Moreover, some scholars went further to argue that
Christian’s explanation of the terms “Father” and “Son” indicates more than three persons. Some
scholars separate the “Son” and “Jesus,” making them two persons, resulting in great confusion
as to what Christians actually teaches regarding the Trinity.
The “being non-rational objection” is agreed upon by most ancient, medieval, and
contemporary Muslim scholars. 149 They accuse Christians of being non-logical in their
explanation of the Trinity because they believe in three persons and call them one God. The
animus with which Islamic tradition views core Christian doctrines is still very much alive
today. 150 Most Muslims and Christians who have entered into serious conversation found the
doctrines of the Trinity to be a “dead end.” I do not intend to solve this dilemma; instead, I seek
to add to the conversation.

149 c
abd al-Majīd al-Sharafī, The Islamic Throught about the reply to the christians: to the End of the Tenth
Century (Tunisia: al-Dar al-Tunisya LilNashir, 1986), 6. Al-Sharafī concludes that most of the Islamic replies to the
beliefs of the Christians after the tenth century were copying the arguments of the previous centuries, especially the
ninth and the tenth centuries.
150
Hugh Goddard, “Muslim and Christian Beliefs,” in Contemporary Muslim–Christian Encounters:
Developments, Diversity, and Dialogues, Ed. Paul Hedges, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 294.

60

Chapter Two: The Iconoclastic Effect of the Qur’anic Perception of the Trinity
In the previous chapter, I presented the Qur’anic understanding of the Trinity, which
includes Mary as a divine person within the Godhead. Several scholars have been studying the
Qur’anic reference of Mary for decades by using different methods and ending with different
conclusions. This chapter surveys these studies briefly, examines the historical and theological
beliefs about the Theotokos icons in the history of Christianity, and finally moves to argue the
effect of the Theotokos icon on the Qur’anic perception of the Trinity for the purpose of studying
the possible reasons why Mary is divinized in the Qur’an.
Survey of Previous Research
Previous studies suggest several reasons for the Qur’anic belief about the Trinity. For
example, Abū Mūsa al-Ḥarīrī, a Christian Arab scholar, suggested that Mohammad learned about
Christianity from Waraqa bin Nūfal, an Ebionite monk who followed the Gospel according to the
Hebrews. 151 Al-Ḥarīrī relied heavily on Islamic resources to learn about Waraqa. He reports that
Waraqa was the only one who translated the Gospel of the Hebrews into Arabic because of his
extensive knowledge of Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebrew languages. 152 Many Islamic resources
mention him copying the Gospel and translating it from Hebrew to Arabic. 153
According to al-Ḥarīrī, Waraqa was well educated and knowledgeable in Gnosticism. 154
This reason pushed al-Ḥarīrī to jump to the conclusion that the Gospel of the Hebrews is the only
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Gospel that was known to Waraqa and it is the Gospel that he used to teach Mohammad. AlḤarīrī states, “The Arabic Qur’an mentions one Gospel, which proves that ‘the Gospel of the
Hebrews’ was the only one known, especially because we find a complete match in the
information concerning doctrines, dogmas, forms of worship, and the religious calendar…” 155 It
is true that several similarities exist between the Ebionites’ belief about Jesus and the Qur’an’s
teachings about Jesus; however, their beliefs are not identical. For instance, the Ebionites denied
the virgin birth and believed that Jesus was the biological son of Joseph and Mary; whereas the
Qur’an approves the virgin birth of Jesus. Al- Ḥarīrī’s study seems to rely heavily on Islamic
resources without taking into consideration other historical factors, such as the beliefs of the
specific Arab Christians in South Arabia that Mohammad encountered. Al-Ḥarīrī even jumps
abruptly to the conclusion that Waraqa was the president of the church in Makkah during Abdul
Mutalib’s life (Mohammad’s uncle) and for a long period of time during Mohammad’s life. 156
Other scholars think that the Qur’anic view of the Trinity was influenced by Christian
sects/cults that exalted Mary far above her usual Christian status. 157 William Montgomery Watt,
Scottish Anglican Islamologist, suggests that Mohammad’s attack on the Trinity was not against
an orthodox Christian formulation but rather against a heterodox community—people who
believed in God and yet introduced false doctrines. 158 He explains that the idea that Mary was
part of the Trinity “may have come from an obscure set of Collyridians, heard of in Arabia more
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than two centuries before Muhammad.” 159 Collyridians were a cultic group in Arabia, composed
mainly of women who worshiped Mary the mother of Jesus. 160 Epiphanius of Salamis writes in
his Panarion about a group of women who came from Thrace to Arabia who seemed to adopt a
particular form of devotion to Mary, offering her loaves of bread on appointed days (called in
Greek Kollyris). 161 Furthermore, Jamāl al-Dīn Qāsimī, a Syrian Muslim scholar, supports Watt’s
idea and argues for the possibility that Surah 5:73 refers to the Collyridians as a Christian sect.
He states, “Among the Christians there was a group (firqa) called ‘Collyridians’ who said that
gods are three: the Father, the Son, and Mary.” 162 Despite the claim “Arabia is the mother of
heresies,” 163 this view has no historical evidence in early Islamic and Christian literature. There is
no evidence that Mohammad was in touch with the Collyridians, and Epiphanius’s polemic
implies that they were an obscure sect of no great importance. 164
As for the origin of the Quranic reference to Mary as one of three gods, Watt mentions
another possible explanation by referring to the goddess connotations of Mary found in the
relatively early Christian Apocrypha. 165 There is evidence that before the fourth century scribes
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in ancient Syria described the Holy Spirit not only as a female but also as a mother. 166 Suzan
Ashbrook Harvey explains that the Syriac church emphasized the birth of Jesus, his baptism in
the Jordan, and his descent to Sheol as imagery in relation to baptism; whereas, the Greco-Latin
churches highlighted the “resurrection, of baptism as a dying and rising, and the baptismal water
as the grave, following on the Pauline teachings of Rom 6:4-6 especially.” 167 Ashbrook Harvey
continues, “In early Syriac tradition Baptism was above all a rebirth, following John 3:3-7, and
the baptismal water was the ‘womb’ that bore true sons and daughters for the heavenly kingdom.
Baptism became the ‘Mother of Christianity,’ as Mary has been the Mother of Christ.” 168 It seems
that cults understood the baptismal imagery in this way: as Mary gave birth to Jesus through her
womb, Christ gave birth to Christians through the womb of the baptismal waters. Thus, womb
imagery might have been used in Gnostic and apocryphal literature to identify Jesus’s mother
with the Holy Spirit, possibly due to the feminine form of the word Spirit in Syriac language. 169
Ashbrook Harvey indicates that the shift to the masculine form of the word Spirit which occurred
during the fifth century was to bring the Syriac churches into closer conformity with those of the
Greco-Latin West. 170
Recent critical scholarship of the Qur’an as represented by the works of Sidney Griffith
and Gabriel Reynolds displays a shift from the heretical Quranic explanation to the emphasis on
the rhetorical language of the Qur’an. According to these scholars, the misunderstanding of the
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Trinity should not be understood as referring to heretical sects but rather “as a rhetorical device
developed by the Qur’an to win over an argument in such a polemical environment.” 171 For
example, when Mohammad claimed that Christians said “God is Jesus, the son of Mary” or “God
is the third of three,” he was not simply repeating these narratives, but he was using polemical
statements to allude, add, and even correct them. Sidney Griffith states that “the Qur’an’s
seeming misstatement, rhetorically speaking, should therefore not be thought to be a mistake, but
rather a polemically inspired caricature, the purpose of which is to highlight in Islamic terms the
absurdity, and therefore the wrongness, of the Christian belief, from an Islamic perspective.” 172
Reynolds echoes Griffith, saying that “Christians refer to Christ as the son of God, and the
Qur’an explicitly rejects this appellation [sic] (Q 9:30), yet it also insists (against the Jews) that
Christ had no father at all (Q 3:59), and so it cannot refer to him as ‘Son of his father.’ Thus, the
Qur’an refers to Jesus as the son of his mother, and thereby encapsulates its argument against
both Christians and Jews.” 173 Given their knowledge about Arabic culture and the way Arabs
argue, Griffith and Reynolds’s suggestion seem very reasonable; however, taking into
consideration the types of Christianity that were available to Mohammad in Arabia and the
context of his conversations with them might reveal a better understanding of his statements
about Christianity. In my estimation, there is no problem with any of the above-mentioned
approaches. They are all prospects that scholars should pursue, but my study seeks to propose
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different possibilities. According to my research, a different explanation may account for the
Qur’anic misunderstanding that scholars have not presented yet.
The Theotokos Icon: A Historical Background
The Theotokos icon was widely spread among Christians in the Levant, Egypt, and
Ethiopia. The few icons that survived were dated between the fourth and seventh centuries,
indicating that such icons were widely spread among Christians well before the rise of Islam.
One example of these is a fourth-century image of Mary and Child seated on a throne,
discovered in the city of al-Fayyum in Egypt and is now in the Staatliche Museum in Berlin. 174
Another is a fifth or sixth-century image of a venerated Virgin and Child appearing on a
fragmentary papyrus leaf from the Alexandrian Chronicle in the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. 175
A sixth-century ampulla from Palestine, now residing at Monza in the Treasury of the Collegiale,
depicts the mother Mary and baby Jesus sitting in the same posture. 176 There is also a surviving
seventh-century image of Mary holding her child in an apse in Saqqara in Egypt. 177 Besides
these, excavators found a sixth-century mural painting of Mary (though her face did not survive)
in Kom el-Dikka, Alexandria. She was seated on a throne and accompanied by angels, and the
Child is seated in a frontal position on her left knee. According to Thomas Mathews and Norman
Muller, the image is an important testimony to the veneration of Marian images in early
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Byzantine and Egyptian churches. 178 The icons and images mentioned here are few among many
that survived.
In a study about the term Theotokos, J. A. McGuckin expresses his belief that “the word is
an ancient Alexandrian theologoumenon that made its way by themed third century to an international
arena because of its use by leading Logos theologians in Egypt, Palestine, and Rome.”179 Building on
McGuckin’s study, Mathews and Muller conclude that Marian icons started in Egypt with the
goddess Isis, who had been called both the Mother of the God (because she was the mother of
the divine Horus) and the Great Virgin (because she miraculously conceived her son after he had
died). 180 The historicity of this theory is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, if Matthew
and Muller’s conclusion is right, then it is reasonable to say that when the Roman empire was
following pagan religions, people made images and venerated their pagan gods. In the same
manner once the Roman empire moved to Christianity, people began making and venerating
Christian figurative art. Without conscious thought about their pagan origins, they began forming
a new theology about the holy images.
In the wider Christian world, a large number of the sixth and seventh-century churches
included mosaics, an art form that displayed the brilliant work of the era. In a church in
Thessaloniki, now transformed into a mosque, “the Ascension of Christ is portrayed on the vault
of the cupola, while on the apse, the Virgin, seated on a gem-encrusted throne, bears the Baby
Jesus in her arms.” 181 A similar iconography occurs in a mosaic of Mary and Jesus in the chapel
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of San Zeno in Santa Prassede in Rome (AD 817-824). 182 In conclusion, the Theotokos icons
were widely spread among Christians in most churches in different styles, shapes, and sizes
before the seventh century. Christians adorned, venerated, and used them in their worship.
The Theotokos Title: A Theological Background
The Theological Argument before the Sixth Century
The theological conversation about the Theotokos started in the fifth century during the
Council of Ephesus in AD 431, when Cyril of Alexandria advocated for venerating Mary by
giving her the title Theotokos (the one who conceived or gave birth to God). Cyril anathematized
Nestorius, the patriarch of Constantinople, who advocated for the Christotokos (the one who
gave birth to Christ). The council ended up voting in favor of Cyril and for use of the title
Theotokos.
Cyril taught that the Word of God was conceived in Mary’s womb in order to sanctify
humanity. The immortal God united himself to a mortal human flesh (even in death) to
accomplish the incorruptibility and imperishability of the flesh in his own body for the whole
human race. 183 By uniting himself to human death in Christ, God who is immortal overcame
death and thus enabled flesh to be set beyond death and corruption. 184 Sarah Jane Boss describes
it well when she says that Jesus “took what was ours to be his very own so that we might have all
that was his.” 185 In order to accomplish this purpose, God used Mary to bring forth corporally
God made one with flesh. Cyril states,
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For this reason we also call her Mother of God, not as if the nature of the Word had the
beginning of its existence from the flesh. For ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the
Word was God, and the Word was with God,’ and he is the Maker of the ages, coeternal
with the Father, and Creator of all; but, as we have already said, since he united to
himself hypostatically human nature from her womb, also he subjected himself to birth as
man, not as needing necessarily in his own nature birth in time and in these last times of
the world, but in order that he might bless the beginning of our existence, and that that
which sent the earthly bodies of our whole race to death, might lose its power for the
future by his being born of a woman in the flesh. 186
Cyril of Alexandria calls Mary the Mother of God not because he thought she was divine but
because Jesus is God, and she played a role in the divine plan for saving humanity. To Cyril,
refusing to call Mary the Mother of God equals denying Jesus’s divinity. Cyril sent letters of
condemnation to Nestorius, stating that “if anyone refuses to confess that the Emmanuel is in
truth God, and therefore that the holy virgin is Mother of God (θεοτόκος), for she gave birth after
a fleshly manner to the Word of God made flesh; let him be anathema.” 187
It was in honor of the definition by the Council of Ephesus of Mary as Theotokos that
Pope Sixtus III built the most important shrine to Mary in the West, the Basilica of Santa Maria
Maggiore in Rome. 188 The theological argument and the council of Ephesus helped to spread the
icon of the Theotokos among churches in the West and the East after the sixth century, especially
after Mary officially became known as the Mother of God.
The Theological Argument after the Sixth Century
After the council of Ephesus, the veneration of Mary started developing into different
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cults. According to Hans Belting, in the seventh century, “a new and decisive phase of the
Virgin’s cult began when the capital and the hard-pressed empire needed a support in the age of
wars against the Avars and the Persian, and ultimately against Islam.” 189 By AD 626, after the
great siege of the city of Constantinople by the Avars and the Persians, Mary had emerged as the
special protectress. People believed that her icon saved them from their enemies, 190 which made
her veneration even stronger.
According to Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon, the earliest images to acquire cult status
were the acheiropoeta of images (made without hands). They are of two kinds: either they are
images believed not to be made by human hands or they are the mechanical impressions of the
divine face or the body—miraculous impressions of the celestials. 191 Three acheiropoeta
manifested during the second half of the sixth century:
The so-called mandylion of Edessa, an imprint of Christ’s face on a piece of linen, was a
contact relic, the sanctity of which was multiplied by the miraculous portrait that
immediately appeared on it. It is first attested c. 590 by Evagrios, and at about the same
time we hear of two more acheiropoieta of Christ: one, in Memphis (Egypt), is
mentioned by the so-called Piacenza pilgrim c. 570, the other in kamoulianai (Syria), is
described in a Syriac epitome of a chronicle by Zachariah of Mitylene written by an
anonymous monk in 569. Like relics, acheiropoieta had intercessory and salvatory
power: they superseded the role of Roman urban palladia—statues that housed the soul of
the city—and channeled divine force to Christian community. Evagrios credited the
Edessa portrait with the salvation of that city, and, in 626 an acheiropoieton image of
Christ (perhaps the Kamoulianai portrait) famously saved Constantinople from the
Avars. 192
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The fact that churches and individual people perceived this as a miracle played a great role in
increasing veneration of images and leading to the formation of several cults. This concept
persisted until the last quarter of the seventh century because it was believed that the holy images
and relics had miraculous or intercessory powers. 193
In most pre-iconoclastic representations, Mary is depicted as holding Jesus, the Child,
and presenting him to the world. She is not only venerated because of her role in the incarnation
but also as an intercessor. Among the many examples of pre-iconoclastic imagery that have been
given, Mary is also “identified by an inscription as HAΓIA MAPIA and is flanked by the
archangels. A suggestion of her role as intercessor is made by the enthroned figure of Christ
placed directly over her.” 194 There is an icon by the south door of the church of Hagia Sofia in
Constantinople (modern Istanbul) depicting the Virgin with Constantine and Justinian on either
side of her. In her lap sits the Christ child. This mosaic has stood in its place for over one
thousand years. While it is not known when it was created and concealed under the whitewash
and plaster, the current image dates back to the tenth or eleventh century, witnessing the
important role that medieval Christians gave to Mary. 195
By the seventh century, churches had begun incorporating Christian symbols in their
designs (such as the shape of the cross and Christ’s image) because they resemble the physical
likeness and the work of God in human form. Ernst Kitzinger reports that the cult of Christian
images increased and intensified from the middle of the sixth century until the imposition of
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iconoclasm in AD 730. 196 It is beyond the scope of this research to study the history of the
iconoclasm; however, it is important to mention that many Christians saw the iconoclasm as a
response to a strong and steady rise in the importance of sacred images from the sixth century
onwards.
By contrast, Palestinian iconoclasm, according to Brubaker and Haldon, “was not
consistently applied; and, in Palestine, it seems to have been a localized response rather than the
realization of some anti-image edict by the ruling caliph.” 197 Under the Umayyads in Damascus
and during the period of Leo III’s rule in the Byzantine empire, five churches attest to active
construction and a skilled artisanal workforce employed by Christians. People facing day-to-day
consequences of Umayyad rule were in a different situation from people living under Byzantine
rule. Iconoclasm in Palestine was neither inspired by Byzantine iconoclasm nor spurred by any
official Islamic policy. The Byzantine iconoclasm was not accepted by Christian churches in the
East after AD 754. It was condemned in AD 760, 764, and 767 by Eastern synods and
patriarchs. 198 The Byzantine iconoclasm did not affect the prevalence of the Theotokos as
drastically as one might think. While the Western iconoclasts rejected the images of Christ,
Mary, and the saints, the Eastern iconophiles acknowledged, defended, and even actively
advanced the decoration of their churches with pictorial renderings of secular themes. 199
Mohammad’s Experience with the Christians During His Life
The Arabic appellation for Christians (masīḥīyūn) never appears in the Qur’an. The
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writer of the Qur’an used instead several other terms that we understand to refer to Christians.
For instance, the most common appellation that Mohammad and Muslims deploy is naṣārā.
According to Griffith, “In the early Islamic period, Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslims
alike regularly used the Qur’an’s term naṣārā as the functional equivalent of the name
‘Christians’ (Χριστιανοι masīḥīyyūn) for the several ecclesial communities of the followers of
Jesus of Nazareth (Acts 11:26), who lived in the world of Islam.” 200 Today, Arab Christians do
not use this word to refer to their religion; however, many Muslims still use it to refer to
Christians. It is also important to note that the English translation of naṣārā always appeared as
Christians in the Islamic scripture. Naṣārā, however, is not the only appellation that is used to
refer to Christians. Labels such as “Scripture People” (ahl al-kitāb) and “Gospel People” (ahl alinjīl) have been used as well (Surah 5:47, 59, 65, 68, 77, 57:29).
The appellations above and the evidence of an exchange of information between Muslims
and Christians suggest that Mohammad was in contact with Christians in different places and at
different times throughout his life. According to Muhammad Hamidullah, Makkah was a
developed city that contained people from different religions. 201 While Medina was a lessdeveloped city, compared to Makkah, it was “a single house that encompasses people of diverse
beliefs within its walls.” 202 Islamic literature mentions several Jewish tribes such as Banī Quraẓa
and Banī Nuḍair who lived in Medina, and it also affirms that Mohammad was in contact with
Christians. Actually, Mohammad met with Christians in several places: in the Levant, Makkah,

200

Griffith, “Al‐Naṣārā in the Qur’ān: A hermeneutical reflection,” 303.

Muhammad Hamidullah, “Aqdam Dustur Musajjal fi-l-ʿAlam,” Islamic Scholars Conference, vol.
1 (1937): 98, accessed February 14, 2021, retrieved from https://abulhasanalinadwi.org/book/aqdam-dastoormusajjal-fil-aa/
201

202

Ibid., 99. “”ﻓﻛﺎن ﺑﯾت واﺣد ﯾﺿﻣن ﺑﯾن ﺟدراﻧﮫ اﻧﺎﺳﺎ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﯾن ﻓﻲ اﻻدﯾﺎن

73

and Medina. Both Surah al-Nisā’ and Surah al-Mā’da are Madni Surahs (written in Medina) that
include speeches related to Christians (Surah 4: 171; 5:78). This evidence indicates that
Mohammad was in contact with Jews and Christians, and this contact was formative to Islamic
identity.
In the Levant
Mohammad’s initial interaction with Christians possibly occurred early in his life when
he traveled to the Levant with his uncle for trade. Most Syrian monasteries appear to have been
situated near the major trade routes because these monks sought interaction with travelers.
According to Islamic biographer Ibn Isḥāq, Mohammad traveled to Syria with his uncle on a
merchant caravan. While they were near Buṣra in Syria, they met with monk Baḥīrā “who was
well versed in the knowledge of Christians. A monk had always occupied that cell. There he
gained his knowledge from a book that was in the cell so they allege, handed on from generation
to generation.” 203 Christian literature written between the sixth and the tenth centuries do not
mention Baḥīrā nor the encounter between him and Mohammad. Richard Gottheil has translated
Syriac and Arabic documents about the legend of Sergius Baḥīrā, who is believed to be the same
monk that Mohammad met in Syria; however, he dates these documents to the late eleventh and
probably early twelfth centuries. 204 These documents seem to be written for polemic purposes,
emphasizing that Baḥīrā was the original channel for Muhammad’s revelations. As Guillaume
mentions in his introduction to the Life of Muhammad, it is hard to authenticate this story. 205 The
part that describes Baḥīrā owning an ancient book that was handed down from one generation to
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another does not give enough information regarding whether this book is an apocryphal book,
such as the Gospel according to the Hebrews, one of the four Gospels, the Diatessaron, or
another book. Despite the lack of detail, this story does offer a glimpse of Mohammad coming
into contact with Christians of some sort—however, it is hard to know whether they were
orthodox or heretical.
In Arabia
It’s possible that the first thorough interaction between Mohammad and Christians took
place in Arabia. Most Islamic scholars agree that Khadija, the first wife of Mohammad, was a
Christian, and her cousin was a monk. Khadija was a rich merchant woman in Mecca who hired
Mohammad to transport and sell her goods in Syria after she heard about his admirable character.
After their marriage, Khadija arranged for Mohammad to meet with her cousin, monk Waraqa ibn
Naufal, who was introduced in Islamic literature as a “blind, elderly Christian sage with profound
knowledge of the Bible.” 206 Like the story of monk Baḥīrā, the narrative of the life of Waraqa is
equivocal. Some Islamic sources suggest that Waraqa died shortly after recognizing Mohammad as a
prophet. 207 Others suggest that Waraqa learned from those who followed the Torah and the Gospel,
wrote the Gospels to the Hebrews, and helped Mohammad launch his new religion. 208 A study written
by Brian C. Bradford suggests that the Hebrew books Waraqa read “could have included groups who
possessed a Hebrew Matthew, the Diatessaron, According to the Hebrews, or any of the other texts
that have been shown to have Qur’anic parallels.” 209 Finally, the above-mentioned study by al-Ḥarīrī,
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affirms that Waraqa was not a Christian but an Ebionite monk who helped Mohammad to launch his

new religion and that all the references to the word naṣāra in the Qur’an were added later by
‘Uthmān. 210 Regardless of the background of Waraqa (orthodox or non-orthodox), the salient point
for our discussion is that Mohammad’s biography shows that he was in contact with Christians, that
he probably met with them in their churches, and that Waraqa was one of them.

The second contact between Mohammad and Christians is well-documented in Islamic
literature. While Christians were not numerous in Makkah, South Arabia was home to several
well-organized Christian communities. Excavations in the city of Sana’a in Yemen revealed a
big cathedral called Qalis church, which represents a strong Christian presence in South Arabia.
Islamic sources tell the story of King Abraha al-Ashram, who built a great cathedral in Sana’a
and called it Qalis. 211 Ibn al-Kalbi cites Abraha explaining to the king of Ethiopia after having
completed the building of the church stating, “I have built to you a church / the like of which no
one has ever built. I shall not let the Arabs alone until I divert their pilgrimage away from the
house to which they go and turn its course to this church.” 212 It seems that the purpose of Abraha
was to create a turning point in the pilgrimage in Makkah to Sana’a by making a great cathedral
that competes with Kacba, instituting a great center for Christianity in South Arabia. This story
informs the reader that Christianity was well-established in the Arabic Peninsula before the birth
of Mohammad.
In addition to Sana’a, a famous area in South Arabia called Najrān has surfaced in both
Christian and Islamic hagiographies. Christianity was well-rooted for more than a century in this
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area before the birth of Mohammad. According to Ifran Shahid, “Najrān converted to
Christianity in the first half of the fifth century by Ḥayyān, one of its merchants, who brought the
Christian Gospel from Ḥīra before the birth of the Monophysite movement.” 213 Philostorgius
writes in his Church History about Theophilus, who was sent to the Ḥimyarite ruler Ta’ran
Yuhan’im, who then converted to Christianity. 214 As a result of his conversion, three churches
were constructed, one in the capital city of Ẓafār, one in Aden, and one near the mouth of the
Persian Gulf. 215 Moreover, The Najrānite Christian community was linked with Abyssinia
(Ethiopia), which had strong political relations in Yemen in AD 525, a connection that
subsequently strengthened the Christian life in Najrān. According to Islamic resources, Najrān
used to have its own Kacba to compete with the one in Makkah. 216
The struggle between Christianity and Judaism before the rise of Islam reached its climax
in the sixth century in Najrān. A major Ethiopian military intervention “brought about the
downfall of the Ḥimyaritic kingdom of South Arabia and spread the Christian faith as well as the
dominion of the Negus across the Red Sea.” 217 A recently discovered Syriac manuscripts reveal
several events of severe persecution that happened in the city of Najrān in AD 523 against the
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Christians, led by a pagan king who converted to Judaism. 218 Thus, Najrān became the Arabian
martyropolis, a place of pilgrimage for the Arabic Christian tribes in the Arabian Peninsula.
Several historians believe that Christians in Najrān were Monophysites. 219 Monophysites
believe in that Jesus Christ only has one nature, the divine nature, and that his humanity was
either dissolved in a sea of divinity or absorbed into the divine at the moment of incarnation. 220
According to Shahid, “It was in the reign of Anastasius and through the vision of Philoxenus that
Najran acquired its strong Monophysite character, which determined the confessional stance of
South Arabia for a century till the rise of Islam.” 221 If this claim is true, then it is reasonable to
conclude that the Christians of Najrān—or the ones who were in contact with Mohammad, at
least—were Monophysites. This piece of information should clue us in on why primary Christian
terms such as Trinity, Father, and Holy Spirit were not mentioned in the Qur’an, and why Mary
was understood to be included in the Trinity.
It seems that Monophysites had an opposite Christological belief from the Muslims, who
denied the divine nature of Jesus and emphasized his humanity, claiming that he was just a
prophet. Monophysites, on the other hand, denied the human nature of Jesus after the incarnation
and emphasized the divine nature. Their major concern when they shared their belief with others
was the divine nature of Christ. The emphasis on Jesus’s divinity is obvious in the Syriac
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documents of the mass martyrdom of the Najranites. These documents include several stories
recounting that many men and women who were martyred because they refused to deny the
divinity of Christ. The Jewish king killed the women’s husbands and gave them another chance,
saying,
You have seen with your very own eyes your husbands put to death because they refused
to renounce Christ and the cross, and because they blasphemously claimed that Christ is
God and son of Adonay. But do you have pity on yourselves now, and on your sons and
your daughters: deny Christ and the cross, and become Jewish like us; then you shall live.
Otherwise you will certainly be put to death. 222
The women were scared neither of death nor being burned alive. They replied, “Christ is God
and Son of the Merciful One; we believe in him and we worship him; for his sake we will die.
Far be it from us to deny him or to go on living after the deaths of our husbands. No, like them
and alongside them we shall die for Christ’s sake.” 223 As mentioned above, Christian terms such
as Trinity, Father, and Holy Spirit are not mentioned in this story. These women acknowledged
their belief in the Father by referring to him as the Merciful One and emphasized the divinity of
Jesus by being willing to die for his sake. It is interesting to see the Najrānites willing to die for
the sake of Jesus, not the Father or God. The prominence that they gave to Jesus’s divinity in
contrast to the Trinity might explain the Islamic denial of Jesus’s divinity and the omission of the
Trinity in the Qur’an. Mohammad’s emphasis on God’s unity, solitary, and singularity speaks
directly against the Monophysite belief in Jesus being divine. Mohammad probably refused
Monophysitism because it conveys double divinities.
The scholarship of C. Jonn Block renders this circumstance increasingly likely. He
reports that a certain kind of Monophysitism was short-lived in the late sixth century, a variant of
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orthodox Monophysitism. He calls it “Philoponian Tritheism.” 224 It was “dominant in South
Arabia, in which Christians worshipped three distinct gods. No longer one nature and three
persons, the Philoponians recognized doctrinally three distinct natures. The doctrine came from
John Philoponus and was spread by the bishops Conon and Eugenius.” 225 The theology of John
Philoponus propagated three individual natures for the three persons of the Trinity and further
denied any common substance between them. Philoponus states in a surviving fragment of his
book On the Trinity,
They [divine persons] do not have equality of substance with respect to their properties,
that is, in those things by which this one is Father, this one Son, and this one Holy Spirit.
In accordance with these [distinctions], they are different in species and separate from
one another… It is the same with “animal,” which is generally said of all animals, though
they vary by species. When “rational” or “irrational” is added to “animal,” then they are
differentiated in species from one another: one animal is rational, another animal
irrational. Therefore, when “Father” and “Son” and “Holy Spirit” are added to “divinity,”
it makes God the Father not the same as God the Son and the divine Spirit. And so, each
one of them is subsequently different from the other two. 226
It seems that Philoponian Tritheism acknowledges the existence of the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit as three individuals, and it does not accept the credal position on the Trinity. If the people
of Najrān were following this particular type of Monophysitism, then it makes sense that
Mohammad understood trinitarianism as believing in three gods, as he expresses in the Qur’an
(Surah 2:135; 3:67; 4:171).
Islamic resources record that the Christians of Najrān visited and communicated their
belief to Mohammad on several occasions. This study will focus on two of them. The first group
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of Christian from Najrān visited the prophet when he was living in Makkah. 227 They asked him
questions about Islam, and at the end of the meeting, they listened to him reciting the Qur’an:
“their eyes flowed with tears and they accepted God’s call, believed in him, and declared his
truth.” 228 It seems that this group returned to Najrān and reported what happened to their leaders,
who in turn, sent another larger and more religiously knowledgeable group to converse with
Mohammad.
The second group of Najrānites visited Mohammad after he moved to Medina. This
cohort of sixty included fourteen of their best men, their prince, their bishop, and their pontiff. 229
Mohammad allowed them to pray in the mosque when their time of prayer came. After a long
theological discussion, the Najranites recognized Mohammad as a prophet, but they decided to
hold to their religion. 230 Al-Waḥidī details the conversation that they had with Mohammad when
he asked them to surrender to Allah. They said, “We have surrendered to Allah before you.”
Mohammad replies, “You lie! Three things prevent you from surrendering to Allah: your
worship of the cross, eating pork and your claim that Allah has a son.” They asked him back,
“Then who is the father of Jesus?” Mohammad refused to give them an answer and asked to
come back the next day. 231 Al-Waḥidī mentions that Allah, on this occasion, revealed Surah 3:59
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as an answer to the Najrānites. 232 Allah said, “Surely the likeness of Isa is with Allah as the
likeness of Adam, He created him from dust, then said to him, Be, and he was” (Surah 3:59). The
reason behind revealing this Surah might seem contradictory to the Islamic explanation of the
origin and the virgin birth of Jesus; however, it is not the purpose of this study to make such
analysis. What the reader needs to note is that the Najrānites had a long theological conversation
with Mohammad about the nature and the origin of Jesus. Mary and her divinity were not
mentioned in this conversation, according to Islamic writings, which suggests another source for
Mohammad’s belief that Christians held to her divinity.
Ibn Kathīr records a detailed explanation of this verse and the conversation between
Mohammad and the Najrānites. 233 While the Christians insisted on their belief in the divinity of
Jesus, Mohammad could not provide evidence for his opposing belief. In order to save the
situation, he invited them for al-Mubāhaleh (Surah 3:60-61). This term means “to curse one
another and then appeal to Allah” 234 for an answer. In other words, when performing alMubāhaleh, one party curses the belief and the people of the other party and asks Allah to
intervene by revealing who is the winning party. The Najrānites were safe and peaceful people
who had experienced mass martyrdom in their history. They feared losing and asked Mohammad
to give them another option. He offered three alternatives: to convert to Islam, to pay jizya, or to
go to war. 235 The Najrānites decided to pay jizya. It is commonly believed that they were the first
to pay jizya among non-Muslims, for jizya became a decree after opening Makkah in Surah
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9:29. 236
The interactions with Christians described above are not the only ones that scholars know
of. Historians record more collaborations between Mohammad and Christians. Since they are of
less significance, this study will only mention them briefly. The biography of Mohammad refers
to him discussing Christian religion while sitting at the Marwa (a spot in Makkah), at the booth
of a young Christian slave called Jabr, learning what he has to say about Christianity. 237 It is also
said that Mohammad learned about Christianity from his Coptic concubine, Mariyah. 238 He
listened to Christian sermons by the bishop of Najrān while attending a merchant festival near
Mecca. 239 All these interactions are documented in both Islamic and Christian sources, and they
agree that Mohammad visited Christian monasteries, possibly churches, and conducted
theological discussions about their Christological beliefs. None of these recorded interactions
directly mention Christians teaching Mohammad about the divinity of Mary.
Mohammad’s Awareness of Christian Iconography, Especially the Theotokos
It is highly likely that Mohammad saw the Theotokos image during his visits to Buṣra or
the Levant as a boy. According to Matthew and Muller, “In Byzantine art the most important
Mary and Christ icons were also door images, namely the proskynetarion icons of the icon
screen, which are located left and right respectively of the door to the sanctuary.” 240 If this is
true, then Mohammad might have seen the image of the venerated Mary and Child for the first
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time in a Christian monastery in Syria.
Al-Balādhurī, a Muslim historian who collected documents and possessed the text of the
peace treaty between Mohammad and the Christian of Najrān about jizya, offers an insightful
note regarding Mohammad’s awareness of Christian iconography usage. The peace treaty made
in exchange for the Najrānites’ safety includes a note about Christian images. After Mohammad
defined the amount of jizya, the treaty mentions that “Najrān and their followers are entitled to
the protection of Allah and the security of Muhammad the prophet, the Messenger of Allah,
which security shall involve their persons, religion, lands and possessions, including those of
them who are absent as well as those who are present, their camels, messengers and images.” 241
Al-Balādhurī indirectly suggests that the Christians of Najrān had images and relics most likely
in their churches, and Mohammad was aware of them because he mentioned that they were to be
protected with the other properties belonging to Christians.
Another Ḥadīth suggests that Mohammad saw the Theotokos image in al- Kacaba in
Makkah. Most Islamic studies reveal that Makkah was a metropolitan center for pagan
religions. 242 It is said that the interior of al-Kacaba was filled with pictures and relics of many
gods. One of the pictures that Islamic resources mention is a sculpture of Mary and her Son
Jesus. Al-Azraqī makes a detailed description of the exterior and the interior decorations of alKacaba, saying, “They paint on its pillars pictures of the prophets, trees, and angels; there was
the picture of Abraham the friend of God (as an old man) dividing the arrows, a picture of Issā
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the son of Mary and his mother, and a picture of the angels.” 243 Al-Azraqī includes several other
authenticated and non-authenticated Ḥadīths related to the same topic. The authenticated Ḥadīths
are the ones that have an uninterrupted chain of speakers going back to the prophet or one of his
close ṣaḥāba (followers). Al-Azraqī includes several authenticated Ḥadīths stating that the relic
of Jesus and his mother was inside al- Kacaba, engraved on one of the pillars. 244 For instance,
Ḥadīth no. 180, which is classified as authenticated, states that “Abū al-Walīd told us, my
grandfather said, whose own source was Da’ūd b. ‘Abd al-Rahman, whose source was camrū bin
Dinār, ‘Before the demolition of al-Kacaba, I have seen (the sculpture) of Issā bin Maryam and
his mother.’” 245 Al-Azraqī includes also several Ḥadīths about Mohammad ordering cOmar his
companion (who became the second caliph) to obliterate all the relics and images of al-Kacba.
Few of these Ḥadīths suggest that Mohammad asked to eliminate all relics and images except the
one of Jesus and his mother. 246 It does not concern this study whether Mohammad actually
destroyed the images or not: the main concern is to know whether he saw these images. It seems
that most of these Ḥadīths affirm that Mohammad saw the Theotokos sculpture. Ḥadīth no. 179
references Jesus seated on Mary’s lap, and they both were ornamented and embellished. 247 The
iconography of the seated Virgin with Jesus in her lap adorned is a universal piece of Christian
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art. This Ḥadīth echoes the aforementioned resources and affirms that it was already widespread
among Christians in the seventh century, even in Makkah.
Other Islamic sources suggests that Mohammad gained an awareness of the Christian
images, relics, and statues from his wives who went to Ethiopia at the beginning of
Mohammad’s dacwah (calling). When Mohammad started calling his tribe Quraysh to Islam, he
and many of his companions faced persecution. These circumstances led a large number of his
followers to migrate to Ethiopia in approximately AD 615. Early Muslims muhājirūn
(immigrants) encountered Christian paintings in the churches of Ethiopia as they sought refuge
and help from Negus the king of Ethiopia. They even expressed their admiration of these images
at the deathbed of Mohammad. This information is reported by authentic Islamic sources. In
Ṣaḥīḥ Bukharī, “Um Habiba and Um Salama mentioned a church they had seen in Ethiopia in
which there were pictures. They told the Prophet ( )ﷺabout it.” 248 Imam Khatib at-Tabriz includes
247F

a similar Ḥadīth, stating that cAisha (the wife of the prophet) said that “when the Prophet was ill
some of his wives mentioned a church called Mariya. Umm Salama and Umm Habiba who had
gone to Abyssinia mentioned its beauty and the statues it contained.” 249 While these Hadiths do
248F

not prove that Mohammad saw the paintings in the Ethiopian churches, it shows that he was
aware of their glory and beauty from his wives and friends.
The Islamic Belief about Images, Icons, and Figurative Arts
Islam is a monotheistic religion that believes in one God, Allah, the creator. It claims a
kind of restorative bridge to Abraham, and it follows the footsteps of Moses in prohibiting the
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use of holy religious images because of their association with idolatry and apostasy. Apart from
the warning against idolatry, the Qur’an does not include an explicit prohibition of images. The
Ḥadīths, however, contain clear and consistent statements against them. Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī mentions
that “the people who will receive the severest punishment from Allah will be the picture
makers.” 250 Any kind of picture (pictures of plants, animals, or humans) that might distract the
faithful person is forbidden in Sunni Hadīths. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim also includes many similar Ḥadīths,
stating that “all the painters who make pictures would be in the fire of Hell. The soul [of the
figure represented in the image] will be breathed in every picture prepared by him and it shall
punish him in the Hell, and he (Ibn cAbbas) said: If you have to do it at all, then paint the
pictures of trees and lifeless things.” 251 Even the painters of figurative art representations will
face severe punishment and torment in hell because they have tried to imitate the creation of
Allah.
The Islamic prohibition of images is a result of the unique view of Allah, the creator. All
creation is under the influence of his creative power. Allah is the only creator responsible for
imparting life in the world by breathing into his creation. The supreme meaning of the Arabic
key term rūḥ (spirit) in Islam was thus “never first the soul or the lifebreath of man, but the spirit
of God, which at most, as in the conception of Mary, can be breathed into a man.” 252 Any attempt
to imitate Allah—the only soul maker—is considered blasphemous. Any anthropomorphic
representation of the transcendental Allah is considered an attack of his innermost being/person.
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For this reason, Islam can be classified as “a phenomenon of iconophobia rather than a
phenomenon of iconoclasm.” 253
Vasile-Octavian Mihoc compares the decorations of the mosques to the decorations of the
churches, stating,
While the walls of the churches are adorned with pictures, the mosques present the
Muslim faithful with phrases from the Qur’an, as once Mohammed did, thus
instrumentalizing the iconic dimension as the bearer of the divine message. As a result of
the anchoring of the earthly counterpart of the Qur’an in the heavenly archetype, ‘the
mother of the script’ (umm al-kitab, Q 43:4), this imagery was clear: the written word
becomes an opening toward the transcendent, a non-figural icon of the divine. 254
The Arab geographer Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Muqaddasī (AD 991) mentions that the Dome
of the Rock in Palestine and the Umayyad mosque in Damascus served as a counterbalance to
the abundantly decorated churches. 255 This is to say that Muslims substituted the figurative art of
the divine with Arabic calligraphy to imitate Christianity without offending the inner being of
Allah.
With the Muslim conquest of the Levant, Muslims found the cross and Christian images a
stumbling block and folly. Politically speaking, the cross retained imperial/military connotations,
and within the new Islamic order, it was a symbol of a hostile and despised power. Muslims saw
the Christian icons as visual references to the doctrine of the Trinity and the incarnated God.
They accused Christians of worshiping the materials rather than the reference that these images
implement. The fact that Christians venerated the holy icons by kissing and prostrating
themselves before them no doubt convinced many Muslims that their worship was little different
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from the idols which the pagan Arabs had worshipped before the coming of Islam. 256 In reality,
Christians believe that the relics and images are pure materials that do not possess any divine
quality. Images were created as expressions of divine essences intended to help the worshiper
remember the person behind the material.
c

Abd al-Malik and al-Walīd, the Umayyad rulers who conquered Palestine and Syria,

were aware of the differences between, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, especially in their manner
of worship and decorating sacred spaces. They, however, wished to compete with and surpass
monuments like the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and the Cathedral of Saint John in Damascus,
which they turned later on into the Umayyad Mosque. 257 The Umayyad caliphs built their shrines
and decorated them in a way that aligns with their theological convictions. Just as the Christian
iconography and church decoration communicated doctrinal beliefs, so Islamic decoration of
certain shrines and mosques asserted emerging theological views—the interior inscriptions of the
Dome of the Rock, which is a calligraphic statement used to express doctrinal statement. In the
heart of the Christian East, those inscriptions declared Islamic opposition to the Trinity by
making multiple references to the absolute unity of Allah and the status of Jesus as a prophet. 258
Conclusion
Several studies attempted to discover the reason behind the misunderstanding of the
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John of Damascus and Theodore abū Qurrah were both iconophiles-defending the veneration of icons
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Trinity in the Qur’an. While this study acknowledges the previous efforts of several scholars and
studies, it follows a different route to examine the iconographic effect on Mohammad’s
understanding of the Trinity. This study explores the effect of the Theotokos icon and the
possible reason behind Mohammad’s assumption of Mary’s inclusion in the Trinity.
In the seventh century, Mohammad started the Islamic religion, which emphasized the
absolute unity of Allah and rejected the divinity of Jesus. Mohammad had several interactions
with Christians during his life. His first wife was a Christian, and one of his concubines was a
Coptic Christian. The most important and thorough interaction he had with Christianity involved
the Christians of Najrān. A number of Islamic resources place the Surahs that talk about the
Trinity (Surah 4:171 & 5:73) within the context of the prophet’s meeting with the Christians of
Najrān. Many historians think that Najrānites were Monophysites, who believed in the Trinity
but emphasized the divine nature of Christ and underestimated his human nature. Mohammad
rejected their belief in the divinity of Jesus and called for absolute oneness because he could not
reconcile Jesus’s deity with the divinity of Allah.
The Najrānites challenged Mohammad by asking him who is the father of Jesus. At first,
Mohammad did not know how to answer them. The next day, Allah revealed to him that the
resemblance of Jesus is like the resemblance of Adam. This is to say that Jesus had no father: he
is fatherless, and God is not his father. This message is also conveyed every time Jesus is called
“the son of Mary” in the Qur’an, which Mohammad purposely used several times (2:87, 253;
3:45; 4:157, 171; 5:17, 46, 72, 75, 78, 110, 112; 9:31…). In comparison to other prophets, only
Jesus is called by the name of his mother. The Qur’an does not call Abraham or Moses by the
names of their fathers or mothers. It seems that Mohammad was trying to make a point when he
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called Jesus “the son of Mary” as if he were stressing Jesus’ origin by calling him “the fatherless
Jesus.”
Islamic writings include some of Mohammad’s sources about Jesus; however, there is no
historical evidence that Mohammad learned about the divinity of Mary from Christians. There is
no record, neither in Islamic resources nor in the early history of Christianity, of Christians
believing or teaching the divinity of Mary. On the contrary, there is historical evidence that early
fathers condemned such teaching and considered it heretical. The lack of resources makes it
reasonable to think that Mohammad’s understanding of Mary and her role was acquired by
inference rather than conversations with Christians.
In comparison to biblical data, Mohammad seems to be confused about Mary’s family.
He conflates Mary the mother of Jesus with Mary the sister of Moses (Surah 19:28; 66:11).
Certain aspects of the story of Mary the mother of Jesus were mentioned several times in the
Qur’an, such as information about her family, her experience with Zakaria, and her pregnancy;
but her divinity was alluded to only once (Surah 5:116). By contrast, the numerous times that the
divinity of Jesus was mentioned surpasses the few times that Mary is mentioned. This is
probably because Christians (likely Monophysites) did not mention Mary much, instead focusing
on Jesus, his virgin birth, and his divinity. What Mohammad learned about Mary was mostly
inferences from the Theotokos icons we know he saw in Kacba, Buṣra, and other places.
Extant icons in Egypt inform us of the early evolution of the son-and-mother pairing,
beginning in pagan’s art and possibly evolving to Christian art (as Jesus and Mary’s pairing) in
the Levant, Ethiopia, and South Arabia by the sixth century. However, theological conversations
among Christians took place at the council of Ephesus. In AD 431, Mary was given the title
Theotokos (bearer of God) against the title Christotokos (bearer of Christ). After the council of
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Ephesus, the veneration of Mary started developing into different cults, especially in Byzantium,
which led to the iconoclastic age. While the iconoclasm took effect in the Byzantine churches, it
was rejected by the Eastern churches, and as the construction of new churches continued even in
South Arabia, Holy images and relics were included in the new churches’ decorations.
Islamic writings show that the relic of Jesus and his mother in al-Kacba was not isolated
but was part of a movement that has started, spread, and continued among the Christians in many
locations. While the Islamic description of the relic of Mary and her son in al-kacba is terse, it is
similar in some ways to the description of the Theotokos icon. The Ḥadīth provided by Al-Azraqī
states that Mary is seated, Jesus is on her lap, and both of them are ornamented. This description
is very similar to the Theotokos icon, in which Jesus and Mary are seated on a throne, Jesus is in
Mary’s lap, and they both look adorned and venerated because of the halos around their heads.
Christians throughout history have developed the habit of standing in front of these icons,
touching, crying, praying, and asking for personal blessings and physical healing. While
Muslims (including Mohammad) know Christians divinize Jesus, they see Christians performing
the same worship/adoration acts in front of the image of Mary. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that a misconception can easily be acquired by someone who is not deeply rooted in Christian
theology. In other words, it is easy to believe that Christians divinize Mary as well as Jesus
because of the adorned guise that the paintings conveyed and the divinized worship acts that the
Christians performed in front of the holy images.
The Islamic understanding of iconography is similar to the Jewish understanding. Icons
and images are linked to spiritual idolatry. The Islamic prohibition of images is a result of the
unique view of Allah. He is the only creator, and any attempt to imitate his creation is a direct
blasphemous act against his inner being. The fact that Christians venerated the holy icons by
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kissing and prostrating themselves before them no doubt convinced the Muslims that Christians
worship the idols. Perhaps this is why Mohammad presumed that Christians venerated Mary.
Unfortunately, extant literature about the Christians of Najrān does not provide information
about their iconography belief, what it meant to them, or how important it was in their worship.
The aforementioned Islamic testimonies about the Christian churches in Arabia and the surviving
ancient ruins of some of these churches suggest that Christians in Arabia venerated and used
images, relics, and statues. Maybe Mohammad not only saw the holy icons but also witnessed
Christians venerating, kissing, and bowing in front of the holy images, leading him to conclude
that Christians divinized Mary as they divinize Christ.
In a nutshell, clues from Islamic and Christian literature as well as history point to the
idea that Mohammad learned about the divinity of Jesus from Christians—most likely
Monophysites—but none of the Christians he met actually believed in the divinity of Mary.
There is no historical evidence that Christians taught Mohammad that Mary was divine.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Mohammad reached this conclusion by inference—
by observing Christian holy images and their adoration, especially to Mary and Jesus’s relics.
The Theotokos icon is painted in a way that gives equal adoration to Jesus and Mary: both are
enthroned and venerated with halos around their heads. When Christians bow and kneel in front
of the Theotokos, they convey the idea that they are worshiping and praying for two divine
beings, Jesus and Mary, and since Christians believe in three, then Mohammad, by inference,
thought Mary is part of the Trinity.
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Chapter Three: The Christian Explanation to the Trinity in the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Centuries
After presenting a possible answer to the Qur’anic perception of the Trinity and the
divinity of Mary, the current chapter focuses on the scholarly Islamic objections to the Trinity—
the ones presented in Chapter One of this study. By relying on English and Arabic resources, this
chapter introduces the life, background, and the trinitarian arguments of three Arab Christian
scholars (John of Damascus, Theodore Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya Ibn cAdī) who defended the
Trinity in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries and answered many Islamic objections to the
Trinity.
John of Damascus (AD 675-754)
John’s Life and Educational Background
John was born in a great Damascene family that participated in the negotiation of the
peaceful surrender of Damascus to the Muslim army. Sarjun, John’s grandfather, negotiated the
terms of surrender with Khalid Ibn al-Walīd and helped the Christians keep fifteen of their
churches. 259 John grew up under Islamic rule and spent the early part of his life working as a
member of the financial administration in Damascus, probably under cabd al-Malik (AD 685705). 260 Daniel Sahas suggests that John may have attained a higher position than his father, a
personal secretary to the caliph, while continuing with the financial responsibilities his father left
to him. 261
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While John lived under Islamic rule, his father made sure that he received a good
education. Several sources report that John learned philosophy and Greek from a Sicilian monk
who was captured by Muslims, brought to Syria, and later on freed by John’s father. 262 Although
most of John’s writings were in Greek, it is hard to know whether this story is authentic or not.
Frederic Chase, who wrote the introduction and translated three of John’s writings into English
states that John’s understanding of classical Greek philosophy was clearly demonstrated in his
books. 263 He also concludes that John’s writings are “sufficient to show that his traditional
reputation as an eloquent, learned, and devout preacher is fully justified.” 264
Later in his life, John retreated to the monastery of Mar Sabas in southern Palestine. 265
According to Janosik, it is likely that John remained working under the Umayyad government
through the reign of Walid I (AD 706-715), entering Mar Sabas monastery to start his monastic
life in AD 716. 266 During this time, John wrote several poems and many liturgical, philosophical,
and theological books, including The Fount of Knowledge, which is mostly Greek philosophy.
He also wrote The Orthodox Faith, which is also called “Dialectic.” 267 It is considered the first
Summa because it includes a summary of dogmatic faith of the early fathers and is designed to
help Christians know their faith. On Heresies is a summarized work similar to Irenaeus and

Kamal al-Yazaji,  أراؤه اﻟﻼھوﺗﯾﺔ وﻣﺳﺎﺋل ﻋﻠم اﻟﻛﻼم:( ﯾوﺣﻧﺎ اﻟدﻣﺷﻘﻲBeirut, Lebanon: Manshūrat al-Nūr, 1984),
34-36. Nasrallah,  ﻣؤﻟﻔﺎﺗﮫ، ﺣﯾﺎﺗﮫ، ﻋﺻره:ﻣﻧﺻور ﺑن ﺳرﺟون اﻟﻣﻌروف ﺑﺎﻟﻘدﯾس ﯾوﺣﻧﺎ اﻟدﻣﺷﻘﻲ, 84.
262

Frederic H. Chase, trans., John of Damascus: The Fathers of the Church Writings, vol. 37, (DC: Ex
Fontibus, 2012), xxviii.
263

264

Janosik, John of Damascus, xv.

There is no historical evidence whether John of Damascus was a monk in Mar Sabas. Griffith, The
church in the shadow of the mosque, 40; Jonasik, John of Damascus, 31.
265

266

Janosik, John of Damascus, 31.

267
J. B. O’Connor, “St. John Damascene,” The Catholic Encyclopedia: New Advent, accessed April 27,
2021, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08459b.htm.

95

Hippolyte’s works against heresies. Finally, John wrote a short article called “The Discussion of
a Christian and a Saracen,” 268 recounting a conversation between a Muslim and a Christian. His
writings still prove influential today, and his teachings continue to be used throughout the
Eastern Orthodox world.
History indicates that John was neither a miracle worker nor a martyr. Nevertheless, the
reason behind his desire to shift to monastic life is uncertain. Some resources mention that he
decided to leave his position under the Umayyad’s rule after he was persecuted by the caliph.
The story asserts that after John sent his iconography defense to the Byzantine emperor, the latter
created a forged letter which counterfeited John’s handwriting and was sent to the Muslim ruler
of Damascus leaking strategic information about the status of the city and its army. When the
Muslim ruler confronted John, he denied writing these letters but acknowledged that the
handwriting seems similar to his. The caliph ordered John’s hand amputated as a punishment.
After the amputation, John prayed to Mary the mother of Jesus to intercede for him. The next
morning, his hand was miraculously healed. When the Muslim prince saw his hand healed, he
asked John about the doctor who helped him. John replied, “My Christ is a medical Seer. He is
omnipotent. It was not difficult for him to heal me, so he was fast in his accomplishment.” 269 It
is important to mention that while Joseph Nasrallah quotes the details of this story, including
John’s prayer to Mary, he states that the event is closer to legend than history, especially
It is also called “The Dispute.” This study will be using J. P. Migue’s translation: John of Damascus,
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considering that it was not mentioned in any earlier historical literature, and is written by
unknown authors. 270
During John’s time in the monastery, he preached in several churches. According to
Frederic Chase, John “was a preacher of the first order and, although his style is at times more
effusive and exalted, he may be said to rank with the great Chrysostom.” 271 In the title of one of
John’s homilies, he is described as a presbyter (priest) of the Holy resurrection of Christ our
God, which may refer to the church of Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. 272 This sort of evidence
indicates that he was ministering in Jerusalem and other areas outside Mar Sabas monastery.
Because he defended the Christian faith in the eighth century against Islamic objections, John is
now considered the first apologist to the Muslims.273
The Formation of Islamic Theology
As stated in chapter one, during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, Islamic theology
developed through conversations and debates between ahl al-ra’y (the people of opinion), who
were mostly Muctazilites, and ahl al-ḥādīth (the people of ḥādīth), who were called
Traditionalists. The former group based their opinions on reason, whereas the latter relied on
literal reading and application of the Qur’an and ḥādīth. 274 While these debates were conducted, a
new party emerged “with its tendency to take the middle ground between the Muctazilites and the
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Traditionists, Ashcarism came to dominate the theological scene in much of the Sunni world.” 275
Ashcarites and Muctazilites debated different topics, but the most important subject concerning
this study is the nature of the Qur’an—the created word versus the uncreated word of God.
Ashcarites argued against Muctazilites that the Qur’an is uncreated—and therefore, it is eternal. 276
There is no time in history when God existed without his word. Similar to God’s speech are
God’s attributes. Ashcarites argued that since God’s speech is eternal, his attributes
(omnipotence, power, knowledge…etc.) are eternal as well. 277 Allah was, is, and always will be
omnipotent, all-powerful, and perfect in knowledge. All his attributes and speech are eternal and
inseparable from his essence.
Muctazilites, on the other hand, refused to believe in the eternality of the Qur’an. They
viewed God speaking or revealing as an anthropomorphic act, which—if taken literally—
ultimately would destroy the unity of God. If God’s discourse is as eternal as God’s being, then
there would be two eternal entities (God and his word) rather than one that existed eternally.
Since the Qur’an is Allah’s speech, then it must be eternal like his nature. 278 The eternality of the
Qur’an also implies that it is uncreated because it is part of Allah’s nature (like his attributes).
Muctazilites rejected this view because, in their opinion, it leads to shirk (polytheism) and
ultimately destroys the unity of God. If the Qur’an existed apart from God (which it did on Al-
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Lawh Al-Mahfūẓ), 279 then there would be two eternal entities rather than one, and the unity of
Allah would be compromised. 280 The seeds of this argument were planted during John’s days,
but it was only officially formulated in the eleventh century. 281
John’s Trinitarian Argument
As stated in the previous chapters, the Islamic invasion of the Levant carried with it
several political, economical, and religious implementations. While many Christians considered
the Islamic conquest as a judgment from God, others lost their faith because of persecution and
the jizya mandate. Many thought that it is economically wiser and physically safer to ally with
the stronger, winning party than with the losers. Their faith was not well-rooted in the church’s
teachings, and their economical situation was given a priority over their spiritual beliefs. John
was quick to notice the spiritual weakness of his own people and the need to define the Christian
faith. While he writes about the fundamentals of the orthodox Christian faith in his book The
Orthodox Faith, he teaches about heresies and Islam in his book On Heresies. John probably lists
Islam as a heresy because during the first half of the eighth century, Islam was still in its
formative process. Its rules, traditions (ḥadīth), and even the written Qur’an was still developing
at that time as the Arabs were expanding into new lands, powers, and territories. According to
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Janosik, “Islam was not very distinct from Christianity in the time of John of Damascus and it is
only in the latter half of the eighth century, when the earliest biographies on Muhammad were
being written and the first hadiths were being penned, that the finalization of the Qur’an was also
taking place.” 282 Many theological schools were yet to form in the later centuries, and the
theological and cultural distinctions between Islam and Christians were yet to become more
defined.
Writing in an Islamic context, John needed to be careful about the way he unfolded his
arguments. At the same time, he needed to be explicit in order to help Christians distinguish
between what they believed and what their Muslim neighbors believed. In his book On the
Orthodox Faith, John’s prologue of his Summa Theologica started by mentioning the
incomprehensibility of God due to the limited knowledge of human beings, which is common
ground between Christians and Muslims. 283 John explains that no one has seen God; therefore,
no one can fully know him. Only Jesus “who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him
… the Holy Spirit knows the things of God, just as the spirit of man knows what is in man.” 284
John gives the divine revelation a high position, advising his students against declaring things
about God beyond what is being revealed to humanity.
On the nature of the Deity and the Trinity, John lists several attributes of the Godhead to
emphasize the oneness of God. While some of these attributes are common between Muslims
and Christians, others are exclusive to Christianity; therefore, they are misunderstood by the
Muslims. For example, John stresses the idea of God being one, “one substance, one godhead,
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one virtue, one will, one operation, one principality, one power, one domination, one kingdom;
known in three prefect Persons and adored with one adoration, believed in and worshiped by
every rational creature, united without confusion and distinct without separation.” 285 His
intention is to teach his students the theistic nature of their belief against the Islamic accusation
of being Mushrikūn (polytheists). 286 John uses the word one in a numerical sense, which is the
same way that Muslims use it to convey the theistic nature of Christianity.
After establishing the oneness of God, John moves to write about the three persons of the
Trinity. He affirms the Nicean Creed, the Chalcedonian confession of Christology, and the
Eastern Orthodox understanding about the Holy Spirit (anti-filioque). 287 John describes the
Father as being “the cause of all things, begotten of no one, who alone is uncaused and
unbegotten, the maker of all things.” 288 Muslims would accept this description and apply it to
Allah; however, they reject the term “Son of God,” (Surah 112:3). As stated earlier, Muslims
understand the theological terms literally, which John took notice of and developed a special way
of teaching the Christians how to understand and explain their orthodox faith. Regarding the
term “the Son of God,” John elucidates that Jesus has the same essence of the Father and is
eternal with the Father because he “was begotten of the Father before all the ages, light from
light, true God from true God, begotten not made; consubstantial with the Father, by whom all
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things are made.” 289 John continues, “We say that he is before all ages, we mean that His
begetting is outside of time and without beginning, for the Son of God was not brought from
nothing into being.” 290 John affirms that the term “Son of God” has a special meaning in the
Christian worldview. It is not literal, physical, nor sexual, but eternal. The Son is as eternal as the
Father and from the same nature of the Father. While the Father is unbegotten, the Son is
begotten. Begotten does not mean that Jesus had a beginning nor had different nature from the
Father. The Son was not God who has converted to a human and lived among us on earth while
leaving the universe unattended. On the contrary, Jesus is eternal with the Father and was even
involved in creation.
The eternal state of the Father and the Son connotes immutability. The Father cannot be
called a Father without a Son. The same thing goes for the Son; he cannot be called Son without
having a Father. Since their relationship is mutual, simultaneous, and has no beginning or
ending, it is by necessity unchanging. “The Father and the Son begotten of Him,” John states,
“exist together simultaneously, because the Father could not be so-called without a Son. Now, if
he was not Father when he did not have the Son, and then later became Father without having
been Father before, then he was changed from not being Father to being Father, which is the
worst of all blasphemies.” 291 The concept of God’s mutablitiy is rejected in Christianity because
it connotes an inferior nature of the divine. If God’s nature is subject to change, then God can
improve and develop. At one point he cannot do something, and at another point he is able to do
it. The changing nature of God connotes progressive development within the divine essence;
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therefore, it is rejected totally in Christianity.
In order to explain what Christians believe about God begetting, John contrasts begetting
and creation. While “begetting means producing of the substance of the begetter an offspring
similar in substance to the begetter,” creation “is the bringing into being, from the outside and
not from the substance of the creator, of something created and made entirely dissimilar.” 292 This
is another way to say that Jesus is not created; he is eternal with the Father because he and the
Father have the same essence. Jesus is not created because there was no time in history when
Jesus was not.
John’s belief about the Holy Spirit follows the Eastern Church’s tradition, which is antifilioque. While the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, he abides in the Son. 293 Ascribing
divine attributes that are similar to the Father and the Son affirms the divinity of the third person
of the Trinity; therefore, John calls the Holy Spirit “uncreated, complete, creative, almighty, allworking, all-powerful, infinite in power; who dominates all creation but is not dominated; who
deifies but is not deified; who fills but is not filled; who is shared in but does not share; who
sanctifies but is not sanctified…” 294 Although the Holy Spirit is divine in nature, he “is distinctly
subsistent and exists in His own Person indivisible and inseparable from the Father and the
Son.” 295 The Holy Spirit participated in creation by giving subsistence to all things. In a nutshell,
the three Aqanīm differentiate in their manner of existing—the Father is uncaused and
unbegotten, the Son is begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. 296
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The attributes of God is another related topic to the Trinity which John focuses on. He
presents the omnibenevolence of God, attributing goodness to God and making him the source of
all goodness. John states that God is “light itself and goodness and being in so far as having
neither being nor anything else that is from any other; the very source of being for all things that
are, of life to the living, of speech to the articulate, and the cause of all good things for all;
knowing all things before they begin to be.” 297 If God is the source of goodness, then he is not the
source of evil; he does not have evil in his nature; therefore, he does not tempt people with evil.
This is a point of difference between Islam and Christianity, and it is related to the morality of
God.
Another divine attribute that is important to the conversation between Muslims and
Christian is the transcendence of God. This doctrine is a fundamental issue and a point of
difference between Islam and Christianity. John explains that God is transcendent; he is
“removed far beyond all things and every substance as being supersubstantial and surpassing all,
supereminently divine and good and replete; appointing all the principalities and orders, set
above every principality and order, above essence and life and speech and concept.” 298 Christians
do not believe that God is only transcendent, but they also believe that he is immanent in his
creation. God is above, yet he pervades “all substances without being defiled.” 299 Traditional
Muslims during John’s time, however, held a different concept of the divine. They believed that
God is utterly transcendent, and nothing is like him in creation. He is not immanent in his
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creation, and only Qur’anic attributes can be used to describe him. 300

John’s Defense of the Trinity against Islamic Objections
In his book On Heresies, 301 John teaches students or Christians how to converse with
Muslims against the accusation of being Mushrikūn (associators) in a more direct way than he
did in his book On the Orthodox Faith. 302 Being Mushrikūn implies that Christians do not believe
in one God but three because they are associating Jesus and the Holy Spirit as divine persons
with God. After explaining that Christians believe in one God, John advises his students to start
the conversation with their fellow Muslims by asking them what the Qur’an says about Jesus.
Based on his knowledge of the Qur’an, John anticipates the answer to be that Jesus is “the word
of God and his spirit” (Surah 4:171). Based on this answer, John teaches his students to explain:
The word, and the spirit, is inseparable from that in which it naturally has existence.
Therefore, if the Word of God is in God, then it is obvious that he is God. If, however, he
is outside of God, then, according to you, God is without a word and spirit. Consequently,
by avoiding the introduction of an associate with God you have mutilated Him. It would
be far better for you to say that he has an associate than to mutilate Him, as if you were
dealing with a stone or a piece of wood or some other inanimate object. 303
Several presuppositions can be extracted from this text: 1) God should be eternal because
eternality is a concept related only to the divine nature, and it is part of God’s substance. Any
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being that is not eternal is not God. 2) God should have a word, and his word should be internal
to him (part of his being), which makes his word as eternal as he is. If God does not have a word,
then he would be mute and cannot communicate with his creation, and if his word is external to
him, then at one point, he did not have a word. 3) God should have a spirit, otherwise he is dead.
His spirit is as eternal as his word. John assumes that these presuppositions are acceptable by
Muslims, and if they deny it, then their concept of the divine is mutilated.
Although both Christians and Muslims use the same words to describe Jesus, their
references are different. When a Muslim thinks of “the word of God,” he/she means the
book/Qur’an. When John thinks about “the word of God,” he means Jesus Christ. Noting this
problem, John seeks to establish a common ground between the two worldviews in order to bring
out the inconsistencies of the Islamic faith. After pointing out that both religions believe that
Jesus Christ is “the word of God,” John notes the first inconsistency about the eternality of the
Qur’an. The Qur’an and Jesus have eternal natures, which makes something/someone co-existing
with God since eternity. Muslims do not see the eternality of the Qur’an as shirk (the greatest sin
in Islam); however, they see the eternality of Jesus as shirk. John rationalizes that the Islamic
belief in the eternality of the Qur’an is inconsistent with the Islamic worldview because it makes
Muslims associators and shirk is the ultimate sin in Islam. When Muslims say that the Qur’an is
eternal with God, they are combining two eternal existences together, and this is not acceptable
in Islam because only Allah is eternal. John introduces this as a logical dilemma of the Islamic
faith, stating that if Muslims accept the view that the “word of God” is internal to him
(inseparable from him) and eternal with him, then they fall into the same trap they accused the
Christians of: they are associating another eternal being with God. If they say, however, “the
word of God” is outside of God and separate from him, then God had no word from eternity—
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this is a mutilation to the divine essence. John, therefore, concludes that it is logical to believe
that the “word of God” is God.
The problem seems to be related to the way Christians and Muslims interpret the meaning
of the phrase: “the word of God.” Muslims tend to be literal when they talk about “the word of
God” because they understand it to be the Qur’an. However, when the Qur’an refers to Isa
(Jesus) being “the word of God,” they shift to the non-literal meaning, stating that “the word of
God” means the messenger of God—Jesus is the one who delivered “the word of God.” In a
different conversation, John realizes this problem and addresses it. The resulting article is titled
“The Discussion of a Christian and a Saracen.” 304 In this article, John teaches Christians how to
converse with Muslims and ask different questions that are related to the topic of the word and
the Spirit. If a Muslim, probably a Muctazili, 305 says that the Qur’an is created, 306 then John asks,
“Who created the Word of God and the Spirit? For if compelled by necessity, he [a Muslim] will
reply, ‘God Himself created (the Word and the Spirit),’ then do you again say, ‘Therefore before
God created the Spirit and the Word, he had neither Spirit nor Word.’” 307 Muctazilites believed in

It is also called “The Dispute.” John of Damascus, “The Discussion of a Christian and a Saracen,” trans.
J.P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 94, (1864): 266-273. The authorship of this document is not definitely known.
It was first ascribed to John of Damascus by Robert Grosseteste, who translated it in the thirteenth century. Louth
and Sahas suggest that the content of “The Dispute” was used by the Arab Christian theologian Theodore Abū
Qurrah in the ninth century. Therefore, it is plausible that Abū Qurrah based his writing on John’s oral teaching.
Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam: the “Heresy of the Ishmaelites,” 102. Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, 7778. Daniel Janosik, John of Damascus, 136. J.P. Migne divides John’s argument and Abū Qurrah’s in his translation.
304

305
During the Umayyad government, the Muctazilite’s belief about the uncreatedness of the Qur’an was
considered a heresy because it was linked to man’s free will. The Umayyad enforced the belief in the ultimate
sovereignty of Allah (Allah controls all men’s actions) in order to establish their rules and control their subjects as
they wished. A number of Muctazilites were executed because of their beliefs under the Umayyad, such as the leader
of the Jahmite groups, Jahm B. Safwan. Janosik, John of Damascus, 156 & Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam, 114115.

Sahas argues that the Greek word for “created” must have been copied incorrectly because the word
“uncreated” fit the context better. Janosik, however, disagrees with Sahas. Janosik, John of Damascus, 159.
306

307
John of Damascus, “The Discussion of a Christian and a Saracen,” trans. J.P. Migne, Patrologia
Graeca, vol. 94, (1864): 266.

107

the createdness of the Qur’an in order to protect tawḥīd (the unity of God); however, if God
created his word and Spirit, then chronologically speaking, at one point in history, he was
without his word and Spirit. This is why John states in On heresies that those who believe in the
createdness of the Qur’an have mutilated God.
John foresees that some Muslims might deny the uncreatedness of the Qur’an, stating,
“Behold, all the words of God are created. But they are not gods.” 308 In the same sense, if Jesus is
the created word of God, then he is not God. 309 John explains in his book The Orthodox Faith
that “things which are changeable must definitely be created,” 310 because they increase or
decrease in quality and morality. However, the creator must be unchangeable because he is
perfect in his nature. This distinction might serve as a trap to the Muslims who believe in the
createdness of the Qur’an, for if God created the word and the Spirit, then how could he have had
his Spirit and word before they were created? If he did not have them before he created them,
then his nature changed after he had them.
In response to the problem of the createdness of the Qur’an, John clarifies the
fundamental rule in biblical interpretation by explaining the difference between the literal and
the figurative meanings of the text. He states, “the literalness refers to the established and fixed
meaning of a thing. Figurative interpretation, however, involves a secondary meaning.” 311 John
does not refer directly to the Nicene Creed, but he quotes it, explaining that the Son is begotten,
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not born; therefore, he is not created. He continues, “I acknowledge only one Word of God Who
is uncreated. But I do not call Scripture λὀγια, that is ‘words’ of God; but ρήματα, that is ‘formal
words’ of God.” 312 John introduces here two distinctions that lie behind the concept “the word of
God,” which is “the uttered words of God” versus “the written words of God,” and the singular
form of “the word of God” (referring to Jesus) versus its plural form “the words of God”
(referring to Scripture). The Scripture (the written words of God) is created because it is the
words of human beings, but the “word of God,” Jesus Christ, is not created (he is begotten),
therefore, he is God.
John wanted to teach his students that the Qur’anic expression “the word of God” refers
to a person, not words/Scripture. 313 The createdness of the Qur’an was not the common view
among Muslims during John’s days because it was the persecuted view. However, John still
marks it as a potential answer. Muslims might point out that Christians also believe in the
creation of “the word of God,” not realizing that there is a great distinction between “the words
of God” (plural form: his utterances, meaning the Scripture) and “the word of God” (singular
form: referring to Jesus Christ). Muslims might claim that either the words are all God’s or that
“the word of God” (the Christian profession of Jesus) is not God. In John’s view, the word (the
written word of God) is neither created nor uncreated; however, Jesus (the living word of God) is
the one hypostatic “word of God,” a point even the Qur’an admits.
Traditionist Muslims, according to Sahas, borrowed John’s distinction of the singular and
plural form of the word/words of God and applied it “as a means to reaffirm the eternity and
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uncreatedness of the Qur’an without any differentiation from its utterance.” 314 The laterdeveloped Islamic distinction of the concept of “the words of God” follows the Christian concept
of the Scripture: the Qur’an was proclaimed to be uncreated, but its pronouncement by men is
created. This distinction was not developed until the end of the ninth century. The later Orthodox
Muslims (Ashcarites) embraced the belief that God’s speech is eternal, but the written Qur’an is
just a representation of the eternal Qur’an in heaven. 315
Harry Austryn Wolfson traces the createdness of the Qur’an to Labīd, who “had taught
the createdness of the Torah, and Ṭalūb—insincere convert from Judaism to Islam—who was the
first to write about this doctrine. So, the original belief about the pre-existent Qur’an was that it
was created and that its uncreatedness was introduced later in consequence of the rise of the
belief in uncreated attributes.” 316 Saeed, on the other hand, proposes a different theory. He
indicates that the Muctazilites’ position on the created nature of the Qur’an “was partly a reaction
to the Christian notion of the incarnation of Jesus” 317 because it threatens the unity of Allah, who
is wholly transcendent and wholly other. If Saeed’s theory is true, then John’s argument may
have played a major role in developing the later theological formation of the Islamic belief.
John’s argument might have led the Muctazilites, a century after him, to believe that the Qur’an
is created so as to avoid the dilemma of acknowledging two eternal beings. 318
Theodore Abū Qurrah (AD 755-830)
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Theodore Abū Qurrah was a Melkite monk who defended the Christian Orthodox faith to
Muslims, Monophysites, and others. Although historians do not know much about his life before
becoming a monk or about how he received his education, they know that he was competent in
Syriac, Arabic, and Greek. 319 Abū Qurrah dermonstrated good knowledge in philosophy by
translating some of Aristotle’s books. 320 He also left a wealth of written works and presented the
rational and philosophical tenability of the Christian faith before Christian and Muslim officials
within the context of his ecclesial and theological tradition.
As stated earlier, Abū Qurrah was the first theologian/apologist of the Eastern Orthodox
Church to write in the Arabic language. His writings model John of Damascus’s works, which
makes scholars think that he had a close association with Mar Saba’s monastery theologians. 321
However, Griffith points out that “none of this requires that Abu Qurrah has been in Mar Sabas
in John of Damascus’ lifetime, as many scholars who have written on the subject have
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assumed.” 322 John of Damascus died before Abū Qurrah was born, but he might have read his
writings, since both were Melkites and knew Greek and Syriac.
In AD 780, Abū Qurrah became the bishop of Ḥarrān in Mesopotamia, a position from
which he was removed and re-appointed in AD 799. 323 The reason for his demotion is not clear;
however, Griffith speculates that “it could have been his position in favor of public veneration of
the icons that put Abū Qurrah on a collision course with Patriarch Theodoret of Antioch.” 324 This
hypothesis makes sense, especially given that Abū Qurrah regained his seat with the ascension of
Patriarch Job, who liked him, perhaps because both were iconophiles. One of Theodore’s main
concerns was clearly engaging in intra-Christian polemic in order to promote the belief of
Melkite doctrine. In AD 780, Abū Qurrah set off on a journey south to Alexandria and north to
Armenia to defend the Chalcedonian orthodoxy. 325 In AD 817 in Armenia, he engaged in a
debate in the presence of a prince, debating the Syrian Orthodox deacon Nonnus of Nisibis. 326 He
also engaged in a debate with Muslim scholars in the presence of caliph al-Ma’mūn in Ḥarrān. 327
Abū Qurrah was a well-known writer. He recognized a great need for effective religious
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teaching in Arabic to support the Christian faith and to proclaim the Gospel in the new social and
political contest. He left about twenty compositions in Arabic, and forty-three other Greek texts
that are attributed to him, though they are arguably translations from Arabic. 328 At the end of the
eighth century and the beginning of the ninth century, Arabic became the lingua sacra of the
Qur’an and the common language of the Levant. This period was also known for mass
conversions to Islam, largely on the part of Greek and Syriac-speaking Christians in the Levant,
Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Many Chalcedonians found themselves soon subject to the rule of an
aggressive and expansionist foreign religion—not adherents to an imperial faith, but merely one
sect living alongside other Christian sects. 329 In this context, Abū Qurrah saw a great need to
teach and write about how to defend and articulate the Christian doctrines against other sects and
the Islamic religion.
Unfortunately, based on the available resources, Abū Qurrah’s biography is incomplete.
However, several scholars—including Muslim scholars—mention Abū Qurrah’s writings 330 and
his defense for the icon veneration. 331 He is also known for his famous debate about the Christian
religion at the council of the caliph al-Ma’mūn in Harrān in the year AD 829. 332 This debate
helped influence and shape clim al-kalām (Islamic theology) during the early Abbasid dynasty. 333
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Historians estimate that Abū Qurrah was about seventy-five years old when the debate took
place, and they presume that he died not long afterward. 334

Theodore Abū Qurrah’s Trinitarian Theology/Argument
Like John of Damascus, Abū Qurrah has a great zeal for the Christian Chalcedonian faith,
which led him to travel to several regions, debate Muslims, and endure persecution and demotion
in his priesthood status. While he was busy in mission work, he did not neglect writing and
teaching about the Trinity and many other doctrines. As an apologist, Abū Qurrah’s main
purpose of his written work was to answer those who do not believe in Christianity, especially
those who do not believe in the Trinity. 335
Christians Can Learn about God via Adam
Abū Qurrah writes little about the Trinity in his treatise Theologus Auttodidactus but
thoroughly in On the Trinity. Theologus Auttodidactus seems to be a preparatory work to other
treatises that he wrote. He uses the natural theology approach with those who are skeptical about
the existence of God by recognizing that the cognitive faculties of human beings—reason, senseperception, introspection—can be used to investigate theological matters. “While God is unseen
through the likeness of our own nature’s virtues,” says Abū Qurrah, “Notwithstanding that God
transcends and is contrary to our nature, our minds can see both Him and the attributes according
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to which He is to be worshipped.” 336 He gives the analogy of a person looking into the mirror.
While he cannot see his real face in the mirror but only its likeness, in a similar way, when he
looks at his human nature, he also cannot see the nature of God and his attributes but only God’s
likeness. 337
Given the difference between the divine and the human natures, human beings can still
learn about the divine nature by observation and reflection. Abū Qurrah uses Adam as a
representative of human nature. Adam’s nature and virtues allow theologians to see God and
have true knowledge of him, despite the fact that God transcends human nature. Abū Qurrah
believes that “when with our minds we examine Adam’s nature and observe its virtues, we can
see God from it and have true knowledge of Him, for that nature is His likeness, notwithstanding
that God transcends and is contrary to it.” 338
The gap between the human nature—represented by Adam—and the divine nature is
wide. Adam has defects, whereas God does not. Adam exists today but tomorrow is gone. He is
learned, wise, powerful, and living today, but tomorrow he is ignorant, unwise, weak, and dead.
While Adam’s nature is changing and defected, God is not. He is perfect and much more
transcendent than human beings. “God is not comprehended through the defects of Adam’s
nature, nor does God resemble Adam in those defects,” says Abū Qurrah, “It is only with regard
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to his virtues that Adam resembles God.” 339 While Adam’s virtues can be attributed to God, his
defects cannot because God is holy and perfect. Adam’s virtues, however, are minor to the
virtues of God, who is maximally greater than any human being. Because Adam acquires such
virtues, we know that God does as well. It is just that God acquires attributes and virtues in a
greater and more transcendent way. 340
Answers to Those Who Deny that the Father Begets, and Jesus Is Begotten
In a similar fashion, Abū Qurrah uses Adam’s resemblance to answer those who deny
that God begets a son. He explains that since “Adam begets and is head over one who is from
him, He who caused him to beget and to be head must surely Himself beget and be head over
One who resembles Him. Nonetheless, this is so in a transcendent and contrary manner.” 341 Abū
Qurrah believes that the ability to beget surpasses the inability to beget, and since he caused
Adam to beget, then He himself should be able to beget and rule over others; otherwise, he is not
the highest conceived God. Those who say that God is unable to beget are demeaning his divine
nature.
Abū Qurrah does not neglect to mention that Adam’s begetting is different from God’s
begetting. While Adam’s begetting of a son took place through a sexual relationship, God’s
begetting of his Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit do not happen through sex and
physical development but in a more transcendent way.
There are in Adam no virtues more noble or exalted than begetting and headship. After
all, if Adam did not beget, he would have neither felicity of life, nor headship, nor
speech, nor generosity, nor any of the other virtues attributed to him. His felicity of life
would be with the pigs, asses, and other beasts—which is not felicity… it would not be
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headship but degradation and dishonor to be called the head of ticks, pigs, scarabs, and
worms. 342
It is glory, honor, and exaltation when the headship is attributed to Adam over other human
beings like him, not a humiliation or a deprivation of human nature. Thus, those who say that
God cannot beget attribute deprivation of the divine nature because they make God rule over
what is less than him and is unable to rule over what resembles him. Thus, among the many
things the mind can infer from the likeness of Adam’s nature is that God is three persons: One
who begets, another who is begotten, and another who proceeds. 343 This belief does not
necessarily undermine the divine nature or disrespect God.
Can God Be One and Three?
In his treatise On the Trinity, Abū Qurrah discusses the topic of faith and reason, keeping
in mind the variety of audiences that he met along the way of his ministry. 344 He knew that some
of them were simple in receiving faith while others were more philosophically inclined. As Najib
Awad points out, Abū Qurrah “believes that reason is faith’s caretaker, which reviews faith and
preserves it. Reason is what enables one to investigate what she believes in and to discover its
truth or falsehood. It is what guides one to the true faith, even if the content of that belief is not
according to what our feelings like and our desires seek.” 345 By acknowledging the fact that
people are on different levels with their philosophical inquiry, Abū Qurrah continues with the
Scripture explaining that Christians believe in Moses’s books and all the prophets of the Old
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Testament; therefore, the Trinity is not a new invention or a new belief that has being recently
acquired. The Trinity is implied in the Old Testament. Several texts refer to two persons but does
not call them two Lords. For instance, in Psalms 110:1, 3 the writer “called both the one who
speaks ‘Lord’ and the one addressed ‘Lord,’ but did not count two lords.” 346 Similarly, Psalms
45:6-7, “do you not see that he mentions a God whose throne is forever and ever and says that
this God has another God who anointed him? As for this anointed one, there can be no doubt for
the wise that this is Christ …” 347 Abū Qurrah believes that the Trinity is implied in the Old
Testament, and many passages describe the Father as God, the Son as God, and the Holy Spirit
as God; however, no writer calls them three gods.
After discussing the implication of the Trinity in the Old Testament, Abū Qurrah uses
reason to explain this doctrine to those who like reasonable arguments. He realizes that one of
the major philosophical errors that people commit is category errors; therefore, he explains the
differences between logical and non-logical names. Logical names indicate persons, such as
Peter, Paul, and John; and non-logical names indicate natures, such as man. The former may be
many, while the latter is one. 348 While Peter, Paul, and John are the names of three persons, the
number three does not apply to the names; instead, it indicates their human nature. According to
Abū Qurrah, it is correct to say that Peter is a man, Paul is a man, and John is a man, but it is not
correct to say that Peter is mankind, Paul is mankind, or John is mankind. 349 This concept is
applied in a similar fashion when a person says, “God is one in three persons: Father, Son, and
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Holy Spirit.” The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, but God is not the
Father, God is not the Son, and God is not the Holy Spirit. God is a name that indicates divine
nature. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are names that indicate three divine Aqanīm (persons). 350
‘Person’ is a logical name and does not belong essentially to just one of them [persons of
the Trinity]. Rather, the name ‘person’ is predicated of the Father and of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit … as well as of every other indivisible entity. The logical name was
introduced solely that number might be applied to it, for it is not right for number to be
applied to their common name, that by which their nature is named … otherwise, it
would follow that there are different natures, as we have already said. 351
Logical names are meant to describe the name of the person, not his nature; therefore, they can
be used in a plural form. However, it is not right to apply numbers/plurality to a particular nonlogical name; otherwise, “number will make each of the numbered entities to be all of them.” 352
Abū Qurrah explains that “If you say, ‘Here, Peter, James, and John are three,’ you make each
one to be the three of them [Peter is also James and John]. So also, if you say, ‘in heaven, the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three,’ you make each one to be the three of them.” 353 The
Christian trinitarian belief, however, does not believe that the Father is the Son and the Holy
Spirit, but it indicates that there is unity in diversity and distinction in unification. While each of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is God, the Father is not the Son and the Holy Spirit. For this
reason, it is necessary to apply logical names to persons, “and that we say that Peter, James, and
John are three persons, but that the name ‘man’ remain singular, neither diffused nor
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multiplied.” 354
Abū Qurrah discuss another reason for why Christians do not apply plurality to the divine
essence by explaining to his audience a philosophical/mathematical principle of plurality. Human
beings are counted as many because they are divided in place, will, and state. However, those
who are many, but agree in the will or place, are to be counted as one. 355 The three men—Peter,
James, and John—are divided in terms of place, will, and state; therefore, it is correct to count
them as many. “As for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,” says Abū Qurrah, “not one is in a place
that the others are not in, not one has a form that the others do not have; and the same holds for
will and state.” 356 Therefore, they are one, and it is wrong to account them as many. What applies
to human beings does not necessarily apply to God.
In order to illustrate this principle more thoroughly, Abū Qurrah offers several trinitarian
examples. He depicts the Trinity as three lamps shining in a dark house. “The light of each is
dispersed in the whole house, and the eye cannot distinguish the light of one from the light of the
others or the light of all from the light of one. So also, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one
God, even though each is fully God.” 357 In the second example, Abū Qurrah asks his reader to
imagine three men standing and reciting a poem while the reader is outside listening. “You hear
only a single poem,” says Abū Qurrah, “but you do not doubt that each of them recited the
complete poem, nor could you say, ‘I heard three poems.’ This is the case even if in the voices of
the men there is some difference.” 358 Finally, the last example is related to three pieces of gold.
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Abū Qurrah states, “If three pieces of pure gold were placed before you, you would say that each
of the three is fully gold and would not say that the three are three golds, but rather that they are
one gold.” 359 Abū Qurrah uses this example to emphasize that it is inappropriate for a number to
predicate the name of the nature of God and to say that the three persons of the Trinity (Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit) are three gods, even though that each one of them is fully God.
Answering Objections
Abū Qurrah anticipates several objections to his explanation. Some may ask, “Was it
three or one that created the world? If you say three, they consider this loathsome. If you say
one, they consider the other two hypostases nullified.” 360 Abū Qurrah believes that the answer
should be “one that created the world.” In his opinion, this answer does not prevent the other
hypostases/Aqanīm from being creators nor nullifies them. To prove his point, Abū Qurrah offers
few more examples. When a person says, “Moses speaking the truth,” it is right to think that
Moses spoke the truth or the tongue of Moses spoke the truth, but it is not right to think that
Moses and his tongue spoke the truth because Moses spoke through his tongue. 361 The same
concept is applied to the sun and its rays lightning a room, a person seeing another person with
his eyes, a carpenter making a door with his hands, and a king and his son striking a person. It is
not right to think both has done it (the sun and its rays lightning the room, the person and his eye
seeing another person, a carpenter and his hand making a door, and the king and his son striking
a person), but it is right to say that each one separately has acted. 362 Abū Qurrah offers these
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examples to imply that the Father created the world and the Son created the world. However, it is
not right to think that the Father and the Son created the world separately, for the Father created
the world through his Son. 363
Abū Qurrah addresses another objection to the Trinity that non-Christians believe leave
Christians with a dilemma. Non-Christians might ask, “Do you deny every God other than the
Father? Do you deny every God other than the Son? Do you deny every God other than the Holy
Spirit?” 364 If the Christian says, “‘I deny every God other than the Son,’ they respond, ‘The
Father and the Holy Spirit, then, must not be God. If, however, the Christian says, ‘I do not deny
every God other than Christ,’ they respond, ‘you have, then, multiple gods.’” 365 Abū Qurrah
points to another error non-Christians commit when they ask, “Do you deny every God other
than Christ?” The questioners have a different assumption about the meaning of the word Christ.
They are not asking about Jesus’ hypostasis but about his nature. “The name ‘God’ is not distinct
to Christ to the exclusion of the Father and the Spirit. The name ‘God’ is the name of a nature,
not a hypostasis.” 366 If a Christian affirms that he or she believes in the Gospel that is presented
to him/her, that does not mean other Gospels are not full Gospels, “for the gospel through which
the Holy Spirit speaks is one. Similarly, you say, ‘I deny every God other than Christ,’ but your
words do not entail that the Father and the Holy Spirit cease being each a full God.” 367 Moreover,
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the same error is applied when a person is asked which image is his/her when he/she looks into a
plate that has three mirrors. Abū Qurrah explains that the face is one thing, and the countenance
of the person is another. Each person has one face only, and denying the procurance of another
image is not denying the image in each of the mirrors.
Abū Qurrah uses a third example to clarify the false presupposition which assumes
that to deny every God other than Christ is to deny that the Father and the Holy Spirit are God. A
person admires another person’s countenance and decides to draw it fully on three pieces of
paper. Should the person whose image was drawn deny every other countenance? Abū Qurrah
thinks the answer should be “yes, except for the one drawn on this piece of paper [the paper that
the artist used].” 368 This is not to deny that the painted countenance on each of the other pieces of
paper is the same countenance. However, when the person points/asks about the countenance
drawn on this particular piece of paper, he or she does not mean the particular drawing (the lines,
curves, and dots), but the essence of the person’s countenance (dark complexion, black eyes, and
aquiline nose)—despite the fact the questioner was pointing with his hand to the lines of the
image. 369 The same holds to the affirmative answer to the question: “Do you deny every God
other than Christ?” To answer yes does not mean to deny that the Father and the Holy Spirit are
God, “for even though the questioner is hinting at Christ with his words, it is not Christ himself
that he means when he names ‘God,’ but the nature of Christ, to which the name ‘God’ refers.” 370
A Trinitarian Answer to the Muslims
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Abū Qurrah affirms the divine simplicity doctrine, which allows no composition in the
divine nature to illustrate the Trinity to Muslims. Combining the Qur’anic illustration of Jesus
being the word and the Spirit of God with John of Damascus’s conundrum, he asks the Muslim
this question: has God ever being without his word and his Spirit? The Muslim is compelled to
answer negatively, otherwise, he or she will make God mute or dead. Abū Qurrah introduces a
follow-up question: is the divine word and his Spirit part of God? If the Muslim answers
affirmatively, he or she then ascribes parts to the divine essence which is proscribed in Islam
because it introduces composition to the divine nature. However, if the Muslim answers
negatively, then the Christian belief is right. Abū Qurrah states,
God and his word and his Spirit are one God even as a person and that person’s word and
spirit are one person. The Son to God as a person’s word is to that person, and the Spirit
is to God as a person’s spirit is to that person, even though the Word of God is God and
the Spirit of God is God—and this, because of how exalted the divine nature is above
composition and the like. 371
The divine simplicity doctrine was emphasized in early Christianity, and it is consistent with the
doctrine of tawḥīd, which emphasizes the oneness of God in a numerical sense. Abū Qurrah saw
similarities between the two doctrines and used them as an analogy to illustrate the Trinity.
Yaḥya Ibn Adī (AD 893-974)
Though most now know him as Yaḥya Ibn Adī, his full name is Abū Zakariyya (his son’s
name) Yaḥya Ibn cAdī Ibn Hamid (his father’s name) Ibn Zakariyya’ (his grandfather’s name). 372
He was born in AD 893 to a Jacobite/Monophysite Christian family. He was born in Tikrit,
which was the seat of the Jacobite bishopric from the fourth century until the middle of the
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twentieth century, when the diocese was combined with the one in al-Mosul. 373 He received his
education in Baghdad under famous logicians, such as Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yūnus (AD 940)
who was a Nestorian, and Abū Nasr al-Farabī who was a Muslim (AD950). 374 Muslim scholars
such as Al-Bayhaqī and al-Mascūdī state that Yaḥya was the most prominent disciple of alFarabī. 375 He earned the title of al-Mantiqī (the logician) by his Muslim peers. 376
Most scholars during the tenth and eleventh centuries were not only philosophers, but
they made a living as physicians, teachers, scribes, translators, or booksellers. 377 Yaḥya himself
was not a monk; therefore, he needed to find other sources for self-support. He earned a living
as a professional copyist and a bookseller, a career that he may have inherited from his father,
c

Adi Ibn Hamid. 378 Ibn al-Nadīm tells a story about Yaḥya spending too much time copying

manuscripts. Yaḥya replies, “Wherefore now do you wonder at my patience? In my own
handwriting I have transcribed two copies of the commentary of al-Ṭabarī, which I have taken to
the kings of distant regions. I have transcribed so many books of the theologians that they cannot
be counted. It is my agreement with myself that I should copy a hundred leaves every day and
night, which I feel to be too little.” 379 His passion as a copyist might not only be because of a
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financial need but also because of his hunger and curiosity to gain more knowledge.
In addition to philosophy, Yaḥya learned medicine from the famous doctor al-Razī (AD
925); however, it is not known whether he practiced it or whether he was counted as a
physician. 380 After the death of his master Matta Ibn Yūnus in AD 940, and with the absence of
his master al-Fārabī (AD 950), who left Baghdad and traveled to study in Syria and Egypt,
Yaḥya became the new leader of philosophical studies in Baghdad. He had accumulated several
pupils and spent much time teaching and writing about religions and philosophy. In his school,
Yaḥya instructed both Muslim and Christian students. Among his famous Muslim disciples were
al-Sijistānī (AD 1001), ‘Isa Ibn cAlī Muhammad al-Badihī (AD 990), and Abū Hayyān alTawḥīdī (AD 1023); and among his Christian students were Ibn Zurca (AD 1008), al-Ḥasan Ibn
Siwār (AD 1017), Ibn al-Khammar (d. 1017), Abu ‘Ali al-Samh (AD 1027), and Naẓīf Ibn
Yomin—all who hailed from different backgrounds and denominations (Melkites, Jacobites, and
Nestorians). 381 He also had a Jewish pupil, Wahab bin Thaqīf al-Rumī, and a Sabian student, Abu
Ishaq al-Sabī’ī. 382
Yaḥya left many writings related to logic, naturalism, math, metaphysics, Kalam
arguments, ethics, and Christian theology. The first group of his writings was a philosophical
translation of Aristotle, Plato, and their followers. He translated many books from Syriac to
Arabic and focused especially on Aristotle’s Organon and Physics. He and his pupils even
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compared, corrected, refined, and added their own writings and translations. 383 His philosophical
discourses include Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (The Refinement of Character) and Maqāla fī Siyasa alNafs (A Discourse on the Management of the Soul). The second group of his writings includes
several discourses concerning Christian philosophy. Samīr Khalīl lists nineteen treatises in his
introduction to Al-Turāth al-cArabī al-Massīḥī (Arabic Christian heritage), a book that belongs to
Yaḥya; however, this chapter will focus on Maqāla fī al-Tawḥīd (Treatise in Tawḥīd).
Yaḥya Ibn cAdī’s Trinitarian Argument
Yaḥya was aware of the Islamic objections to the Trinity as well as his peers’ writings
and teachings about this doctrine. As a philosopher, he saw a great need to explain, defend, and
answer the Islamic objections to the Christian concept of the unity and oneness of God without
mentioning or attacking the Islamic concept of tawḥīd. His philosophical defense is of a unique
nature. According to Samīr Khalīl, Yaḥya might not be the first philosopher who has written
about the Oneness of God, but he is the first to target and expand on this topic. 384
Yaḥya’s makes his defense in several treatises and books. Because of the limited space
and the nature of the study, this research will concentrate on “ [ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻮﺣﯿﺪTreatise in Divine
Unity]" and his answer to al-Warrāq, which was compiled and presented in Nadine Abbās’s book
". ﻧظرﯾﺔ اﻟﺗوﺣﯾد واﻟﺗﺛﻠﯾث اﻟﻔﻠﺳﻔﯾﺔ ﻋﻧد ﯾﺣﯾﻰ ﺑن ﻋدي ﻓﻲ ﻛﺗﺎﺑﮫ "اﻟرد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟوراقIn his treatise, Yaḥya focuses on the

term wāḥid (one), which both Muslims and Christians use to express their beliefs in the oneness
of God. He presents a philosophical explanation of the term, when it can and cannot be used to
describe the divine oneness of God. In his answer to al-Warrāq, Yaḥya focuses on the logical
objection to the Trinity. He explains that it is not a logical mistake to believe that God is one
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substance and three Aqanīm because the “one” can be one in one sense and three in a different
sense. 385 This section of the study will start with Yaḥya’s treatise " "ﻣﻘﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻮﺣﯿﺪto establish the
philosophical meaning of the term wāḥid. Then it will move to Yaḥya’s answer to al-Warrāq to
explain the Trinity.
Relying on Aristotelian philosophy and moving away from theology and biblical studies,
Yaḥya analyzes the different meanings of the word wāḥid. He does not only discuss the oneness
of God in terms of its logical sense—how should wāḥid be understood in terms of logical or
linguistic analysis?—but also in terms of the correct understanding of the divine unity. Yaḥya
strives to show that in one aspect, the Creator is one; but in another aspect, he is multiple.
Influenced by his teacher al-Farābī, 386 Yaḥya presents different meanings of the word wāḥid,
which vary based on context. Something/someone can be described as wāḥid based on its jins
(genus), nawc (specie), nisba (relation), muttaṣil (continuum), ḥadd (definition or limitation), or
ghayr munqasim (indivisiblity). Yaḥya demonstrates that Al-Bari’ (another name that Arab
Muslims and Christians use to describe Allah/God, meaning Creator) cannot be wāḥid in genus,
specie, relation, or continuum because they require either the existence of others or a causal
connection to exist. However, God is the uncaused cause of everything. He has nothing that
caused him, but he is the cause of every other existence. 387 Thus, anything that is caused by
another or has any causal connection for its existence cannot be God. 388
Al-Bari’ cannot also be understood as a negation of divisibility (in either an existing or a
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non-existing object) or the principle of all divisible things. 389 Regarding the negation of
divisibility, wāḥid is like the quality of the thing under description—such as its color or its
taste—not its quantity. These qualities cannot be divisible. As for the meaning of the principle of
all divisible things, wāḥid can be understood in two ways: by its substance or by its accident. By
its substance, such as the point/dot and the unit. It is one and indivisible by nature, but there can
be many of them. By accident, wāḥid cannot be the principle of all divisible things because
accidents are caused by other causes.
Since none of the previous meanings of wāḥid can be applied to Al-Bari’, Yaḥya strives
to show which aspect of the wāḥid is applicable—the meaning that can be used to describe God.
According to Yaḥya, Al-Bari’ is wāḥid in action, substance, and subject.
First, al-Bari’ is wāḥid in action, but not in power. Whatever exists, exists either by
action or by power. “If it exists by power,” Yaḥya says, “Then every power is directed toward an
action, and every power need—in egress what is in it toward an action—another cause to egress.
This necessarily makes the cause caused and this is impossible.” 390 The power needs an action to
be consummated; therefore, it cannot be uncaused cause, and if the oneness of God is not in
power, then it should necessarily be in action. Second, al-Bari’ is wāḥid in substance. “If it is
thought of wāḥid in multiple sense,” says Yaḥya, “Then the unity applies by necessity because
wāḥid from each multiplicity does exist; this is to say that the existence of multiplicity and its
substance is a compound union.” 391 Everything exists by its substance, whether it is one or
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multiple. Lastly, al-Bari’ is wāḥid in subject as long as the subject reflects the definition of
wāḥid and represents its substance. 392
According to Yaḥya, wāḥid could be understood in different senses; however, a person
can discuss the oneness of God only if he or she has the correct definition of wāḥid. When
describing Allah, scholars assume different meanings of the term wāḥid. Some used it to negate
multiplicity, others meant it as “the One who has no one like him,” and others used it to convey a
strictly numerical sense—one person/one divine being. In Yaḥya’s opinion, the previous
different meanings of the term wāḥid break several laws of logic; and therefore, they do not
necessarily apply to God.
Yaḥya accuses those who define God as al-Wāḥīd to convey the idea that “there is no one
like him” with committing the equivocation fallacy—that is, using similar words to convey
opposite meanings. 393 Yaḥya’s logical argument goes as follows: If wāḥid means no one is like
God, then mawjūd (the existing thing/creation) is also not like him. This makes God not
equivalent to mawjūd and mawjūd not equivalent to God in the same respect and aspect. If wāḥid
(God) is not equivalent to wāḥid (not God, but other existing things), then wāḥid is not
equivalent to wāḥid. This makes the existence of wāḥid mean that he is not equivalent to the
thing that is not equivalent. This makes the two wāḥids (that are equivalent and similar things)
not equivalent and not similar, and this cannot be because two things that are parallel and similar
to each other (wāḥid and wāḥid) cannot not be (but should be) similar or equivalent in some
aspects, but not different in all aspects. 394
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Whereas some people say wāḥid means “there is no one like God,” others might say,
wāḥid (God) is “the opposite to all that describes human beings.” No attribute of God is similar
to human attributes. Yaḥya shows that this understanding of wāḥid is wrong because it makes
God identical to his creation, with the exception of human beings. “Some of the attributes of
being a human being,” says Yaḥya, “Is that he is not a dominant, not a mare, not a plant, not
eternal, is different from every accident, totally different from all that exist except another human
being. So, it is necessary that none of these attributes should be applied to wāḥid.” 395 Yaḥya
continues,
If none of these negative attributes apply to wāḥid, then it is necessary to apply the
positive attributes that are opposite to it… So, wāḥid is not not a plant, but a plant; is not
not a quantity, but a quantity; is not not a modality, but a modality… in total, since God
is not different from all that exists, except another human being, he is necessarily
everything that exists, with the exception of not being a human being. 396
Yaḥya’s explanation can be demonstrated in the following equations:
God is not a human being
Human being is not a plant
God is not (not a plant)
-------------------------------Therefore, God is a plant.
The concept of wāḥid (the opposite of all that describes human beings) denies that the attributes
of human beings are similar to the attributes of wāḥid (God), and this denial makes wāḥid
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identical to his creations, but not a human being. This aspect of wāḥid must not apply to God
because God is not a created being, and he is not part of creation.
By describing God as wāḥid in the sense that “there is no one like him,” Yaḥya wanted to
stress the idea that wāḥid should be understood as “there is nothing except him that is similar and
equivalent to all his attributes and epithets.” 397 It is wrong to say that nothing is similar to God
because similarity does not necessarily require parallelism/identification. There are no two
similar things/persons that are identical in all their attributes. If two things/persons are similar, it
is necessary that they do not match. They are similar in one aspect, but they are not identical, nor
do all their attributes match up. Therefore, using the term wāḥid to describe God in the sense that
“there is nothing like him” in an ultimate sense is wrong.
In the next section of his treatise, Yaḥya moves to explain the meanings of wāḥid that
are applicable to God. He argues that wāḥid could be one in one sense and multiple in a different
sense. The numerical nature of wāḥid is not the only sense of the oneness. While it is impossible
for wāḥid to be multiple in genus, species, relation, continuum, and indivisibility, wāḥid can be
multiple in action (not in power), in substance (not by accident), and in definition (not subject).
In order to explain this multiplicity, Yaḥya discusses the attributes of al-Bari’—the attributes
that may be predicated of the divine essence. 398 Al-Bari’s attributes can be deduced from his
creation because his essence is hidden, but his effect on the creation is evident from his activity.
Since God is the creator, every existing being/thing exists because of a cause. As stated earlier,
no created thing (individual or material) exists in this world without a cause. God is the cause of
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every created thing and the only uncaused cause. 399 Being the uncaused cause and the cause of
every existent being shows his omnipotence. Furthermore, God caused other things to exist
voluntarily because there is no other cause which forced God to create his creation. All that
exists came into being out of nothing. All that was once non-existent came into existence
because of God’s power, and he had no other cause beside himself to create this creation. Thus, it
is reasonable to say, “since He was existent before these came into being, the spontaneous and
voluntary act of creation reveals His bounty.” 400 His omnipotence and his bounty are manifested
in his power to create what exists and to choose not to create what does not exist. In a similar
way, his wisdom is manifested in the order and the perfection of His work. He created everything
to work together and to sustain itself in a very amazing way. These three essential attributes (aljūd (bounty), al-Qudra (power), and al-ḥikma (wisdom) can be derived from his activities in
creation—especially that his essence is hidden from human beings, but his effect in creation is
manifested through his activities. 401 Yaḥya used the three attributes of God to depict the idea that
wāḥid can be one in one sense and multiple in a different sense. God is wāḥid in being and
multiple in attributes.
Like Abū Qurrah, Yaḥya faced several objections from Muslims scholars. In his reply
to Abū cīsā al-Warrāq and the dilemmas he presented against the Trinity, 402 Yaḥya uses different
arguments to show that God can be one in one sense and multiple in different sense. He
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interprets the persons of the Trinity as symbolic representations of Aristotelian ideas: the Father
symbolizes al-caql (the intellect), the Son symbolizes al- cāqil (the intellectually cognizing
subject), and the Spirit symbolizes al-macaqūl (the intellectually cognized object). According to
Abbās, when Yaḥya says “the essence cognizes with its substance all that exist,” 403 he means:
He cognizes its substance because he is one of things that exist. When He cognizes his
substance, He becomes al- cāqil [the intellectually cognizing subject] to his substance,
and al-macaqūl [the intellectually cognized object] to his substance. Then, al-caql
becomes the substance of mere intellect (which is the intellect’s essence) which is
available in three statuses: the status of substance by itself without any other meanings—
c
āqil or macaqūl; and a status where it is cāqil (the cognizing subject), and a status where
it is macaqūl (the cognized object). 404
Yaḥya considers the essence of the intellect by itself the reason for the existence of the other two
statuses: the object and the subject of the intellect. The reason behind his understanding lies in
the fact that each one of them cannot be depicted without the intellect’s essence (al-caql). The
intellect cognizing itself (al-caqil be cāqilan) cannot happen without existing of himself or the
existing of the cognized object (macaqūlan). The act of God cognizing himself makes him the
essence “the intellect,” the subject (because he cognized), and the object (which is himself) at the
same time.
Yaḥya’s language equates essence (jawhar) and substance (dhāt). He does not use the
word essence in a plural form because he believes in divine simplicity— God does not have three
parts/essences. 405 Yaḥya instead uses the term Aqānīm in reference to the substances or the
meanings of the three persons of the Trinity. Each of the substances/Aqānīm has its own essence
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(secondary essence/substance).
In order to understand Yaḥya’s language, Abbās makes a distinction between essence and
substance to differentiate between primary essence and secondary essence. The latter is the
special substance of the Father, not the one related to the Son or the Spirit; whereas the former is
the one that belong to all the Aqānīm. 406 Yaḥya wanted to show from the formulation of al-caql,
al- cāqil, al-macaqūl that the exitance of the Father necessitates the existence of the Son and the
Spirit. As the existence of the intellect cognizing itself necessitates the existence of al- cāqil (the
intellectually cognizing subject) and al-macaqūl (the intellectually cognized object), so does the
existence of the Father necessitate the existence of the Son and the Spirit. 407
To summarize Yaḥya’s standpoint, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are eternally
omnipotent and wise, but the Father is not the Son and not the Spirit. The Father is the mūlid of
(the one who begets—in the sense of cause) the Son and the source of the Spirit (by procession),
especially that the Son is begotten, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father. Moreover, the
fatherhood of the Father is from the substance of the Father, not necessarily from the substance
of the Son or the Spirit. 408 According to Abbās, the Father is Father because of the Son. The
similarity among them is the cause. As the intellect cognizes itself and becoming the cause of the
meaning of the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object, the Father
is the cause of the birth of the Son and the procession of the Spirit. 409. Applying this concept to
the Trinity makes God one in one sense (one in essence) and multiple in different sense (multiple
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in substances—or Aqanīm). The concept of unity and multiplicity in different senses is not a
contradiction. It just shows God as one divine being who can have multiple substances, roles,
and attributes. Aqānīm can be distinct from each other without having different essences.
Conclusion
The previous discussion presents great arguments that call for deeper research. The three
scholars used different methods. John and Abū Qurrah’s methodologies were theological,
whereas Yaḥya’s method was philosophical. Despite the different backgrounds of the three
scholars (Chalcedonian and Jacobites), all of them agreed on the definition of the Trinity: one
divine being manifested in three hypostases/Aqanīm. Their agreement shows that all orthodox
Christians agree upon the description, the functions, and the role of the Aqanīm, which do not
match their corresponding human description—they are not like people.
John, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya share several common points between Christianity and
Islam in order to start their arguments or to solve a problem at hand. For instance, John and Abū
Qurrah’s starting point regarding the incomprehensibility of God is a shared point among
Christianity and Islam. They both admit that God cannot be fully known because of the
limitations of human beings. Moreover, while the topic of oneness in Christianity and Islam is
mutually believed, it is also a point of tension. Muslims do not understand the trinitarian concept
of God nor classify it under theism, which leads them to accuse Christians of worshiping three
gods or being Mushrikūn. The three scholars were aware of this misunderstanding, so they
prioritize the defense of God’s oneness over the divine unity of the three hypostases/Aqanīm.
Despite the different backgrounds of John, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya (Chalcedonian and
Monophysite), the three scholars use the word Aqanīm to describe the three persons of the
Trinity, which is still a common practice among Arab theologians today. The three scholars
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defend the Eastern model of the Trinity—the anti-filioque model; however, they also explain the
relational aspect of the nature of God differently. While they affirm the fatherhood of the Father,
the sonship of Jesus, and the procession of the Holy Spirit, they show that the intra-relationship
of the Aqanīm is very unique to the divine nature because it cannot happen without their roles.
The Father is called Father because he has a son; the son is a son because he is born of the
Father; and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father showing how the three Aqanīm are living in
an eternal relational existence with each other.
John, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya shared two main themes while defending the Trinity: the
divine oneness and God’s attributes. The divine oneness is a crucial topic that is often
misunderstood by Muslims. Many of Eastern fathers prioritized defending the divine oneness
over the eternal relationship of the Aqanīm because of the Islamic accusion of being Mushrikūn.
John relies mostly on the Scripture to show that Christians believe in one God—one divine
being, one godhead, one virtue, one will, one operation, one principality, one power, one
domination, and one kingdom. John uses the concept of the oneness of God in a numerical sense,
which is similar to the Muslims’ understanding and their description of Allah as wāḥid-one
being.
Abū Qurrah also depends on Scripture to show Muslims that the Trinity is not a newly
invented doctrine. It was implied in the OT. He does not stop here, but he proceeds to explain the
linguistical aspect of the doctrine by using the distinction between logical and non-logical names.
The former indicates persons such as Peter, Paul, and John, and the latter implies nature. While it
is correct to say that Peter is a man, Paul is a man, and John is a man, it is not correct to say that
Peter is mankind, Paul is mankind, or John is mankind. In a similar manner, the Father is God,
the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, but God is not the Father, God is not the Son, and
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God is not the Holy Spirit. God is a name that indicates divine nature; and Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit are names that indicate three divine Aqanīm. Yaḥya does not rely directly on the Scripture;
however, he uses the linguistic argument. He discusses the different meanings of the term wāḥid
to teach that the divine being is one in one sense and multiple in a different sense, and this is not
a contradiction. The logical argument for the Trinity indicates that plurality within the unity is
possible in the creation and in the Godhead. The numerical sense of wāḥid is not the only way to
understand this term. There are many other different senses of the term wāḥid that can be applied
in creation but not to the divine nature. While wāḥid in the sense of genus, specie, relation,
continuum, and indivisibility cannot be applied to God, wāḥid in the sense of action, substance,
and definition is applicable. Thus, thinking of God in one sense (the numerical sense) is not
rationally correct.
The attributes of God is an important topic shared by Christianity and Islam. Scholars
cannot study the nature of God without discussing God’s attributes. While Muslims affirm that
Allah has ninety-nine beautiful names/attributes, they disagree on the list of these names and
many of their meanings. Muslims who follow the doctrine of Bilā kayfa are unable to answer
many questions related to the morality of Allah because they confirm that Allah’s attributes are
not like humans’ attributes, and Allah cannot be described in a non-Qur’anic way. However, by
discussing God’s attributes, John, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya were able to show that he is
maximally good through the doctrine of the Trinity.
John, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya discuss the topic in three different ways. While John infers
the attributes of God from Scripture and tradition, Abū Qurrah and Yaḥya believe that God’s
attributes can be deduced from creation. The first attribute discussed is the omnibenevolence of
God. The maximally good God in Christianity is shown in different ways. John mentions several
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attributes. He believes that God is uncreated, eternal, uncircumscribed, unchanging, source of
goodness and justice, and so on. These divine attributes are shared with Muslims; however, some
of them are related to the triune nature of God more than others. John, for instance, comments on
God’s omnibenevolence by attributing goodness to God’s essence (not his will, as Muslims do).
This distinction makes God maximally good and the source of all goodness. He is the very
source of being for all things that exist and the cause of all good things. Being maximally good
(omnibenevolence) is reflected in the way God treats his creation and the way he relates to evil
in this world. When the goodness of God is ascribed to his essence, his will and power shown in
creation will follow.
Abū Qurrah believes that people can learn about God’s attributes by observing Adam’s
virtues. While Adams’s defects cannot teach about God, his virtues can by affirming the gap
between human nature and divine nature. Whatever virtues Adam possesses (bounty, goodness,
wisdom …etc.), God possesses in a greater, multiple, and more transcendental manner. Through
the virtues of Adam, people can imagine God being maximally good and greater than all human
beings. Yaḥya believes that God’s essence is hidden, but his effect on creation is evident from
his activity. The three essential attributes of God are his bounty, his power, and his wisdom. The
three attributes are extrapolated from his creation and show his goodness. His omnipotence and
his bounty are manifested in his power to create what exists and of his choice not to create what
does not exist. Similarly, his wisdom is manifested in the order and the perfection of his work.
Whether the omnibenevolence of God is extracted from the Scripture or from creation, it is
related to the essence of God. If God is maximally good, then his nature (whether triune or
oneness) should reflect his goodness.
The omnipotence of God is another attribute that is shared between Christianity and
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Islam. Abū Qurrah emphasizes the omnipotence of God by focusing on the Trinity. He states that
begetting surpasses the inability to beget. Any denial of the Father being able to beget
undermines the omnipotence of God. Yaḥya, on the other hand, does not link his formula of alc

aql, al- cāqil, al-macaqūl to God’s omnipotence because he talks about God’s power separately.

However, being the only being who can apply this formula shows his great power. Yaḥya’s
formulation moves beyond the roles of the Aqanīm to the reason behind the existence of each
Iqnūm. The existence of the intellect cognizing itself necessitates the existence of al- cāqil (the
intellectually cognizing subject) and al-macaqūl (the intellectually cognized object). The
existence of the Father necessitates the existence of the Son and the Spirit. No other being can
accomplish this formula because all other beings need external beings to serve as the subject and
the object. The Trinity is the only model that shows God not needing otherness outside his being
in order to be able to conceive. As the intellect cognizes itself and becomes the cause of the
meaning of the intellectually cognizing subject and the intellectually cognized object, the Father
is the cause of begetting the Son and the procession of the Spirit. He does not need any other
being to be able to achieve this formula.
The last attribute that is related to the doctrine of the Trinity is the immutability of God.
This attribute means that God does not change in his character or nature, unlike his creation.
Unlike God, a human father was not a father before having his son. In fact, he became a father
when he had a son. The heavenly Father has always being a Father because there was no time in
history where the Father was not a Father and the Son did not exist. The relationship between the
Father and the Son is mutual, simultaneous, and has no beginning or end; therefore, it is
unchanging. Furthermore, John brings to the attention of his readers that the Son of God is God’s
word. God is not wordless, and he has never been without his word at any point of history. Thus,
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it is correct to think of God being the communicator. His word was always with him and in him;
and later on, it was revealed to humanity. What makes his word different from our language, is
that our words are perishable and changeable, whereas he is unchanging and eternal. The Trinity
works as a great model to potentially present the unchanging nature of God. If God’s nature is
subject to change, then God can improve and develop. At one point, he cannot do something and
at another point, he can do it. The changing nature of God connotes progressive development
within the divine essence; therefore, it is rejected totally in Christianity.

Chapter Four: A Contemporary Christian Answer to Islamic Objections Against the
Trinity
Now that the study has offered background on the Medieval period in the Middle East,
three major Arab theologians, and their defenses of the Trinity, it will move to present a modern
defense of the doctrine of Trinity against Islamic objections, especially the doctrine of tawḥīd.
During the Medieval period, Arab Christian scholars were preoccupied with proving the oneness
of God over discussing the importance of God being manifested in three persons. They moved
from the three Aqānīm to the one divine being. Western scholars, on the other hand, were
influenced by Neoplatonism, in which “the presentation of Christian theology began from the
one God and then went on to the God triune.” 410 Therefore, they were preoccupied with the
relational aspect of the three persons of the Trinity over proving the oneness of God.
To defend the Trinity, Christian Middle Eastern scholars discussed God’s attributes. John
of Damascus, for instance, listed them to explain what kind of God Christian believes in;
whereas Theodore Abū Qurrah and Yaḥya ibn cAdī expanded the explanation and used them in
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their illustrations to define the Trinity and prove God’s oneness. Western scholars, on the other
hand, did not neglect the discussion of divine attributes, but they included significant
reorientations and revisions. Therefore, the current chapter serves as a bridge between the East
and West to present a comprehensive, but not an exhaustive, trinitarian model showing God as
the greatest conceived being.
The Greatest Conceived Being: A Summary
Christian scholars always pursue ways to understand God. Throughout church history,
they formed several creeds in order to fight heresies and defend orthodoxy. In similar fashion,
Muslim scholars have always sought ways to talk about Allah. They call theology the science of
kalām, 411 which is used, not for the purpose of understanding Allah—Allah is supremely
transcendent, and no one can understand him—but for the purpose of speaking about Allah as the
Qur’an reveals him.
In both religious disciplines, Christian and Muslim scholars proceed with caution,
especially in using terms that describe the essence of God. They believe that using absent
terms—terms that have no fixed meanings—lead to people speaking about abstract concepts
because no one knows what the author meant by it. Christian theologians such as John and Abū
Qurrah realized this fact and encouraged their audience to seek comparisons between the
attributes of God and the nature of man to discover the differences. Abū Qurrah argues that
people can learn about God’s attributes by observing Adam’s virtues, acknowledging his defects,
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and affirming the gap between the human and the divine natures. 412 If some ideas or experiences
do not match or map onto the divine essence, then people know nothing about God and his
perfection. As Medieval Christian scholar, John Dun Scotus puts it, “If things were really this
bad, we would have no better reason to call God wise than a rock.” 413 He adds,
Every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this fashion: the formal notion of
something is considered; the imperfection associated with this notion in creatures is
removed, and then, retaining the same formal notion, we ascribe to it the ultimate degree
of perfection and then attribute it to God . . . Consequently, every inquiry regarding God
is based upon the supposition that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it
obtained from creatures. 414
When Christian scholars say God is the seer, the hearer, and the communicator, they know what
vision, hearing, and communication is; however, they ascribe the ultimate and the perfect ability
to see, hear, and speak with all creation to God who is omnipotent.
While this method of inquiry followed Christian theologians throughout church history,
Muslim theologians resisted such comparison, acknowledging a wide chasm between Allah and
humanity. As Islamic theology evolved, many Muslim traditionalists in the early years of kalām
followed the principle of “man ṭalaba al-dīn bi’l kalām tazandaqa (whoever seeks religion
through kalām becomes a heretic).” 415 This slogan did not refer to the whole project of theology
as represented by Usūl al-Dīn (the origin of religion), but to the investigation of the basic
features of the nature of Allah, especially his attributes, which some early Muslim thinkers
engaged in. Later generations of Muslim scholars accused other theologians of assuming too
Qusṭanṭine Bashā,  اﻗﺪم ﺗﺄﻟﯿﻒ ﻋﺮﺑﻲ ﻧﺼﺮاﻧﻲ:[ﻣﯿﺎﻣﺮ ﺛﯿﻮدور أﺑﻮ ﻗﺮة اﺳﻘﻒ ﺣﺎرانMayamir Theodore Abū Qurrah
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much about the knowability of the divine nature, so they created the doctrine of bila kayfa
(without asking how). It means believing in certain attributes (Allah’s ninety-nine beautiful
names) without attempting to understand them beyond their description in the Qur’an and
traditions. The discussion of Allah’s attributes continued afterwards in a very limited way.
Both Christian and Muslim theologians confess the perfect-divine theology. Divine
perfection relates to a state of completeness or absolute wholeness. As stated in chapter one, the
greatest conceived being has no ontological deficiencies, has no flaws, or depends on anything
else. There is no greater being that can be thought of which deserves human worship except the
greatest conceived being. This concept can be demonstrated with the following equation:
Maximally good + Maximally perfect = Maximally great. This is the definition of the greatest
conceived being. In other words, God is maximally good and maximally perfect; therefore, he is
the greatest conceived being.
Maximal divine goodness means God cannot be morally better; there is no room for him
to obtain more moral skills. His goodness is maximal and full. If there is anything in the world
that can contribute to or increase his goodness, then he is a minor God. In like manner, maximal
divine perfection means he lacks no thing (e.g. skill, ability, attributes …etc.). There is nothing
in creation that can add or subtract from him. God did not create the world because he must or
ought to, nor because he needs to. God is self-sufficient; he does not need the world to be
unsurpassably great. He is perfect with or without the world. Divine maximal goodness and
aseity (self-sufficiency) make theists (both Christian and Muslim) believe that God/Allah is the
greatest conceived being, and therefore, he deserves human worship.
Theists, however, follow two different models for divine perfection—Trinity and tawḥīd.
The study advocates for the divine trinitarian model because it demonstrates divine perfection in
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an unsurpassable way. As Kallistos Ware states, “The doctrine of the Trinity is not just one
possible way of thinking about God. It is the only way. The one God of the Christian church
cannot be conceived except as Trinity.” 416 Other non-trinitarian models of theism (especially
tawḥīd) do not reveal God as unsurpassably perfect. Their presentation of the divine essence
portrays God as contingently relational, especially before creation. Allah was alone with no other
person to communicate with. All his divine communicative attributes were dysfunctional before
the existence of creation because there was no one to practice these attributes with—e.g. AlBaṣīr (the Seer), As-Samīc (the Hearer), Ar-Razzāq (the Sustainer), Ash-Sahkūr (the Thankful),
al-Ḥāfiẓ (the Preserver), al-Muqīt (the Nourisher), Ar-Raqīb (the Watcher), al-Karīm (the
Generous), al-Mujīb (the One who Responds to Those Who Ask) …etc. 417 Consequently, the
Islamic presentation of tawḥīd shows that Allah is contingent upon his creation in order to
communicate. This shortcoming in the divine nature affects the greatness of the divine and runs
the risk of misperceiving the greatest conceived being.
The argument goes this way:
P1: One aspect of divine perfection is relationality—the greatest conceived being should
be a relational being in order to be perfect and good (the greatest).
P2: The trinitarian model shows God as an eternally relational divine being (intrarelational and inter-relational).
C: God as a Trinity is the greatest conceived being.
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The Greatest Conceived Being Is Relational in Nature
Many theologians appeal to the concept of divine attributes in an attempt to discover the
mystery of the divine essence. One of the ways to understand the greatest conceived being is by
studying his attributes to ensure that none of them is in conflict with other attributes. The
attribute that this study will focus on is the relational nature of God—God in relationship. It is
rare to see the relationality of God discussed in theology proper as an attribute; however, the
relationality of God in the sense of interconnectedness is undeniable in any theistic worldview.
God communicates and connects with his creation. He hears his people’s prayers, answers their
inquiries, and reveals his will. If God does not possess the ability to relate, then he is a lesser
God. If he is non-relational, then he cannot communicate with his creation. He cannot hear the
prayers of believers and cannot communicate his divine revelation and will. In the theistic
worldview, the greatest conceived being does not miss any attributes that might make him
imperfect. Therefore, within theism, God must be relational.
Relationality: An Essential Trait of Divine Personality
Relationality Is Essential in the Theistic Worldview

All theistic worldviews (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) believe that God connects
with his creation in one way or another. God gave his revelation (the Bible and the Qur’an).
He spoke directly with his prophets (Ex 31:18; Dan 5:25) and he communicated his message
to human beings through angels and apostles. Today, the written revelation is completed, but
God still communicates with his people. He listens to their prayers and answers their needs
(Ps 4:3; John 9:31; 1 John 5:14) (Surah 21:48, 76; 35:22). In other words, within a theistic
worldview, God is still involved in his creation by communicating with his followers. He did
not leave the world alone to wrestle with its challenges, as in a deistic worldview.
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Relationality Is Essential to Personhood
Relationality requires personal agency—an agent who can hear/listen and speak/talk. The
form of communication is not important at this point, and it will not be addressed. The
significant point, however, that this study conveys is that no relationship of any sort (father-son
or master-slave) can be done without the ability to connect. The minimum requirement for
starting a relationship is the ability to see, hear, and communicate. Objects, such as newspapers,
televisions, and computers are all transmitters rather than ends in themselves. They do not
represent or reflect themselves, but they point to a variety of things, such as the flux, flow, and
changing circumstances around the world. 418 They are unable to create or maintain a relationship,
unless there is a personal agency behind them.
Relationality rules out indifference. Usually, objects are indifferent to what is around
them. Scotus states, “Something with passive power is indifferent to contrary states of affairs,
like how logs are indifferent to being hot or not being hot. After all, a log does not care, so to
speak, whether it is one or the other, for there is nothing about a log that requires that it be hot, or
that it not be hot.” 419 On the contrary, an agency of a person who cares about the status of the log
can interact with it by heating it up and causing it to receive heat. In the same sense, an active
power, such as the sun, is indifferent to the many effects it can bring about to creation; however,
an agency of a person (who has control over the sun) is not indifferent to its affect. A personal
agency is intentional about its effects on the creation because it seeks to emphasize virtue and
minimize harm.
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Relationality requires otherness—another agency to connect with. The communicative
ability of a personal agency cannot be completed without another personal agency to receive,
convey, and impart the information that is being transmitted. Relationships require at least two
agents for meaningful interaction. It is pointless for someone to make a relationship with himself,
or to be satisfied seeing the dirt or listening to the wind. Pure individualism or selfishness is not
perceived as a virtue. Even psychologists, while they emphasize the traits of self-awareness for
the sake of furthering and improving interpersonal relationships, they do not recommend it for
the sake of furthering individualism. 420
Relationality Is Essential for Human Flourishing
Relationality is fundamental for human flourishing. God does not only ask people to
worship him, but he also promises to bless them if they believe and obey him. Those who are not
believers will not receive his blessings, and those who believe will receive their deserved awards.
In other words, the results of the divine relationality should lead to human flourishing (at least
for those who are obeying the divine communication/revelation). Those who do not want to have
a relationship with God might not enjoy human flourishing, but those who want to establish a
relationship with God are promised a thriving life. If this is true, then God ought to communicate
to establish a relationship with his creation. If he is unable to convey his message or listen to
prayers, then his greatness is disputable.
Humanly speaking, some people are better than others in their relatedness and
communication with other people. Some can make friends so easily—it comes naturally to
them—whereas others struggle with making friends and relating to people. No matter how hard
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connecting with others is, the ability to communicate and relate is essential to any person,
otherwise the individuals would be stripped of their humanity. Needless to say, human
relationships are different from God’s relationship to the world. God is transcendent and does not
need humanity to flourish (Eccles 5:2; Isa 6:1) (Surah 87:1; 2:255; 42:12). While this is true,
there is a need to note that God is omnipotent (able to do all possible things) (Rom 4:21: 2Cor
9:8; 2Tim 1:12) (Surah 17:99; 23:17; 36:81; 46:33); therefore, perceiving him as unable to
establish a relationship with his creation (especially human beings) is not a virtue, but a defect.
In a nutshell, relationality is a fundamental attribute to divine agency. Most theistic
religions believe that God created human beings to worship him. Relationship with the divine
started through the divine agency (God) who communicated to human beings their need and duty
to worship him. Intuitively speaking, if the divine agency is unable to communicate this
requirement, then he is to blame, not the human. In other words, the first step in relationality
starts with the divine, who is communicated to be the supreme, the creator, and the omnipotent;
subsequently, he deserves to be worshiped. God’s inability to communicate with his creation at
any point in history would be considered a flaw, not a perfection.
The Fundamental Factor of Relationality
Relationality: Intra-Relational Nature of the Divine
Intra-relationality is essential to the divine agency because it shows God not only as
relational but also as eternally relational. Christians and Muslims perceive God as an eternal
divine being, which implies that God has no beginning and no end. He was not born, does not
have a starting point, and will not die (Rom 1:20, 16:26; 1Tim 1:17) (Surah 28:88; 55:27). As
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Stanley Grenz states, “To refer to God as spirit means to understand God as the Living One.” 421
Living in this case implies the idea of always/eternally living.
Since creation has a starting point (at one time in history there was no creation), then
scholars can think of divine relationality in two ways: the relationality of God before the creation
and after it. The divine intra-relationality is related to God’s unity, and it refers to his sociality
within the Godhead—God as a community and the way he perceives himself. This criterion
helps thinkers understand God’s nature inwardly—whether he is alone (as one agent) or a
communion of persons—and whether his relational nature is consistent with his eternality.
Relationality: Inter-Relational Nature of the Divine
Inter-relationality is another type of divine relationality related to the communication
between God and his creation. God is integrally involved with his creation. He is not static, but
active and affected by the events of the world. Any relationship requires at least two agents: one
speaks while the other listens, one loves while another receives the love, and so on. This criterion
is important because it provides answers about the nature of the relationship of God with his
creation. How does God relate/act with his creation and what does he require/expect from his
creatures? After the fall, what did he do to save humanity? This criterion helps thinkers
understand God’s nature outwardly through his actions.
Allah and Relationality
The Main Islamic Theological Schools: A Historical Overview
As stated in chapter three, during the Islamic formation of theology (kalām), theological
and philosophical conflicts arose between two major Arabic schools of thought: the traditional
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and the rational. The traditional school, led by the Ashcarites, stressed the idea that revelation
should precede reason. They viewed inspired writings as superior to human reasoning and
believed that faith and surrender were therefore required. Consequently, “interpretation of the
text was to be either limited or forbidden, and ignorance must be admitted.” 422 On the other
hand, the rational school, represented by the Muctazilites, recognized the necessity of reason.
They placed reason above revelation. Faith was not complete without understanding. When a
discrepancy between the mind and revelation occurs, interpretation is required. In the eleventh
century, after a long dispute, the Muctazilites were accursed and the Ashcarites were recognized
as the orthodox party. 423 Based on this distinction, both Ashcarites and Muctazilites presented
different perceptions of the divine attributes. While they both were intent on saving God’s unity,
they became preoccupied with God’s power over God’s relationality.
Islamic Overview of Divine Attributes
The two Sunni groups disputed the topic of Allah’s names/attributes. In the Qur’an,
Mohammad states that “to Allah alone belong all perfect attributes. So call on Him by these”
(Surah 7:180 Islam International Publications, 2015; 17:110; 20:8; 59:24).424 Following
Mohammad’s commands, Muslims believe that they should not look to nature or the virtues that
human beings enjoy in order to extract God’s attributes. Instead, they should only use the names
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that Allah and Mohammad used in the Qur’an. The dispute was over what names to include and
what are the meanings of these names.
Using different methods of interpretation, the Ashcarites’ understanding of Allah’s
attributes resulted in different interpretations from the Muctazilites. The most famous scholar that
the Ashcarites followed was Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (AD 855), who rejected the Muctazilites’
rationalism and gave precedence to divine revelation. Ibn Ḥanbal believed that the attributes of
God, according to the teachings of the Qur’an, are not subject to human reasoning, and thus must
be accepted without qualification. 425 Asking whether God’s attributes are part of his essence (in
him) or part of his will (without him) was an unacceptable religious innovation. 426
The ongoing issues between the Ashcarites and Muctazilites culminated in the question of
anthropomorphism (tashbīh). The Qur’an speaks of God’s hands (Surah 38:75), eyes (Surah
54:14), and face (Surah 55:27). It also describes him as hearing (Surah 2:127; 17:1; 22:61),
seeing (Surah 4:58, 134; 5:71; 17:30), and seating himself on his throne (Surah 20:5), apparently
implying that he has a body. Many Ashcarite scholars, such as al-Baqillanī, al-Juwaynī, and alGhazalī, argue that these verses must be understood metaphorically. As al-Juwaynī states, “What
is correct, in our view, is that the hands [of God] should be construed as power, the eyes as
vision, and the face as existence.” 427 Ashcarites were eager to avoid anything that might be
construed as anthropomorphism (tashbīh). 428
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Dar al-Ifta al-Missriyyah, which is the highest religious authority in Egypt, issued a
mandate on their website, commending Sunnis to
Believe in them [Allah’s attributes] and to receive them with acceptance and resignation.
And to not engage in its interpretation, its refutation, likening the attribute to something
tangible, and other problematic methodologies. It is incumbent to establish the attribute
as it came and to leave interpreting its meaning and to resign its meaning to the One who
spoke of it in accordance with the way of those who are firmly established in the faith…
He [Allah] has castigated those who innovate in interpretation ‘But those in whose hearts
is perversity follow the part thereof that is allegorical, seeking discord, and searching for
its hidden meanings, but no one knows its hidden meanings except God.’ 429
Dar al-Ifta al-Missriyyah also quotes Imam Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, who, regarding Allah descending
to the sky of this earth and the scene on the day of resurrection, has stated that “we believe in
these texts and we verify their truth without asking how, or without seeking a meaning and we
desire nothing of this. We believe that what the Messenger of God brought is truth and we do not
respond to him nor do we describe God with more than what He has described of Himself ‘there
is none like unto Him and He is the all seeing, all hearing.’” 430 This statement affirms the
attributes of Allah, and if any of them are ambiguous or equivocal, then Sunnis should accept
them as is without further question.
What is important to our study is that the Ashcarites affirmed Allah’s Attributes (sifat),
divided them into two groups, and emphasized seven essential ones. The first group is the
essential sifat. They are called Al-sifat al-dhatīya (attributes in essence): namely power,
knowledge, life, will, speech, hearing, and sight, which eternally subsist in God’s essence. From
eternity, Allah is omnipotent, omniscient, living, willing, speaking, all-hearing, and all-seeing.
The second group is called Al-sifat al-ficlya (attributes in actions), such as mercy, love, wrath …
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etc. These attributes exist only as Allah acts with his creation. The Ashcarites’ semantics
regarding the attributes of actions is ambiguous. Some scholars say, “These attributes [attributes
in actions] are therefore not eternal and do not subsist in His [Allah]Essence.” 431 Other scholars
say that these attributes are eternal, but they are not related to the essence of God but to his
will. 432
Muctazilites, on the other hand, contributed to the attribute debate by presenting different
views from the Ashcarites. According to John Renard, the Muctazilites’ views “flow from the
first principle: since God is simply and irreducibly one, his ‘essential’ attributes (power,
knowledge, existence) are identical with God’s being. But since God also acts in time, his
speaking, hearing, seeing, and willing are separate from God’s essence and subject to change.” 433
Muctazilites attempted to save a strict concept of monotheism, which, in their opinion, requires
an uncompromised observance of the transcendence and the absolute unity of God. In their view,
Allah should be pure in essence and has no attributes because assigning attributes implies
multiplicity. 434 If the attributes are identical with God, then they would have to be identical
among themselves. God’s knowledge would thus be the same as God’s omnipotence.
The Muctazilites maintained the attributes of essence; however, they insisted that it would
be blasphemous to acknowledge the attributes of action as defining what God is like. 435
According to Shehadeh, “Muctazilites maintained that the attributes of action are not eternal, but
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created, and therefore, contingent, unnecessary and changing.” 436 Allah’s attributes in actions are
the abstract meanings, human semantics, and knowledge that were created to know Allah. Thus,
it is easy to imagine a time when Allah did not have these attributes because they only came into
being when he acted with his creation. As a result of this claim, Muctazilites made Allah mutable
and subject to change. 437
The Intra-Relationality of Allah
Neither the Ashcarite nor the Muctazilite understanding of Allah’s attributes show him as
relational before creation. Muctazilites do not believe that Allah’s attributes, such as seeing,
hearing, and speaking, are eternal. Most of the Islamic dispute happened over God’s speech, in
which Muctazilites view Allah’s speaking as an attribute of action; therefore, it is not eternal.
Moreover, Muctazilites have different interpretations for Allah being the seer and the hearer. AlShahrastānī mentions several Muctazilite views on this topic. Al-Kacbī, for instance, believes that
Allah being the seer and the hearer means “he is aware of what is being said and seen.” 438 Other
scholars, like Al-Jibā’ī, understood Allah (the seer and the hearer) as al-Ḥay (the living, who is
not dead, full of life, and the existent). 439 In other words, Muctazilites do not affirm the attributes
of Allah as part of his essence; subsequently, they are not eternal. They interpret Allah being the
seer and the hearer by alluding either to his life or his knowledge of the objects of seeing and
hearing. To protect Allah’s unity, Muctazilites end up presenting a mutilated concept of the
divine by making him unable to see or hear from eternity.
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The Ashcarites, on the other hand, acknowledge that Allah sees and hears because it is
written in the Qur’an that “He is the Hearing, the Seeing” (Surah 42:11, Shakir). The problem
with this view lies in the idea that Allah could hear and see eternally before creating the world
because these attributes are part of his essence. But here’s the question that Ashcarites never
asked: Whom did Allah see or hear before the creation of the world? If he did not see or hear
anyone, he only started seeing and hearing after the creation; consequently, his nature changed.
Perhaps he had the potential ability to see and hear, but his attributes were dysfunctional until he
created the world.
The eternal divine communication problem in Islam, which is mentioned in chapter three,
extends to Allah’s speech. Remember, the Ashcarites’ view about Allah’s speech is understood
by his perpetual state of being, as a substance (macna), not in the sense of a set of temporal ideas
or representations, but as an eternal divine attribute. This understanding raises the same problem
of seeing and hearing: Allah had no one to communicate with before the creation of the world.
His ability to communicate was contingent on his creation.
The conflict between the Muctazilites and the Ashcarites regarding the relationality of
Allah exposes the weakness of absolute oneness. Muslims encounter a dilemma with their
concepts of tawḥīd based on their descriptions of Allah’s attributes. Those who affirm the
eternality of the attributes—especially speaking, seeing, and hearing—mutilate their concept of
the divine because Allah needs another agent to speak, see, and hear. Otherwise, Allah would be
speaking, seeing, and hearing with himself, and that seems meaningless. Those who do not
affirm the eternality of the attributes, on the other hand, end up presenting a minor image of the
divine who could not communicate—speak, hear, or see—until after the creation came into
existence because there was no subject of communication to fulfill his attributes with.
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To answer this dilemma, later Muslim scholars suggested that Allah did not form creation
ex-nihilo (out of nothing), but instead by emanation. The concept of emanation means that all
created things are derived from something else in the sense that secondary things proceed or flow
from the primary. 440 Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī (AD 1001) believes in eternal creation. Time
does not have beginning or end. According to Joel Kraemer, al-Sijistānī maintains that God’s
power is “spread throughout the world permanently” and saw creation as “a non-temporal,
eternal process.” 441 This means God did not create out of nothing nor in six literal days as the
Qur’an states. Instead, creation is perpetually existent with God. Ibn Taymīyya (AD 1328), who
was regarded as a kalām theologian and not a philosopher, argues for the idea of continuous
creation from eternity. Commenting on a ḥadīth in Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī and a Quranic verse, he argues
that Allah created this world while his throne was already in existence. 442 It is written in the
Qur’an that Allah “is Who created the heavens and the earth in six Days - and His Throne was
upon the water” (Surah 11:7 Pickthall). This verse connotes the idea that water and Allah’s
throne were already in existence when Allah created the world in six days. Hoover notes,
God’s creative activity had a beginning. They correctly see that reason dictates that God
could have become an agent after not having been one unless a prior cause originated to
necessitate the change. That is, it is impossible that God arbitrarily started creating at
some point in the past after never having created before. Here ibn Taymiyya endorses the
philosophers’ axiom of efficient causality—every event requires a cause—and he rejects
the Kalām view that it is in the nature of God’s will to decide without prior cause. 443
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Despite ibn Taymīyya’s suggestion about the eternality of the world, the dilemma of the
relationality of Allah remains unanswered. For even if water and Allah’s throne (or just basic
atoms) is all that existed at the beginning (from eternity), Allah’s attributes as the hearer and
communicator were not perfected until the creation of human beings. Allah was still unable to
communicate in a relational way or demonstrate his relational nature until the creation of human
beings. Allah’s inability to see, hear, and speak limits his power and perfection. Additionally, the
idea of the eternal nature of water and God’s throne is problematic. For only Allah is eternal, and
all that is eternal is Allah. 444 If water or Allah’s throne was eternal, as ibn Taymiyyah claims,
then other things were Allah or associating with Allah from eternity. This idea is completely
rejected in Islam because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of tawḥīd—only the divine is
eternal. In other words, the eternality of the universe limits the divinity of Allah because it
presents something else as eternal, and this idea refutes the concept of tawḥīd.
The Inter-Relationality of Allah
Allah’s attributes describe him communicating with his creation, which raises the
question of the inter-relationality of Allah. The Qur’an describes Allah speaking to angels,
teaching them mysteries about the future, and ordering them to bow to Adam (Surah 2:30-34).
The Qur’an also depicts Allah hearing the pleading of woman regarding her husband (Surah
58:1), seeing everything (Surah 17:1; 26:218; 96:14), and hearing everything (Surah 5:76; 6:13;
21:4). Perhaps most importantly, the Qur’an itself is the speech of Allah to his servant via the
angel Jibrīl Mohammad (Surah 6: 19).
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Most theistic scholars believe that God is a person/agent. 445 He is not a person as human
beings are, but he is a person in a unique, divine way. The divine person, for instance, is eternal,
having no beginning or end. He is not born, and he cannot die. 446 The divine person is not a
secondary but a primary and absolute notion in existence. As John Zizioulas states, “Nothing is
more sacred than the person since it constitutes the ‘way of being’ of God himself.” 447 Christians
and Muslims, however, differ on the idea of whether God (as a person) exists in communion or
alone. Christians believe that if God is a person, then he cannot exist in isolation or alone;
whereas, Muslims have no problem with God being alone and lonely. They believe that there is
no plurality in him because his essential characteristic is that of unity. Nevertheless, his lack of
plurality means he is not in relationship throughout eternity, for there is no other with whom he
might relate.
The reason behind this difference is that Christians relate the idea of personhood to the
idea of identity. For a being to be a person is unique and unrepeatable. Even if a person dies, he
or she will still be remembered for who he or she was. Their skills, traits, characteristics (good
and bad) will always be remembered. However, animals, who are not persons, are replaceable,
and their traits and characteristics are repeatable. “They can be similar; they can be composed
and decomposed; they can be combined with others in order to produce results or even new
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species; they can be used to serve purposes—sacred or not, this does not matter.” 448 On the
contrary, persons cannot be replaced, reproduced, combined, or used the same way the animals
are used—even the most sacred ones. Whosoever treats persons in such a way automatically
turns them into a thing. When people die, they perish physically, but they bring into existence
their personal particularity. As Zizioulas explains,
Death dissolves us all into one indistinguishable nature, turning us into ‘substance,’ or
things. What gives us an identity that does not die is not our nature but our personal
relationship with God’s undying personal identity. Only when nature is hypostatic or
personal, as is the case with God, does it exist truly and eternally. For it is only then that
it acquires uniqueness and becomes an unrepeatable and irreplaceable particularity in the
‘mode of being’ which we find in the Trinity. 449
Some Muslims might partially agree with this explanation; however, those who reject the idea
that God is a person are trying to avoid the term because of its anthropomorphic connotation.
Such Muslims prefer to use other titles and names of Allah, such as rabb (lord) (Surah 40:28;
43:64), a word used to refer to the God of Mohammad or the God of al-Kacba. Ilāh (a god – pl.
āliha), a word of considerably lower incidence in the Qur’anic text, is used often to refer
generically to the false gods of others, including Jesus and Mary (Surah 5:116, 16:51; 20:88). 450
Whether Allah is defined as a person or a divine agent, his relationality to the world is
essential. The Islamic presentation of divine attributes can be opaque because absolute oneness
focuses on the power of Allah and the freedom of his will. A revealed action of God “deals with
the will of Allah and not Allah himself.” 451 Shehadeh thinks that “the emphasis was placed upon
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the phenomenon that there is never a promise given by God in the Qur’an that is not
accompanied by a statement stressing his freedom and power to act according to how he
chooses.” 452 This is mainly because in Islam, human beings are created primarily to worship
Allah rather than to have a relationship with him. Ida Glaser states, “The ultimate in relationship
is willing submission rather than interaction.” 453 Glaser adds, “God’s love may cause him to
have mercy on his creatures, even to the extent of communicating with them; but it is a love that
condescends in beneficence rather than a love that shares in relationship.” 454 Relational love
includes both benefits and relationship.
If the previous analysis is true, then God’s absolute power and authority over the whole
universe constitute a master-slave relationship instead of a father-child relationship. It is his right
alone to enforce the affairs of men as he wills, and it is the duty of the slave to obey and worship
his master without questioning. Al-Shahristānī openly affirms this kind of relationship between
Allah and everything in his creation (including human beings) by indicating that “Ar-Raḥmān
[another name of Allah’s names] should not have a son because he is exalted. He did not
become, nor was caused to exist; he did not beget, nor was begotten; but everything to him is as
slavery to masterdom. All who existed in heavens and on earth become slaves to Ar-Raḥmān,
and he is the master of everything and its [the world] creator, and the God of all that exists …” 455
The super-transcendence of Allah in Islamic theology presents him as above his creation
because there are no signs of personal interaction with human beings. When Allah wanted to
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interact with his created beings, he sent them several prophets, such as Abraham, Moses, Jonah,
and many others. When the age of maturity, or the age of reason approached, Allah sent prophet
Mohammad to his people as the Seal of the prophets (Surah 33:40). 456 He did not simply reveal
the continuation of the Judeo-Christian faith, but he claimed to be the culmination of all previous
revelations. 457 Up to this point, Allah did not leave himself without a witness. He was still
communicating with his people. He saw the conditions of humanity, heard their agony, and
taught them what they need to know about his majesty. He corresponded with them by speaking,
and he spoke by revealing. He communicated by sending a messenger, whom he gave supreme
authority to reveal his will (Qur’an 42:51). After this point, Allah stopped communicating with
human beings. He stopped sending prophets and revealing more messages. It seems that Allah
gave humanity the moral law and taught them the ethical codes that they should apply, but he
then left them on their own to struggle and fight. This part of Allah’s relationality is also missing
from Islamic theology. Allah seems to distance himself from the creation.
The original equation of God’s perfection + God’s moral goodness does not seem
compatible with the Islamic presentation of the divine. For Allah to be the greatest, he must be
maximally good and maximally perfect. Maximally good means God cannot morally improve.
He cannot be non-relational at one point of history, then become relational, and later stop being
relational again. Being non-relational at any point in history makes him a minor god. Similarly,
God being maximally perfect means he lacks nothing. If he does not exhibit the feature of
relationality necessarily, then he is a contingent being. He needs his creation in order to be
relational. Before the creation of human beings, there was no one to hear, see, or speak to. The
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doctrine of tawhīd rejects the idea of relationship within the divine community and emphasizes
the idea of oneness—Allah is Wāhid, Aḥd, and Samad. He is not a community of external
persons who need no creation to communicate with, but he is contingently reliant on his creation
to be relational.
Despite all the attempts to protect God’s transcendentalism and perfectionism, being
morally contingent does not make the Islamic divine being necessarily perfect. Allah is either
essentially morally perfect or essentially morally defective. For the greatness of Allah to occur,
his goodness and perfection should match. Just as we do not take God’s omnipotence to be
threatened by God not being able to make water H2O, we need not take God’s greatness to be
threatened by the fact that he cannot exhibit the attribute of relationality necessarily. The concept
of God existing eternally independent of the world must here be judged as being strictly
incoherent. By logical necessity, the concept of Allah’s self-sufficient sociality must be rejected.
The Trinitarian God and Relationality
As it is commonly known, Christians believe in the Trinity. The Trinity to them is not
just a doctrine or a concept. It is more than that. It is God himself. God is completely unique, and
he is totally unlike anything else. So, to define the Trinity is to define God. Is it possible to
define the undefinable? Human language fails theologians in two ways: first, it is based upon
time. While God is not limited to time, human beings speak of the past, the present, and the
future. Thus, when they speak about God, they are forced to place misleading limitations upon
his being. Second, words often carry with them “baggage,” which is to say that specific words
might conjure up a particular mental image. 458 The most obvious example is using the word
person when we are describing the deity—the persons of the Trinity. Like Muslims, Christian
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theologians are aware that human beings (as persons) are unlike God. To avoid any confusion,
Arab and Syriac theologians invented a special theological term and called it Aqānīm (sg.
Uqnūm) to refer to the persons of the Trinity. The three Arab Christian scholars that were
discussed in the previous chapter followed this pattern, and this study will follow the same
pattern. This is to say that Arab Christians who were conversing with their Muslim peers knew
about the problem of anthropomorphism and its Islamic rejection. They saw a necessity in
inventing a theological terminology that helps clarify the meaning of the divine persons while
honoring the distinction.
It has been argued in the previous chapter that most Chalcedonian Christians follow the
definition of the apostles’ creed of the Trinity. God is one divine being manifested in three
Aqānīm. Like Muslims theologians, Arab Christian theologians explained the doctrine of God by
discussing his attributes. However, they did not classify the attributes into two categories (the
attributes of essence and the attributes of actions); instead, they emphasized that the knowledge
of God is possible through studying God’s actions and through observing human’s virtues while
keeping the distinction between the divine and human virtues clear.
Most theologians did not include the relationality of God in their discussions. This
attribute has a close relation to the omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and the immutability of God.
If God is not eternally relational, then he is a minor God who is an abstract concept, and not a
being that deserves worship. If God is not relational in essence, then he is not maximally good
because relationality is superior to non-relationality, and lacking relationality indicates lacking
ability, which makes God non-omnipotent. Finally, if God was not relational, but he became
relational after he created human beings, then his nature is changing. He was not perfect at one
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point in history because he was not able to practice all his virtues, but at another point in history,
he became able to. This change in God’s nature indicates inferiority.
The next sections discuss in further detail how the relationality of God is important to
show the perfection of his nature. In Christianity, God is eternally relational because the three
persons of the Trinity are eternal in nature. The trinitarian model is the only way to show God as
intra-relational within himself and inter-relational with his creation, without compromising his
omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and immutability—all of which reflects his perfection. For to
construe God’s sociality as being world-dependent rather than self-sufficient presents weakness
in the divine essence.
The Trinitarian God is Intra-Relational
Christian theologians emphasize God in his revelation. God’s own eternal being and the
salvific actions of the three divine Aqanīm in history reflect the intra-trinitarian relations in the
eternal Godhead. For all the attributes of the Father are beheld in the Son, and all the attributes of
the Son belong to the Father, insomuch as the Son abides wholly in the Father and in turn has the
Father wholly in Himself. Thus, the Uqnūm (Person or hypostasis) of the Son becomes, as it
were, the form and countenance by which the Father is made known, and the Uqnūm of the
Father is made known in the form of the Son. 459 Basil of Caesarea points out that the Son
beholds the attributes of the Father, and the Son’s attributes belong to the Father, “in so much as
the Son abides wholly in the Father and in turn has the Father wholly in Himself.” 460 The Father
and the Son inter-dwell with one another in an intimate relationship in which each fully knows
and beholds the other.
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John of Damascus was one of the prominent theologians who spoke about the intrarelationality of God. He developed what was later called the doctrine of perichoresis—the mutual
indwelling of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit within the blessed Trinity. 461 This
doctrine grasps the circulatory character of the triune God in which “the Persons exist in one
another.” Perichoresis is seen in the mutual cleaving of the Aqanīm, in which
the abiding and resting of the Persons in one another is not in such a manner that they
coalesce or become confused, but, rather, so that they adhere to one another, for they are
without interval between them and inseparable and their mutual indwelling is without
confusion. For the Son is in the Father and the Spirit, and the Spirit is in the Father and
the Son, and the Father is in the Son and the Spirit, and there is no merging or blending or
confusion. 462
Each Uqnūm of the Trinity is vitally existing in the other two without losing his own identity.
Miroslav Volf calls such a construct reciprocal interiority. 463 We find this type of thinking
predominantly in the Johannine writings in the New Testament. John sees the Father in the Son
and the Son in the Father (John 14:11). Divine unity is an act of interiority; is an expression of
divine intra-relationality.
The doctrine of perichoresis provides a proper ground for claiming that God is not
contingently relational, but that God is eternally relational because he is relational within
himself. God is fundamentally a community of divine Aqānīm who displays love and functions
in harmony within himself. Since God is triune in nature, perichoresis promotes the idea that
God is never “alone.” According to Bruce Ware, God “never experiences, whether with or
without the world he has made, a sense of individual isolation and ‘loneliness.’ He never has
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been lonely or alone, in this sense, nor could he ever be, even in principle. The one God is three!
He is by very nature both a unity of Being while also existing eternally as a society of
Persons.” 464 God is a relational being. He is social within himself and in relationship with his
creation. Ware adds,
In this tri-Personal relationship the three Persons love one another, support one another,
assist one another, team with one another, honor one another, communicate with one
another, and in everything respect and enjoy one another. They are in need of nothing but
each other throughout all eternity. Such is the richness and the fullness and the
completion of the social relationship that exists in the Trinity. 465
Perichoresis reveals that God is not a distant, alone, or lonely deity who foregoes intimate
interaction with persons; rather, God is intrinsically personal and therefore reaches out in love
and offers humans what they most desperately need—a personal relationship with him.
Against the Islamic understanding (especially al-Warrāq’s claim), the Trinity is not a
contradiction but a paradox. According to Bloomsbury Guide to Human Thought, a paradox is a
Greek word, which means, “Against expectation, in mathematics, is a pair of mutually
contradictory statements, or apparently contradictory statements, which are both deductions from
statements which are accepted as true.” 466 The Trinity is an apparent contradiction to those who
do not understand the progression of divine revelation. Christians believe that the Trinity is not a
contradiction because if it is, then God is one and not one in the same time, sense, and
relationship. However, the Trinity is one divine being in one sense and three Aqanīm in another
sense. In God, we find the eternal and singular being existing and expressing himself in the three
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Aqanīm of the Father, (who is not the Son or the Spirit), the Son (who is not the Father or the
Spirit), and the Spirit (who is not the Father or the Son). The three members of the Godhead
work together in harmony and complementary roles. They are not three and one in the same
sense—otherwise the Trinity would be a logical contradiction (A and not A at the same sense).
Many Christian scholars like to offer illustrations from life and creation to explain the
Trinity, as Abū Qurrah and ibn cAdī did in the previous chapter. I personally do not like to use
this method because as stated earlier, the Trinity is not a mere concept: it is the being of God,
and nothing in creation can be similar or equivalent to God. However, Ware’s musical
illustration might be useful to explain the concept of perichoresis, which is a philosophical
concept about the relationship between the three Aqanīm, and does not define the divine being. 467
The perichoretic relationship between the Aqanīm might be illustrated as a musical band. There
are different voices singing in different pitches. One carries the melody and others carry the
strains of harmony to fill out and complement the melody. The one who carry the melody is
important, but not alone, for all voices are important to achieve harmony. In order for this to
happen, each part must be an expression of the same score and the same composition, expressing
the mind of the composer. 468 The concept of perichoresis is similar: “God’s unified nature
expressed richly and beautifully in the three equal and full possessions and manifestations of that
one nature, with each ‘voice’ contributing variously, yet with complete unity and identity of
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nature or essence.” 469 As stated earlier, the three divine Aqanīm are not identical divine Persons,
but they are harmonious and complementarian in their roles of accomplishing God’s one
purpose, goal, and salvific work, since they each possess fully the one, undivided divine essence.
The Trinitarian God Is Inter-Relational
In Christianity, God is not only intra-relational but also inter-relational. The relational
structure of the concept of divine relationality also includes God’s relations with the world.
Being relational means living in relationship with others and recognizing the interconnectedness
with them. In a human sense, relationship with others means being engaged, centered, grounded,
clear, generous, humble, and kind. A positive relationship to another person is always valued and
hoped for. In Christianity, the triune God desires to have a personal encountering relationship
with his people and enter into a relationship with his creation. He is even willing to do more than
that: he is willing to enter his creation to facilitate that relationship.
From beginning to end, and in virtually every chapter in between, the relational presence
of God unifies and advances the biblical story. The Bible begins with God’s presence relating to
his people in Genesis and ends with God’s presence relating to his people in Revelation. In the
Old Testament, God enters into a covenantal relationship with Abraham and promises to bless
him and his descendants. God’s powerful presence appears to Moses in the burning bush and on
Mount Sinai and is seen in the tabernacle and later in the temple. God’s deliverance of his people
from Egypt, protection through their journey in the wilderness, and direction into the promised
land all point to God’s presence and his desired relationship with his people. Throughout much
of the Old Testament, God’s covenantal relationship with Israel is revealed by an often repeated,
three-part statement: “I will be your God” (Ex 6:7; Jer 11:4), “you will be my people” (Jer 7:23),
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and “I will dwell in your midst” (Eze 43:7, 9 Zech 2:11). This indicates that the concept of God
dwelling among his people is foundational to his covenant with Israel; yet as a result of their
continuous sin and disobedience, Israel was expelled from God’s presence and sent into exile.
The restoration of God’s presence promised throughout the Old Testament (Zech 2:1013) is fulfilled in the New Testament when Jesus, Immanuel (God with us), appears. As Duvall
and Hays state, “The incarnation brings to a climax the relational presence of God, the theme that
drove the entire OT story.” 470 The Apostle John presents Christ as the Logos in two senses. The
first refers to ordinary speech among people: “my word” (John 8:37) and “the word of the
woman” (John 4:39). The second refers to a theological title of a historical person: the Word
(John 1:1-2, 14), the Word of life (1 John 1:1), and the Word of God (Rev 19:13). John
introduces the Word as being always in a relationship with the Father, who came to the world
(through incarnation) to disclose God and his nature to us. He came to reveal that the
transcendent God, who is above humanity, draws near to be in relationship with human beings.
The doctrine of the incarnation reveals that the Son became a human person at a specific point in
time, being born as a baby and living life on earth as the God-man. Jesus, as “the radiance of the
glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature,” further reveals the deeply personal nature of
the Triune God (Heb 1:3).
As Shehadeh declares, God, upon his presence in the incarnation, “did not stop at giving
humanity revelations to understand with their minds; he himself came to guide each individual
personally. He did not stop at giving humanity laws to try to obey in their own efforts; he himself
came to grant power to each individual personally.” 471 While revelation stresses Jesus’ exalted
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and glorified status, it also affirms his incarnation as a significant aspect of God’s relational
presence.
God’s relationality culminates in the crucifixion and the resurrection of Jesus. While God
longs for a relationship with humanity, their sins prevent that relationship. God is holy, and
human beings are sinful. The only solution was for God to take upon himself the initiative to
draw humanity closer through the death and the resurrection of Jesus. The end goal is to establish
God’s kingdom, where he will dwell among his people forever.
The relational story of God and humanity does not end with Jesus’ death or resurrection;
the last revelation of God does not end with Jesus nor with an eschatological hope for the future.
In the book of Acts, after Jesus’ ascension, the Holy Spirit comes to dwell within each believer.
Just as the holy presence of God in the Old Testament dwelt in the temple, the promised Spirit
comes on the day of Pentecost in fulfillment of God’s promise to live within and among God’s
people (e.g., Acts 2 fulfilling the promise of Joel 2:28). Jesus refers to the Spirit as another (of
the same kind) “helper” (John 14:16), who testifies about Jesus, reminds the disciples of his
teachings, guides them into all truth, and discloses what is to come (John 14:26; 15:26; 16:13).
One of the primary roles of the Holy Spirit is to assure believers of God’s presence in their lives
(1 John 3:24). 472 God’s relational presence drives the story line from beginning to end,
consistently unifying the biblical metanarrative and moving the divine plot toward the ultimate
goal of God living with his people in the new creation.
Conclusion
The Qur’an Reveals Allah as Contingently Relational
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Because of the doctrine of tawḥīd, the extent to which Allah is a relational deity is
debatable. Islamic scholars view Allah as the “One and Indivisible” (Surah 112:1) agent who
created this world; therefore, he is highly transcendent above it. Islamic scholar Seyyed Hossein
Nasr affirms that “the Quran continuously emphasizes the Unity and the Oneness of God, and it
can be said that the very raison d’être of Islam is to assert in a final and categorical manner the
Oneness of God and the nothingness of all before the Majesty of that One.” 473 This view,
consequently, makes Allah alone before the creation of the universe. At that time, there was no
one to see, hear, or speak to—especially before the creation of human beings. Arguably, without
the concept of the Trinity, one cannot hold an eternally relational conception of God because
many attributes of personality are expressed within the context of a relationship—in addition to
things like seeing, hearing, and speaking there are things like love, communication, empathy, and
self-giving. The functionality of such attributes before the world came into being is open to
challenge, making it impossible to see Allah intrinsically and eternally relational. If Allah is truly
the seer, the hearer, and the communicator, one must presume that these attributes were
dysfunctional until Allah created the world. In that case, Allah would be dependent on creation,
which appears to be at odds with what Surah 112:2 says: “Allah—the Sustainer needed by all.”
A dependent deity would be merely a minor deity because he needs his creation to be able to
speak, see, and hear.
The Bible Reveals God as Eternally Relational
The Christian view of the divine (one God who exists in three Aqanīm) seems to present
God as eternally relational and independent of his creation. The three Aqanīm within the
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Godhead, (distinct, yet not separate) who exist in a relationship with one another, present the
personal and loving nature of God. Their interpenetrating relationship, which occurs within the
Godhead, exists at the center of the universe. Because of this special relationship within the
Godhead (via the three divine Aqanīm), God does not need the creation to see, hear,
communicate, or be compassionate. All his acts/attributes were functional before the creation of
the world within the Godhead. All of God’s actions in history are expressions of this intimate,
personal relationship that exists at the very heart of ultimate reality.
Understanding the reciprocal and mutually dependent relationship between the three
Aqanīm demonstrates the nature of God’s relationship with the world, which is the key to
knowing God as well. The way God relates to himself and to creation helps human beings realize
that the world arose not as a self-unfolding divine subject, but through the will of God, who as a
free being, brought forth a world out of an overflow of love. The world is the product of the
mutual activity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, not just a product of his power. God is
relational—with the world or without it. He does not need the world to be social. He has
accomplished his relationality within himself through the Aqanīm. Thus, God is not dependent
on other agents to activate his attributes as the seer, the hearer, and the communicator.
The assumption is that Christians and Muslims agree when it comes to the perfect being
theology because God already has specified his perfection in the Bible and the Qur’an. No
improvement in respect to power, morals, duration, presence, or anything of the kind is possible
for him. If whatever is divine is perfect, then it would be better to be necessarily perfect than to
be contingently perfect. Therefore, being necessary relational is better than being contingently
relational.
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Being perfect does not allow an attribute that is incompatible with perfection. If being
relational in all respects is a perfection, then it is better to have it necessarily than contingently. If
whatever is divine is perfect, then it is necessary that whatever is securely and permanently
divine is securely and permanently perfect. 474 “If it is possible to be securely and permanently
divine, it is possible to be securely and permanently perfect.” 475 Therefore, an omniscient,
omnipotent, perfectly relational being can maintain his relationality, and so his perfection, if he
chooses. In the same manner, an omnipotent God is able to assure things, break down, or
paralyze his choice (e.g., seeing, hearing, and having a relationship). So, his relationality renders
his choice permanent. 476 The maximum of security and permanence in perfection would be
having relationality of God necessarily. If an eternally relational divine being is better than a
contingently divine being and his relationality is compatible with the rest of his attributes, then
perfect-being theology lies within the court of Christianity, and the doctrine of the Trinity is the
only model that shows God eternally relational, not the doctrine of tawhīd.
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Final Conclusion and Prospective Areas of Study
Christian-Muslim relations in the eighth, nineth, and tenth centuries resulted in the rise of
Islamic theology (kalām). The House of Wisdom established by Harūn al-Rashīd, the translation
work that was carried over by the Syriac scholars, and the debates between Muslims and
Christians in the presence of the caliphs paved the way for the development of Islamic theology.
Christians (Chalcedonians, Jacobites, and the Church of the East) were already known to being
multilingual, profoundly rooted in Greek philosophy, and spent centuries developing their
theology against various heresies—especially in relation to the Trinity and Christology. During
this time, many learned, wrote, and preached in the Arabic language because Muslims were not
willing to learn the local languages, but they spread Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, in
schools and public systems. As a result, the first part of the Abbasid century saw an
unprecedented rise in Arabic Christian apologetic writings directed against Islam.
Various Islamic schools of thought started emerging during this time of history, forming
many standard belief systems (e.g. Qadarites, Jabrites, Ashcarites, Muctazilites, Murjicites,
Kharijites, and Shicites). Muctazilites enjoyed a golden period of theological and political
dominance during al-Ma’mūn’s reign, which left implications on the nature of the ChristianMusim debates during this period. The discussion about Allah’s speech, the nature of the Qur’an,
and Allah’s attributes started in this period and carried on until the Ashcarites became the
majority view in the eleventh century, in addition to many Christian apologies that were devised
to defend Christian beliefs against Islamic objections.
During this time, the doctrine of the Trinity was widely accepted in most Christian
communities. By the end of the fourth century, the expression “one ousia and three hypostases”
was settled within the Christian tradition. However, the historical discussion of the doctrine of
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the Trinity is completely ignored in the Qur’an. The Qur’anic understating of the Trinity includes
Mary as a divine person within the Godhead. This perspective was never part of orthodox
Christianity throughout its history; however, it seems that Mohammad perhaps inferred the
divinity of Mary from another source. Many studies written on this topic suggest that
Mohammad learned about the non-conventional Trinity (God the Father, God the Mother, and
God the Son) from cultic Christians or non-orthodox communities who lived in the Arabic
Peninsula during the seventh century. This research shows that while the previous studies are
possible, there is no sufficient Islamic historical information which suggests that Mohammad
was in contact with such communities. The Christian information about cultic Christianity in
Arabia is scarce, and the historical Islamic records suggest that Mohammad was in contact with
Christians who had decorated churches. During that time of history, the iconoclasts were rejected
by the Western church, but they were flourishing in the East. The Theotokos icon and many other
icons were widely spreading and decorating the Eastern churches. Mohammad probably
developed a non-orthodox understanding of the Trinity by observing Christian icons, especially
the Theotokos icons.
The first objection this study addresses is classified as non-historical because the Qur’an
ignores the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity, especially the Nicene Creed.
While Mohammad was in contact with Christians in the Levant, Arabia (Makkah and Medina),
and Africa (through his wives), he heard and most likely saw the Christians icons—the most
famous of which is the Theotokos icon. His contact with this icon probably happened in the
Levant when he was a young man, in Makkah inside al-Kacaba, or from his wife who went to
Ethiopia at the beginning of his calling and came back reporting about a magnificent icon of
Mary she has seen in Africa. Since there is no historical evidence—from Islamic or Christian
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resources—which suggest that Mohammad learned about the divinity of Mary from orthodox or
cultic Christians, it is reasonable to think that his understanding of Mary and her divine role was
acquired by inference rather than by cultic teachings. In other words, knowing that Christians
believe in the Trinity and seeing them venerating the icons—especially the Theotokos icon—
might have played a major role in Mohammad’s misunderstanding of the Trinity, which he then
conveyed in the Qur’an.
The second group of objections are semantic in nature and related to the three Aqanīm.
The titles “Father” and “Son” are understood in both literal and anthropomorphic senses. The
Father had a wife who bore him a son, and they called him Issa. The Father, Son, and Spirit are
three deities that resemble the polytheistic nature of the Christian worldview. Theodore Abū
Qurrah, who was attentive to this objection, argues that every perfection apparent in creation
must also be a prediction of the creator. He based his argument on Surah 3:59: “Surely the
likeness of Isa is with Allah as the likeness of Adam.” If Adam did not beget a son, then he
would be the head and the representative of animals, such as pigs, asses, and worms, who have a
paltry nature compared to humans. In this way, Adam would be just a representative of what is
below him in nature. Begetting a son makes Adam the head and the representative of all
humanity. In the same sense, those who say God does not beget attribute deprivation to his
divinity by making him ruler over what is less than him and unable to rule over what resembles
him.
In relation to this objection, Abū Qurrah distinguishes between logical and non-logical
names. He explains that logical names indicate persons, such as Peter, Paul, and John, and nonlogical names indicate natures, such as man. While logical names can be many, non-logical
names are collective in nature and singular in form. The number three does not apply to the
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names because it indicates human nature. While it is correct to say Peter, Paul, and John are three
men, it is not correct to say Peter is mankind. In the same sense, God is a name which indicates
divine nature; whereas Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are names that indicate three divine Aqanīm.
The essence of God cannot be plural, and the titles Father, Son, and Holy Spirit attribute plurality
to the Godhead, not to his essence.
The third group of objections is called the non-rational objections, which is agreed upon
by most ancient, medieval, and contemporary Muslim scholars who accuse Christians of being
non-logical in their explanation of the Trinity. The idea of believing in three persons and calling
them one God is illogical to the Muslim mind. Yaḥya Ibn Adī takes the rational route and
provides answers that might be applied to the semantic and the non-logical objections. Using
philosophy, he discusses the concept of al-wāḥid. Muslims call Allah al-wāḥid to convey that he
is one (divine being) in a numerical sense. Yaḥya, who was attentive to his objection, was the
first Arab Christian philosopher to argue that the creator is one in one sense and multiple in
another sense. Being one is one aspect of the meaning, not the full meaning because wāḥid can
be understood in many different senses. God is one as a divine person, but he cannot be one in
genus, specie, relation, or continuum because all these types of essences require either the
existence of others or a causal connection to exist. However, God is the uncaused cause of
everything. While he causes other things to exist, he cannot be caused by anything/anyone else.
Moreover, it is semantically and philosophically wrong to understand wāḥid in one sense, which
is the numerical, because wāḥid does not refer only to quantity but also to quality, such as
qualitative names referring to color and taste. Restricting the meaning of wāḥid to the numerical
sense is a mistake because the word has several meanings and can be understood in different
senses. Some of them can be applied to God, while others cannot.
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While Muslims follow the doctrine of bila kayfa in regards to Allah’s attributes, they
refuse to compare Allah to any of his creation. They believe that Allah is extremely transcendent
and that it is demeaning to the divine nature to be compared with human nature, for there are no
similarities that can be discovered. John of Damascus, Abū Qurrah, and Yaḥya, on the other
hand, base the doctrine of God’s attributes on the concept that every perfection apparent in
creation must also be precedence in the creator. Realizing that the attributes of perfection in God
are unrestricted and eternal in contrast to those in man, Yaḥya explains that it is wrong to say
that nothing is similar to God because similarity does not require 100% matching identification.
There are no two similar persons/things that are identical in all their attributes. If two
persons/things are similar, it is necessary that they do not match. They are similar in one aspect,
but they are different in many. They are not identical, and not all their attributes align. Yaḥya’s
explanation answers the problem of anthropomorphism and logically explains that Christians are
not wrong when they look at the virtues of human beings to extract the attributes of God.
The danger of separating God’s actions from his nature is that it impairs a person’s
knowledge of what is real and objective about God as he is in himself. Separating the attributes
of action from the attributes of essence deprives the essence of its content and meaning, for God
is not a mere substance essentially separated from his attributes. Such a notion would reduce the
divine essence to a barren concept, a hypothesis devoid of content and meaning. “God’s being is
not the bearer of the divine attributes; rather, God’s essence and attributes are identical.” 477 Thus,
preventing reflection on the essence of God amounts to preventing God from revealing wonders
about himself, and this robs humankind of understanding God’s relationship with his creation
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and his purposes for it. This is a narrow but revealing point that can be identified at the end of
the eighth and early ninth centuries as Muslims came to a greater awareness of Christian
thoughts about the divine attributes, the sifāt Allah. This encounter helped bring Islam to a
greater theological and philosophical maturity, while Christians confronted the challenge of
translating traditional doctrines into a new idiom.
Building on the early Christian Arab apologies on the Trinity, the topic of the
relationality of God emerges as the most important aspect of this study. Relationality of God is
an essential divine attribute that was not given much attention in Islamic and Christian Arab
theologies. The trinitarian model of divinity demonstrates that God is eternally relational because
he is intra-relational and inter-relational. He is intra-relational within himself in the Godhead, as
the three Aqanīm live in eternal harmonious relationship of love, honor, and respect. God is
fundamentally a community of divine Aqānīm, who never experienced loneliness and isolation,
whether with or without the world. God is in need of nothing to practice his relationality. He is
not dependent on his creation to be able to see, hear, communicate, and love. He is the seer, the
hearer, the communicator from eternity to eternity. Such is the richness and the fullness and the
completion of the social relationship that exists in the Trinity.
Although Muslims believe that Allah interacted and communicated with humanity, the
nature of the inter-relationality of God with creation is shown differently within Islam and
Christianity. In Christianity, the triune God moves closer to human beings throughout history,
further revealing the personal nature of the Godhead. In the Old Testament, God pursues human
beings in the Garden. When the Fall occurs, he offers help and guidance on how to live a holy
life. In the New Testament, the second Person of the Trinity, Jesus, takes on human flesh in order
to dwell among human beings, ultimately repairing their personal relationship with God (Phil
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2:6-11). Additionally, the third Person of the Trinity—the Holy Spirit—following Jesus’s
ascension to heaven, is sent to dwell and live within believers. God pursues his creation through
the incarnation of the Son and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.
The divine Islamic concept of relationality, on the other hand, is not eternal. Because
of absolute oneness, Allah is contingent in his relationship with creation. When there is no
concept of plurality in the Godhead, his relational attributes seem to be dysfunctional, and
therefore, God’s essence is dependent on his creation. In Islamic theology, Allah is attributed as
the seer (the one who sees everything) and the hearer (the one who hears everything); however,
based on the absolute oneness model, he was not able to see or hear anything because there was
nothing to see or hear. This presentation of the divine makes some aspects of the deity contingent
on creation.
The Islamic view differs from the Christian view in two aspects: 1) the creation of human
beings is not Allah’s priority. 2) The most important goal from creating the world is to show
Allah’s power and magnificence. The Islamic understanding of creation implies that the created
world has more value than human beings. Mohammad states, “Certainly the creation of the
heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of the men, but most people do not know”
(Surah 40:57). Man is not the greatest creative act of Allah, and the universe is far more complex
and magnificent than man. The ultimate purpose, however, for creating human beings is to
worship Allah (Surah 51:56). In other words, Allah created human beings to show his glory and
majesty, not to start a relationship with them. Ibn Kathīr explains in his commentary that
“worship Allah” means “I [Allah] created them to command them to worship me, not because I
need them.” 478 Despite the fact that God’s relationality does not necessarily mean that he needs
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his creation, in the Islamic view, creation is the natural consequence of the creator who cares
about showing his power and dominion more than expressing his love toward his creatures. The
concept of the ultimate power of the divine is the most important aspect in Islamic belief;
however, it ignores the relationality of the divine.
If Allah is the greatest, how can human being know, acknowledge, and worship his
greatness without having a relationship with him? Relationality is what teaches humanity about
the divine. It implies that the value the world has for God is in expressing, not in constituting.
Moreover, the eternal relationality of God increases the value of the world before God—
precisely because God does not need it to be God. The world, therefore, takes on the beauty of
grace and free love that is greater than the necessity of power and domination. God saves
because he loves and has mercy, not only because he is free. His love is based on a decision he
made long before the world was created.
Worshiping the divine for his absolute power and magnificence without having a
relationship with him makes human beings slaves. Their relationship with the divine is to
acknowledge his grandeur and majesty without being able to closely open up to him. He is like a
master receiving honor rather than a father who cares about the wellbeing of his sons and
daughters. While the slave-master relationship is based on command and obedience, the fatherson relationship is about respect, nourishment, and protection. Slaves seek to please their masters
because they fear punishment; whereas, sons and daughters seek to please and honor their father
because they love him and he loves them. Love, respect, and sustenance are the foundational
elements of this relationship, not fear and trembling.
Unfortunately, when twenty-first century Christians think about the word God, they do
not think about the Trinity. Like in the Islamic view, people think of God as the most powerful,
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eternal spiritual being who is the creator of the universe. In most people’s understanding, God is
also a moral judge who will ultimately decide who gets to spend eternity in heaven or in hell.
The hope of this study is to encourage Christians to think of God as the Trinity first before
contemplating his majesty, expectation, and commands. The eternal existence of God as Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit was the central affirmation of the ancient church and the fundamental truth
from which all other theological understanding flowed, and I hope this notion continues and not
fade into obscurity.
Finally, it is significant for the purposes of Christian-Islamic discussion that the parties
involved in such debates and apologetical writings understand themselves to be seeking a
common end—a clearer expression of true statements about God and all of creation. The purpose
of this study is directed toward this goal. It is not the writer’s intention to offend the Islamic
presentation of the divine but to push it toward into a more reformed view that honors God. A
successful participation in such dialogue means not simply that one has convinced one’s
opponent, but hopefully that the discussion is furthered toward a better end.
Final Thoughts and Future Studies
The status of Christianity in Arabia is a very tempting topic, which deserves more
attention and research. Few scholars have attempted to write on this topic because of political
reasons. For more than fifty years, Saudi Arabia was a closed country ruled by Sharica law.
However, recent changes have introduced more liberties in the kingdom that might usher in
educational opportunities that need to be taken advantage of. Excavation was banned in Saudi
Arabia; therefore, most of the historical arguments about cultic Christianity were either
arguments from silence or based on the limited testimonies of early church fathers. Mohammad’s
connection with these cults cannot be historically confirmed, such as the case with the
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Collyridians/Marian cults. Hopefully, such research will be allowed soon in the Arabic
peninsula, which might reveal more information regarding Christianity in that community, the
Syriac community in the Arabian gulf, and the Christians community in Najran.
The project of commending Christian doctrine in an Islamic environment is an area that
should be further explored for three distinct reasons. First, learning the source of Mohammad’s
understanding of the Trinity would help with further discoveries about other topics, such as
Jesus’ nature and his miracles in the Qur’an. Further findings about Christian doctrine in an
Islamic environment will help apologists immensely today. Second, learning about the history of
Christianity in the Arabic Peninsula would help with the study of historical Mohammad. Many
European scholars are advocating for the non-historical view of the Islamic prophet, pushing the
origination of Islam to the Levant under the Umayad dynasty. Excavation works in the Arabic
peninsula will help reveal whether their arguments are factual or false. Third, excavations in
general have an unpredictable nature about what scholars might find. Sometimes excavations
affirm their predictions, and sometimes they surprise them completely with new discoveries.
Scholars might be able to find additional biblical manuscripts, apocryphal literature, and hymnals
that early Arab Christians used to use in their masses and prayer times.
There are several Arab Christian theologians and philosophers that are not known in the
West. This study sheds some light on Theodore Abū Qurrah’s theology and Yaḥya Ibn cAdī’s
philosophy, especially related to their defense of the Trinity. Grasping their works and presenting
their ideas to the public arena of western thought is one of the unfinished projects of this study.
Abū Qurrah left a great inventory of literature in Greek and Arabic languages that has not yet
been translated into English. There are potential studies to be written about Abū Qurrah’s
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theological and apologetical methodology, his defense against the iconoclasm, and his theory of
human free will, among other things.
Like Abū Qurrah, Yaḥya’s Christian philosophical works are not translated into English
and deserve considerable attention. In fact, what makes his apologetics unique is his Aristotelian
philosophical background. He was one of those who translated the works of Aristotle into
Arabic. He also was a student of the famous Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī. His discussion of alwaḥid is unique because he took most of his ideas from his Muslim professor and applied it to
his understanding of the divine. The most important book he left is about morality, called
Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq [Refining Ethics]. According to Nadīne cAbbās, it is one of the most
important books about the philosophy of ethics in the Arabic world. 479 Translating this book into
English will contribute profoundly to the fields of ethics and theology.
Among the points most relevant and most worthy of further consideration is the doctrine
of creation in Islam in relation to the doctrine of tawḥīd. The multiple views of the doctrine of
creation and the schism between traditionalists and philosophers would lead to multiple
understandings of tawḥīd and potentially to a misunderstanding of the doctrine of Allah.
Traditionalists deny the philosophers’ suggestions regarding the creation of the world. As briefly
presented in this study, some medieval philosophers believed in the eternality of time, and others
believed in creation by emanation. Their beliefs threaten the doctrine of tawḥīd because they
assume an eternal nature of the universe is necessary. However, creating another eternal reality
alongside Allah is inconsistent with the nature of absolute oneness because it makes Muslims
binitarian monotheists, not unitarians as they claim.
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ibn Adī],” Tafahum Magazine, 2015, 137. Retrieved from: https://tafahom.mara.gov.om/storage/altafahom/ar/2015/048/pdf/07.pdf.
479

c

185

The same problem might be applied to the Qur’an, when scholars assume its eternal
nature. The eternal nature of the Qur’an makes Muslims binitarian as well, requiring them to
clarify how the Qur’an relates to Allah’s absolute oneness. The Qur’an’s purpose is to deliver a
divine message that has a dialogic character. If this is true, how can the Qur’an (the eternal)
communicate with human beings (the non-eternal)—especially since the Qur’an is written for
people, not for angels? To speak of the Qur’an as a distinct eternal reality to Allah is similar to
speaking of the Logos as a distinct eternal reality to the Father. Muslims reject such belief and
consider it a shirk (association). Therefore, further illumination is required as to the double
standard of allowing the Qur’an and the creation to have distinct eternal realities from Allah, but
not granting this liberty to the Logos. Why otherness is allowed to be predicated in Allah by
Muslims and not considered shirk, whereas Christians are not allowed such concept in their
theology.
Moving from Islam’s foundational era to more modern theological developments, the
topic of the relationality of God has an apologetical potential against process theology. To
classify the relationality of God as an attribute of essence is to make God a personal being.
Process theologians, such as Paul Tillich, advocate for the concept of “God as Being.” In
Tillich’s view, God is not a Being, because that would describe God as one “being” among other
beings. Rather, “God is being itself”—or “the ground of being.” 480 If God as the ground of being
infinitely transcends everything, then whatever one knows about a finite thing one knows about
God, because it is rooted in him as its ground. At the same time, anything one knows about a
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finite thing cannot be applied to God, because he is, as Tillich says, “ecstatically experienced and
symbolically expressed.” 481
Another topic Tillich talks about is the distinction between a “sign” and a “symbol.”
“Signs” (like letters and written words) have no essential connection to what they represent but
are merely used to point to their referent. “Symbols,” on the other hand, have a stronger
similarity or “participation” with the thing to which they refer. Religious symbols negate
themselves in their literal meanings but still have something to say about God, including his
qualities, actions, and manifestations. They have a symbolic character, but the meaning of “God”
is completely missed if one takes the symbolic language literally. God’s “fatherhood” for
instance is a symbol because of the fatherly qualities that God and other fathers share. The letters
G-O-D share nothing essential with God and are therefore only a “sign” for God. Process
theology turns God from a personal being into an idea; therefore, by focusing on the relational
aspect of God, conservative theologians have an argument to turn God into a Being in a personal
way, not just as a symbol. While someone might suggest that all “Godtalk” is symbolic and does
not exhaust the mystery of God’s being, the analogy of personal encounter and the use of person
as a theological model have distinct advantages over impersonal approaches to the problem.
To Christians, the centrality of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be denied. To them, the
Trinity is not a problem to be solved but rather a beauty to be discover, a mystery to be clarified,
and a Being to have a relationship with. Their readiness to receive God’s revelation of himself,
like a beauty and a mystery, provides growing knowledge with no end. The Trinity is not a
contradiction or a barrier to belief; rather, it is the Being of God, whose discovery is an unending
worship.
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